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THE FUTURE OF OUR NAVY.

Our war with Spain was too brief to provide many examples to be followed, or many warnings to be heeded. There were plenty of incidents and accidents; but most of them were of the old, accustomed kind familiar to seafaring men. Those that were new, that bore upon the modern questions as yet unsettled,—of guns, armor, speed, and tactics,—were of too infrequent occurrence to supply that cumulative evidence which only long wars can provide, but which is so earnestly desired by the framers of a naval policy for the future of a maritime people. "Guard yourself against false deductions," was the constant cry of one of the friendly foreigners present with us during the Cuban campaign. "Beware of generalizing upon the slight data this war provides. Remember that the enemy was very feeble, and did not furnish you with reliable war evidence upon which to base future action in shipbuilding or in planning naval campaigns."

All this was true and pertinent. The instruments of modern naval war had not undergone the long strains needed to test thoroughly their endurance. There were not enough fights to guide surely the tactics of future fleets. If at San Juan in Porto Rico we found that the smoke of our guns delayed and confused our fire against the batteries, this was only what we knew would happen, and what our able Ordnance Bureau was striving day and night to remedy by providing us with smokeless powder. If against the Morro and Socapa batteries at Santiago we found our fire always effective to silence the enemy's guns, but practically ineffective to destroy beyond repair the Spanish earthworks, this, too,

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was only what we anticipated; for navies have always known that ships against forts are finally victorious only when marines or army troops are at hand to take immediate possession, under the guns of the fleet, of the silenced works before reoccupation can be effected by the dispossessed enemy. If, again, when matched against Cervera's squadron, we found ourselves fully prepared with torpedoes in five ships of the line, and Cervera's four ships and two destroyers likewise ready with them, but that, although conditions of sea and weather were favorable to torpedo work, no such work was done, or scarcely thought of, and that, further, the battle was practically decided by gun-fire before the fleets had even approached torpedo range, this fact—which it must be confessed is real evidence—has to be considered apart. The battle must be regarded as one of only a few isolated battles, whose joint evidence is certainly against torpedo efficiency in naval engagements, but is too slight in amount to have great weight against this now established arm of naval warfare, as it is believed by many to be. Had several fleet fights occurred in this war and in the Chino-Japanese War; had the Spaniard proved a more formidable antagonist; or had the Chinese held up their heads against the Japanese, this question and many others would have been removed from the region of doubt and darkness in which they are now hidden.

Some details have a better light thrown upon them. For instance, the armored belt at the water-line has met with a distinct reverse. Of course a hole there is very serious; but it seems, from our Santiago battle, that the chance of being struck at that place does not justify extravagant protection. It is, of course, always possible to be hit there. But our fleet fired several thousand projectiles at the Spanish fleet on July 3, most of them in the first hour of the action. All were well aimed, and many of them hit the ships; yet the examination after the battle indicated that no serious injury was sustained by them at the water-line, nor near enough to it to cause their armor belts to be of any essential service.

Although this was but one battle, the number of shots fired, the favorable conditions for gunnery practice existing on the morning of the engagement, and the absence of any water-line hits on Cervera's ships (so far as they could be examined), constitute weighty evidence bearing upon the distribution of armor, and force upon us the propriety of diminishing the thickness of plates at the water-line, of carrying this thickness higher up to protect the men at the upper-deck batteries, and of extending the metal to the bow and stern. The small number of hits with the heavy guns, and the efficiency of the smaller calibres, suggest to some the wisdom of substituting in future battleships six 11-inch, or

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eight 10-inch, guns for the four 13-inch at present in use. Another change hinted at by a few, but finding little advocacy as yet, is the reduction in the number of turrets, or their abolition, and the assembling of the principal guns of the ship in an armored compartment or citadel, thus reverting to a former stage in the development of modern men-of-war.

The question of liquid fuel for our future navy forces itself to the front as the solution of many difficulties and as the remedy of serious defects. The supply of seamen; the need of more marines to be at the call of the commanding admiral; the number and class of torpedo-boats; the proper *rôle* to assign to monitors,—these and many other details deeply concern the future of our navy.

However important these questions of equipment and proportion may be,—and they are, without doubt, of the utmost importance, naval efficiency being based upon perfection in the details of *personnel* and *matériel*,—we must now pass to the consideration of the larger questions of the fleet itself as determined by our national policy.

In a proper treatment of these matters we should consider, first, the future needs of the country; deduce from them the size and kind of fleet essential to meet these needs; determine therefrom the number and kind of vessels requisite as the units of this fleet; then decide how many of these shall be built per year, how they shall be manned, what dry docks, repair-ships, colliers, and supply-ships shall be provided and when they shall be ready, and, finally, how this force shall be distributed, and in what strategic centres we shall prepare fitting naval bases for its maintenance and preservation. This is the logical, but unusual, method,—the common-sense way which is so uncommon. We suspect similar methods applied to armies, in reading of the Roman Legion in its prime; we recognize them quite plainly in the fighting of the German army against France in 1870; but we fail to find other marked instances. Truly the logical method is the rare one.

Now that our future policy begins to shape itself, and the nation realizes its new responsibilities, we can consider with reasonable thoroughness the future requirements of the country, and determine with some approach to accuracy the amount and quality of the naval force that will fulfil those requirements. The country has slept long,—a healthy slumber,—but has grown meanwhile; and we do not recognize at once that the youth that slept has awakened a giant. This slight scratch of war in the Antilles and Manila has broken our long rest; and as we rouse and look about us we find our bulk unwieldy, our clothes

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but shrunken rags, and our voice grown strong and loud, disturbing our neighbors and surprising ourselves.

We look abroad, and find that we have fallen into the possession of vast and rich territories. We did not want them. We had argued against them for a century. Our national saints had warned us against them. It was a matter of conscience with a strongly conscientious people that we should limit our forcible seizure of lands to the Indians'; and that there should be no more of that, now that we had taken practically all there was to take. We never meant it to be so; and we fret more or less about it. We say we meant to grow great and strong and rich, while avoiding all the natural consequences of greatness, especially its responsibilities and pains. We at least intended to choose for ourselves the cares and troubles we contemplated undertaking. We invited greatness to come to us and remain with us; and now many of its inseparable associates have come with it. Therefore now that it is here as a permanency, and we recognize the fact; with Porto Rico absolutely ours; with Cuba ours to defend and maintain during the years she will be growing up to the age and strength to maintain herself,— now that all this has come to pass, and that from a semi-political, semi-commercial association of small though sturdy colonies, we have expanded into an empire, and are now the imperial republic of the world, our home-keeping youth must realize that homely wit is out of place, and that plans for the future must be made by minds willing to acknowledge that imperial resources may be needed to preserve these possessions that have fallen to us, to protect their feeble peoples, and to aid them in their efforts to secure a political happiness and freedom hitherto denied them.

How shall these resources be expanded, to maintain in years to come the power and dignity of the Republic in its new relations to the world? They must be distributed wisely and economically among the various departments of the government. Of these the writer may consider only the navy, together with commerce in so far as it requires a navy to foster or protect it. The future of our navy becomes, then, a matter of unusual interest to the country, now that national conditions, present and future, indicate its importance, its vital necessity, to the nation.

The situation may thus be briefly stated: In the Atlantic, the West Indies, and the Caribbean, the United States has interests that even during this generation will be paramount and pressing. Nature has so distributed the land and water south of us, has so placed the Gulf of Mexico and the outlet of the Mississippi, that the commercial

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and naval Power which shall occupy this continent, and rule the Mississippi Valley, must, in the nature of things, dominate those seas and islands, whether that dominance be friendly and commercial or warlike. The establishment of this control has been long delayed by our inherited traditions against expansion and by our eagerness to develop our own country and to grow rich within ourselves. The strength of these traditions has been enormous. They have stood firm against the disorders of neighboring states and against the wish of feeble races to ally themselves with us. They have remained unmoved before our commercial needs, the necessities of future strategy, and the encroachments of other nations. But all things must have an end; and when, nerved to the effort by the "Maine" horror, we stretched out a strong arm to punish, control and the responsibilities of control fell instantly upon us and are now ours.

We find ourselves now in a position to dominate that great barrier ridge of the Antilles, the strong first line of defence for a future isthmian canal. The results of successful war have placed us in the position that naturally belongs to us. This situation will work itself out harmoniously and with a minimum of effort on our part. Whatever accidents or mishaps occur, we shall, while remedying them, be floating toward our goal; for we work with the current nature has caused to flow.

The writer does not believe this condition to be so marked in the case of the Philippines. The connection between them and the United States must be for a considerable period in some degree artificial. They cost us little to gain, thanks to the gallantry of Dewey and his fleet; but it will demand at first much energy to hold them, such as one must put forth who swims against a contrary current. Therefore, when we consider the future of the navy as to its use in the Philippines, we shall find the force required to be greater in proportion to desired results than in the Antilles and the Caribbean Sea.

Let us return to the regions south of us. They will be controlled by the nation whose fleets are there supreme. The number of troops to garrison the strong places can be determined accurately: but the connection between them and our own soil will be by water; and upon the fleet depends finally the continuance of supremacy.

What has our fleet to do in the future? It has certain peace duties for its cruisers and gunboats; such as surveys and the occupation of bays and rivers needing the presence of the flag in order that trade may feel secure. In addition to these duties, commercial in their character, the navy during peace should select the roadsteads and harbors

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where great fleets may assemble in times of war or when hostilities are impending; where the battleships and their attendant vessels may lie secure and in some degree of comfort, well provided from day to day with coal, water, ammunition, and provisions, yet not pent up in some small-necked bottle of a bay, which may be corked at will by a "Merrimac" or a "Mercedes"; where powerful fleets may wait, but not waste all their energies in waiting; where they may rest and yet not impair that mobility which is strategic vitality. These works of preparation for war and of clearing the paths of sea trade are for times of peace; and among them must be included the estimating of war force needed, and the number of battleships our line of battle will require among the seas and islands south of us. Here we approach the concrete questions included in the title of this article.

Upon such estimates, carefully made, the ships to be built and the men to be enlisted must be based, and their disposition prearranged with reference to strategy, the natural strength of our position, the hostile forces, and the national policy. Returning later to consider some of these elements more closely, and premising that I speak now of the Atlantic and Caribbean and not of the Philippines, it may be said that the hostile force likely in the next generation to contest our supremacy in the West Indies and in the adjacent coasts and waters will be about twenty battleships with their usual following of cruisers, colliers, supply-ships, and repair-ships. This estimate is based upon the probability that for a generation to come the relations of this country with England will be those of friends, if not of allies. It is based, too, upon the probable fact that no one of the Continental Powers will be disposed to undertake single-handed a naval campaign against us in West Indian waters. The forecast may be wrong: but preparations for the future must be based upon something; and a carefully studied estimate is the only basis available. I select, therefore, some possible combinations of Continental navies, and deduce therefrom a force of twenty battleships as the probable maximum available in future years to contest with us our positions in the West Indies. It is not expedient to designate here the various points of attack possible for such a force in the regions under consideration, or the localities it might select as bases of operations for such attacks. Whatever its plans might be, the work must be undertaken at a great distance from home ports and from the base of supplies.

These difficulties of an enemy's fleet are valid reasons for reducing our own force which is to be matched against it. If based upon the

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dockyards of our own coast, fifteen ships of the line appear enough to contest with equal chances a hostile fleet of twenty ships in the region under consideration.

I deal with probabilities in making these estimates. They presuppose an equality in the bravery of the men and the skill of the admirals. It has been well said that in making plans for war we rule out stupidity, on the one hand, and the presence of a Napoleon or a Nelson, on the other. Such accidents of fortune do sometimes occur: but they are rare; and the estimates of those who prepare for future wars must be founded upon averages, not upon extremes and exceptions.

It is not difficult to imagine certain plans which might make twelve of our ships, instead of fifteen, successful against twenty of an enemy's, if the strength of our position in the West Indies be clearly recognized, and its weaknesses carefully guarded. Again, if, through lack of knowledge of war conditions existing there, we fail to understand the situation, and an enterprising adversary takes advantage of the weak features, we may easily need thirty ships of the line to make head against twenty of an enemy. So far as can now be seen, we should prepare fifteen first-class battleships, should maintain that number plus their attendant vessels, and keep them thoroughly equipped and incessantly drilled, ready for instant war service. The question of their disposition, and the selection and preparation of naval bases for their use in localities selected for strategic reasons, will require wisdom and foresight on the part of those chosen by the Government to decide these matters; but the limits of this article will not permit a discussion of them. We may not doubt, however, that a Government which has known how to prepare our navy so successfully for the war just closed will continue its work with discretion and energy.

I should add that the question of naval bases will influence in some degree the size of our proposed fleet. Let us imagine a dockyard created at some favorable point in our new possessions, and all facilities and conveniences there provided,—dry docks for our heavy ships, coal in large quantities, the means of loading it rapidly into our bunkers, stores of provisions and ammunition, machine-shops for all kinds of repairs, and, finally, defence-works on shore that could be counted upon to hold out a reasonable length of time in the temporary absence of our fleet. Such a naval base would enable us to maintain our force of ships in the strategic centre of operations for a long time without the need of concerning ourselves overmuch about our communications, and would also reduce somewhat the number of ships needed. Twelve battleships,

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based upon such a stronghold at a commanding point in the theatre of war, and held there in perfect readiness, would be, in the vicissitudes of a probable conflict, a match for twenty such vessels available at the home ports of Continental Powers for distant campaigns. It will be seen, in fact, after a certain point is reached in naval expansion,—an expansion made necessary by far-away possessions,—that a naval stronghold properly located and equipped has a military value which, after some study, may be expressed in terms of battleships. In considering the future of our navy, therefore, and in formulating a logical policy which shall determine our expansion for many years to come, the cost of a naval base should be figured; and when a certain number of battleships have been provided for,—say ten, for example,—the outflow of money should be diverted in part from further increasing the number of ships to the establishment of an advanced but primary naval base.

Readers who have followed me thus far will note that the national and naval policy of our own and other countries, as well as the principles of strategy and tactics, must be considered as elements of a correct estimate of our future needs in the navy. That national policies change may not be denied; but it is unlikely that we shall ever substitute actual contraction for our present expansion, although we may remain long under present conditions before any new situation is created for us by our national growth. Our naval requirements, then, are not likely to be less in the future than in the present; and if they are greater, a naval system and policy, if well studied at the outset, will accommodate themselves without friction to the demands for a larger force.

It may be noticed that I have discussed the conditions of future naval preponderance in the West Indies without reference to the defence of our own coast. The latter is, nevertheless, provided for by the maintenance of the force above mentioned of twelve to fifteen battleships, with the auxiliary vessels and naval bases essential to their efficiency. The safety of the coasts can be insured by them from serious harm, if by this is meant harm in a military sense such as would militate against our final success in a war. That raids against exposed and unprotected towns may be made is unquestionable; but they must be endured, or at least the chance of their happening must be confronted without undue dismay. Capt. Mahan has spoken of the alarm at coast villages and shore resorts during the late war and of the desire of each locality for individual protection, which could only be furnished by dispersing our fleet, thus rendering it valueless as a force with which to decide the war. We must accept the chances of raids on unimportant localities, if we

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know that our important ports are strong enough to resist, not only raiding cruisers, but an enemy's strong squadron for such a period of time as will permit our own squadron to reach the scene.

This brings us face to face with an element in the future of our navy not to be disregarded: it is naval force for coast defence. If that be carefully prepared and vigorously handled, we shall have our minds freed from grave burdens, and our battleship fleet can be disposed to its best advantage. Much of our naval strength will depend upon this element of coast defence, which still requires earnest study to be fully understood. After monitors are provided, yachts transformed, torpedo-boats commissioned, and submarine mines in position, there will yet be the *personnel*, the trained men and officers, to be sought for, and with what success we know not. Some authorities speak now of a National Naval Reserve with which to solve this problem. Doubtless this is good, if it be in addition to the naval militia; but it would not replace it. For from the State organizations would be largely recruited the best element of the Naval Reserve. The naval militia has not, in the writer's opinion, ceased to be a necessity to our future navy. Let us train it during peace, that its gallant work may be even more effective in our next war than in our last.

I have confined this discussion to the bare question of the number of ships of the line that would be needed under the conditions named, and in the locality under consideration; namely, the Atlantic Coast and the West Indies. The fleet needed for the Philippines calls for separate treatment. In both fleets the general type and size of the vessels, as well as the cruisers and various auxiliaries necessary to the maintenance of the line of battle in effective condition, require mature consideration. To consider these latter questions of type and size would lead into a lengthy discussion; but I may say a few words as to the Philippines.

We consider first, as in the case of the West Indies, the possible forces by which we may at some time be confronted in those regions. European nations interested in those waters are gradually strengthening themselves as to their navies, while Japan continues her rapid development toward the first rank of maritime efficiency. Besides ourselves, the naval Powers specially interested in that part of the world are England, Japan, Russia, France, and Germany. I have omitted China, she being for the present erased from the list of naval Powers. It is improbable that for many years large numbers of ships of the line will be there. The naval bases and great dockyards, without which these

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vessels are liable to become ineffective, have not yet been provided by all these countries on the shores of their Asiatic possessions. It will take time to do this, and will involve a heavy expense.

It is not possible to estimate closely the future naval strength of these countries in their Asiatic relations. The ground for reasonable conjecture is not so firm; but we may assume a possible combination of naval forces there which would oppose to our fleet six battleships, with their accompanying force of auxiliaries, based upon one or more of the dockyards of the Asiatic Coast. Upon this assumption, we may conclude that, during the period of time prior to our establishing a naval base in the Philippines, we should require eight battleships to make head against an enemy's six. This increase in our numbers is requisite, not alone for the guarding of our lines of communication,—for, with Honolulu and Guam tolerably fortified, and held by trained forces of marines or soldiers, our communications would be fairly well protected,—but because some superiority is necessary for us by reason of an enemy's advantage in possessing bases on the Asiatic Coast at no great distance from the Philippines. If a primary base, thoroughly well furnished as are our great navy-yards at home, should be established at the Philippines, with docks, machine-shops, and strong fortifications, we could reduce the estimate of eight battleships to five with every probability of making head against an enemy's six in a campaign having for its object naval supremacy in those waters. We have not such a naval base or dockyard in that region, and we have yet to realize how much time and labor and money must be expended before it can be provided; but, until this provision is made, it may be safely said that eight battleships are needed for that vicinity, and will be needed for some time to come.

In this sketch I have been able to touch upon the main features only, and to glance but briefly at the subordinate questions which will influence our estimate from year to year. Among these is the question of the natural route across the Pacific Ocean. It is safe to say that no comprehensive survey of our future strategy in the Pacific and of our naval strength there can omit the plain fact that the quickest route from San Francisco to Manila lies well to the north; also, that the shortest distance between those points is along a line which passes much nearer to Japan and Bering Sea than it does to the Hawaiian Islands. Strategy and commerce must take account of this; and when the fact is fully recognized, we shall for the first time realize how valuable to the future of our navy, both in peace and in war, is our possession of the Aleutian chain of islands.

H. C. TAYLOR.

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IS OUR ARMY DEGENERATE?

THE late Spanish-American war has demonstrated beyond controversy the efficiency of our navy. The naval battles of Manila and Santiago have astonished, not to say startled, Continental Europe, as did Marengo and Austerlitz. The United States has leaped suddenly, like a full-grown giant, into the arena of European politics, and is recognized at once as the most resourceful military Power in the world.

The American navy has surprised the world by its superb discipline, accurate marksmanship, mechanical perfection, and strategic skill. The student of the art of war will analyze the manœuvres of Dewey at Manila, and find them thoroughly scientific. The Admiral displayed energy, audacity, and skill,—the salient features of leadership in war.

The naval orders governing the blockade of the rat-trap at Santiago were strategically correct and were executed without error. After weeks of weary, fruitless watching, the enemy sought to escape at the moment when it was hoped the blockaders would be unprepared; but *within two minutes* the battle was on with terrific frenzy, and *in twenty minutes* one of the most decisive naval engagements of history was practically won.

During the Civil War our naval operations were useful models for study; and new models in naval architecture were developed that have revolutionized warfare on the sea. Since then our navy seems to have kept pace with the modern inventions of this inventive century; and all its forces—ships, officers, and men—are thoroughly up to date, constituting, probably, the most highly organized and scientific naval establishment in the world.

Is this development the evolution of chance? The United States Naval Academy at Annapolis was established in 1845, and has graduated the most highly educated corps of naval specialists in the world. Substantially all of the officers of our navy are graduates of the Academy (all but about a dozen out of 774 line officers on January 1, 1898); all are students; all are men who have devoted a lifetime of systematic study to the theory as well as the practice of their profession. In the Naval Academy is found the secret of our recent victories.

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On the other hand, what do we find in the history of our army? The war of 1812 started out with the disgraceful retreat and surrender of Gen. Hull, followed by the defeat at Queenstown, during which battle the New York militia arrived at the Niagara frontier and refused to go to the rescue of their brothers in distress, in plain sight across the river, because it was "unconstitutional" to order them out of the State. The crowning humiliation was found in the capture of our capital and the burning of our public buildings by only 3,500 English regulars, who landed on the Lower Potomac, and were confronted by 7,000 American militia who ran away as fast as their legs could carry them the moment they caught sight of the red coats of the enemy.

The Mexican War was conducted without scandal, and was really fought by the regulars, who, while numbering but 27 per cent of the troops engaged, suffered 60 per cent of the losses. Gen. Scott said:

> "I give it as my fixed opinion that, but for our graduated cadets, the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; whereas, in less than two campaigns, we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish."

The early days of the Civil War developed some mistakes; but they were the mistakes of ignorant levies and of junior officers. The country was poor in munitions of war; and, in the North, military spirit lay dormant. The poor sheep that were pushed off the field in the first battle of Bull Run scarcely knew the dangerous end of a gun. They did know that the butt end was dangerous because it kicked them: but the muzzle was comparatively harmless; for they could hit nothing they aimed at. The junior officers scarcely knew "Fours right about!" from a double somersault. But the "poor sheep" of '61 became, under efficient leadership, the heroes of '62. Our recruits flocked to the Potomac frontier, but were sent back until our agents could scour Europe for old, rusty muskets for which we paid exorbitant prices; yet the general officers on both sides displayed skill, and soon brought order out of chaos. The Commissary and Quartermaster's departments were conducted without scandal. It took some time to teach the Yankee how to ride a horse; but what magnificent cavalry followed at the heels of young "Phil" Sheridan in 1864!

The Civil War had scientific leaders pitted against scientific leaders; and raw levies rapidly developed into hardened veterans. The South, with fewer resources, but with the great advantage of the defensive, fought like tigers and died like heroes, till, leadership being equal, the

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God of Battles placed the wreath of victory on the banners of the heaviest battalions. Skilful leaders make skilful troops; and we have the authority of Gen. Grant for saying that the seasoned veterans that passed in the last review before President Johnson at Washington in 1865 were the best troops the world ever saw. For there are no soldiers like patriotic, intelligent, and educated soldiers of experience. If Napoleon Bonaparte could have had one army corps like them at Waterloo, where his soldiers were schoolboys, and his marshals "small change,"—well, all Europe might have been France to-day. But he could not have them. That kind of flower does not bloom under monarchies. It takes the rich soil of liberty and the hot sun of national necessity to develop such intelligent, enthusiastic, and unselfish patriotism.

Sir Archibald Alison, in his "History of Europe," after commenting upon the worthless character of our raw troops, and the magnificent fighting-material that they developed when instructed and disciplined, advises Great Britain, in the event of another war with the United States, to throw suddenly a large force into our great seaports, and, by a succession of quick, stunning blows, to humiliate the Americans, and make them sue for peace before they have time to prepare for war. England's control of the ocean greyhounds would enable her to carry out this programme; and our experience in the Spanish War indicates how serious might have been our position had we confronted a well-fed and well-organized foe.

We have no criticism for the army of '61–'65. The leaders were young, vigorous, and highly educated military specialists. The raw material for troops was the very best; and its rapid development into a superb army did credit to the skill of the senior officers and to the intelligence of the field and line. The material at hand was the crudest possible. It is doubtful if there were a hundred men in the North, outside of the army, who could command a battalion; and but few more were competent to command a company.

In 1861 the United States was comparatively a nation of farmers, without diversified industries. We had few factories, little commerce, and less credit; plenty of men and plenty of food, but no munitions of war, no guns, no uniforms; enough excellent material for generals, but practically no drill-masters. What a change in 1899! We are to-day the richest nation of the world, with money and credit to spare. According to Mulhall's "Dictionary of Statistics," the wealth of the United States in 1890 was sixty-five billions of dollars; of Great Britain, forty-five billions; of France, forty-one; and of Germany, thirty-four. Our

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riches are beyond even our own comprehension. Our diversified industries could supply the world. Existing plants, working night and day, could, in four hundred days, furnish all the armies of Europe, active and reserve, with rifles of the highest grade. We could feed them by cultivating our waste places and fence corners. We could furnish them with uniforms when alive and with coffins when dead. We have thousands of well-drilled National Guardsmen,—counting active members and veterans,—hundreds of men competent to command battalions, and thousands competent to drill volunteers. North and South stand shoulder to shoulder without jealousy, inspired by patriotic emulation. The North is to-day as military as the South ever was; and our young men are willing to sacrifice everything to satisfy their thirst for military glory. The military spirit is in the air.

And yet, in the war of 1898 our army developed little but scandal. With overflowing granaries, from which we freely fed strangers in distress, our soldiers often lacked food; with skilful physicians and abundant remedies, our sick heroes died without medicine; and all the time food and drugs in plenty were stored in ships riding at anchor in plain sight on a smooth sea. We have highly educated military specialists in abundance,—young, energetic, ambitious, already famous in military literature,—yet our one prominent campaign was conducted without system on the go-as-you-please plan, and the one prominent land battle was fought and won by colonels and captains. I am aware that interested persons will deny the truth of some of these statements; but knowledge gained in the practice of my profession permits me to allege them with confidence.

What is the matter? Why are there no talented leaders like those of '65? The problem of '61 is reversed. Then, inexperienced subalterns and men were at fault: now, company officers and men take the bits in their mouths, and, in spite of their general, gain glory at San Juan and El Caney. *Is our army degenerate?*

My first answer to this question must be "Yes," because the most important part of an army is its general—not its generals, nor its Strategy Board; for no army was ever large enough or small enough to be commanded by two men.

The United States is the most resourceful military Power on earth. The military strength of a nation consists of (1) its natural resources, (2) its disciplined battalions, (3) its corps of military specialists for the line and staff departments, and (4) the genius of the one man that commands them all. The last is far more important than all the rest

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combined; for history has demonstrated beyond controversy that if a reasonable opportunity be presented he will create the other three.

(1) The natural military resources of a nation consist of its fighting-material of intelligent and patriotic men, its abundance of food, wool, and iron,—all gifts of God,—and its manufactories of iron, wool, and explosives, which are all the result of its own good economic sense.

To-day the United States has the best natural military resources of any two nations of the world. A crisis would probably put from eight to ten millions of intelligent bayonets in the field (it would, of course, take years of discipline to make real soldiers of them); and within our own borders are food, wool, and iron in abundance, and factories to convert them into materials of war.

(2) With regard to the second element of strength, well-disciplined battalions, we are as poorly equipped as any second-rate nation of the globe. Our regular army is superb, but too small to be noticed. Our National Guard, in some States, is excellent; in others, poor. In nearly all of them it is controlled by politics, not by the rules of war. Its marked weakness is in its higher officers, many of whom have never dreamed of any military literature other than the drill regulations, and consider that military organization the best which presents the most gorgeous appearance on a Decoration Day parade, and receives the most applause from children and nurses. The National Guard gives us, however, an enormous advantage over our condition in '61, in that so large a proportion of its officers and men are competent to drill volunteers and to become excellent subaltern officers. National Guardsmen have, as a rule, considerable preliminary military knowledge, but little discipline, which latter is a growth, and cannot be acquired suddenly. Discipline consists in obeying orders without thinking, automatically as from a confirmed habit: like character, it takes time for development.

(3) In relation to the third military resource, a corps of highly educated military specialists, the United States is admitted to have the finest in the world in the graduates of its Military Academy. No other nation has any institution that pretends to rival our national school.

(4) The fourth military resource, a military genius for a commander, can only be developed by emergencies. "The poet is born, not made"; but great generals are both born and made. It takes years of conscientious study to develop a born military genius into even a fair general. They are never developed except from among educated military specialists. This new American race, this race of inventors, is not wanting in

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military geniuses from which to choose a competent commander, as will hereinafter appear.

It will be noticed that I have given to the United States the very first rank as a military nation in all respects except disciplined battalions. Natural military resources mean nothing unless battalions are disciplined; for undisciplined men are mere mobs, a source of weakness, not strength. Natural military resources and well-disciplined battalions combined mean very little unless there are highly educated officers to command the larger subdivisions of the army and in the staff departments. And no matter how great the military resources, how abundant the well-disciplined battalions, how numerous the military specialists in the several staff departments, they will all be as children in the hands of a giant, like Rome's half-million of stalwart sons in the presence of a Hannibal, if our armies be outgeneralled.

I am aware that most people will resent the idea that *one man* can be of more importance to his country than all its other resources combined; but most people do not know that there *is* such a thing as a Science of War,—the most important and most difficult of all sciences, a science that not only has its own specialties in strategy and tactics, logistics and military engineering, but utilizes and subordinates all other known sciences. The history of the world emphasizes the "one man" idea.

The fate of war does not always depend upon the weight or discipline of a nation's battalions. It as often depends upon the genius and learning of one man; and I wish to emphasize and illustrate this "one man" idea,—the fact that one highly educated military specialist is often of far greater value to his country than disciplined armies. Space does not permit me even to mention the names of the greatest generals, all of whom were literary and scientific soldiers, whose biographies are largely the history of the world, and whose victories were the triumphs of individual geniuses. A single illustration must suffice.

The troops of Carthage were mercenaries, and never equalled the free legionaries of Rome; and yet Hannibal, with only 26,000 of these hirelings, accomplished what was considered impossible, in crossing the Alps from Spain. He destroyed three large Roman armies in succession at the Trebia, Lake Trasimenus, and Cannæ. Hannibal's science triumphed over Roman brute force and discipline. For half a generation he kept Rome on the brink of ruin and despair, and so intimidated the haughty, all-conquering Romans, that, for years, with hundreds of thousands of well-fed, well-armed, and well-disciplined troops in the field,

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they never dared to attack the ragged, half-starved, heterogeneous hirelings of Hannibal, but endeavored to wear him out in a guerilla warfare in front of their own capital. Like a pack of bloodhounds around a bear at bay, they dared not risk a final struggle. Rome possessed half a million of the best troops in the world; but her only idea of war was to march out and fight a battle. By numbers, courage, discipline, and hard knocks, she had won battles and conquered nations, until a military genius appeared and overcame her with a handful of ragamuffins. Hannibal taught Rome that war is a science, that intellect can conquer brute force, and that one man educated in the science of war is of more value to the state than many legions of good soldiers without scientific leadership. It was the physical, mental, and moral qualities of one man that humiliated Rome.

With an incompetent leader, the best troops are helpless. When a campaign goes wrong, it is one man that is to blame, if he has been given all the powers that rightfully belong to a commander.

Let us note in passing that all the greatest soldiers have been young men. "Old men for counsel, young men for war." Alexander's active military career began at 18 and ended at 33; Hannibal's extended from 13 to 47; Cæsar's, 40 to 55; Gustavus', 16 to 38; Frederick's, 28 to 51; Napoleon's, 27 to 46. Cæsar was a subaltern at 20, and served in several campaigns before his active military career began. Every prominent general of the Civil War, I think, was in 1861 under 45 years of age, excepting Gen. Lee, who was 54. I know of no major-general in the recent Spanish War who was under 60 years of age.

The first axiom of war is "Action, ACTION, ACTION!" I have no recollection of any great general in an active campaign who was over 60. The indefatigable Frederick fought what he called a war, extending over a year, when he was 66; but it contained nothing but vexatious delays, no battles, and a treaty. How different from the Frederick of 28!

Napoleon was an old man at forty, when his downward career began. His was a short-lived race, he having lost five ancestors within a century. His father died at 38 of the same disease as his illustrious son. Napoleon once said of himself, when he was thirty-five, "One has but a certain time for war. I shall be good for it but six years more: then even I shall have to stop." His words were apparently prophetic; for at about that time his star of success began to wane. The physical endurance of a military genius had gone. It is simply suicidal to place the command of active armies in the hands of an old man. Yet the

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new Army Bill, as proposed, would permit the appointment of civilians up to fifty years of age.

Every great general must have the body, spirit, and brain of a great soldier. A general should be sound in body. All great generals have displayed marvellous physical endurance. Many interesting examples might be cited. At forty Napoleon Bonaparte had grown fat and lethargic. His brain never dimmed; but the body and spirit of a leader had departed. Had he retained at Waterloo the thin, wiry body of '96, he might have prevailed.

Every commanding general should have the spirit of a hero,—that indefinable something which inspires his men with his own enthusiasm. An icicle has no place at the head of an army; for enthusiasm is worth more than rifles. Witness the patriotic Japanese marching rough-shod over the numberless battalions of phlegmatic China.

Last, and most important of all, every general should have educated brains. Natural genius is not enough. War is both an art and a science. Every great general of history has been an educated soldier and a military specialist. Especially in these modern times, theory and practice must go hand in hand; and years of ardent study are none too long to fit a "born genius" for active service. No one would think of putting a "born mechanic" in charge of the intricate engines of a battleship, even though he were a tireless stump speaker, unless he were an educated engineer. Yet naval engineering may be taught in a year or two; while it takes a lifetime of study to acquire the "military habit" and to be competent to exercise an independent command. To appoint an inexperienced "natural born genius" (*i.e.*, a politician, or his son) to command a battleship or a regiment is to be guilty as accessory to wholesale murder. I say *regiment;* for by the term "general" we must include whoever is called upon to exercise an independent command. While any officer may, a colonel of a regiment is expected to, find himself in that responsible position in frequent emergencies. Therefore, he should possess all the knowledge necessary to keep his command in health, strength, and good nature, to move it with celerity, and to fight it with confidence; and to his technical knowledge must be added tact and that force of character which commands respect and inspires enthusiasm in his troops.

Before finally answering the question "Is our army degenerate?" let me give a further illustration. The great cathedrals of Europe were centuries in building. Generations of master-masons chiselled the stones faultlessly, fathers teaching their sons. But when a new cathe-

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dral was projected, no stone-mason, even though he had excelled at his art for fifty years, was selected to draw the plans: an architect was chosen who had spent his time in school studying theories. So in war, experience in subaltern positions does not fit an officer for independent command. He is but a stone-mason, not an architect; and architects in war must have wide learning in science, literature, and art. If a stone-mason becomes an architect, it is in spite of his trade, not by reason of it.

What was the trouble in the Spanish War? Its leaders were stone-masons, some of them of long service; but they were not educated architects. After the Civil War the most active and ambitious officers returned to civil life and won fresh laurels. Others, if they had sufficient political influence, received commissions in the regular service; and for thirty-three years they drew their pay and *breathed*, and gained rank by merely living, until, in 1898, they were at the heads of armies and departments. Had the Spanish War become serious, all of these old men would have dropped out as suddenly as did the veterans of '45 after the first battle of Bull Run. Toward the close of the Civil War, after the nation had had the discipline of defeat, every commander of an army and of a department was a graduate of the Military Academy; and the war was conducted by the general commanding in the field, not by politicians in Washington presuming to know more about war by intuition than their generals did by education and experience combined.

In 1866 the army was reorganized on a peace footing; and we learn from the "Army Register" of January 1, 1867, that out of 2,367 general, field, and line officers of the regular army only 408, or 17 per cent, were graduates of the Military Academy. And even this small percentage included more than 100 cadets graduated in 1865 and 1866, after the war was over. The civilian spirit dominated; and regiments were so subdivided, and companies so scattered, that commanding officers could exert but little personal influence.

It was not until the eighties that the younger element became numerous enough, experienced enough, and brave enough to make themselves felt. The literary and industrious spirit seized the younger officers. The Military Service Institution and Infantry and Cavalry schools were founded; and field manœuvres and target-practice were established. The army was too small for practice in strategy; but the strategy game of *Kriegspiel* became popular. Essays on strategy in all its branches became a fad; and the younger officers drilled by day and studied by

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night. I believe it fair to say that the majority of our officers under forty-five years of age are to-day the most highly educated and accomplished military strategists in the world: they only lack an opportunity to demonstrate their theories. Like Napoleon before the Italian campaigns, unknown to fame, they have spent years in the study of the Art of War; literally lying on their maps, working out every conceivable military problem that might be presented, and awaiting the opportunity that finally came to Napoleon. I have no hesitation in making the prophecy that, should a similar emergency arise, hundreds of our young officers would appear as fully equipped military geniuses of inestimable value to their country.

But in the war of 1898 young men and educated soldiers had no opportunity. Excepting the Engineer and Ordnance corps, which took little active part in the struggle, *every* head of a department was a non-graduate. At the beginning of the war, of the 6 brigadiers all were non-graduates. Of the 3 major-generals only 1 was a graduate; and he was "shelved," as it was thought, in the Philippines. But it transpired that his was the only campaign of the war conducted with science and without adverse criticism. His men were well fed, well cared for, well clothed, and skilfully handled 8,000 miles away from his base of supplies. It is almost needless to say that he *insisted* on having educated subordinates in the higher commands and important staff positions.

Of the 18 volunteer major-generals appointed during the war only 1 (now retired) was a graduate taken from the army: the other 3 graduates were old men and prominent politicians taken from civil life. Of the 72 volunteer brigadiers 23 were graduates, and 49 non-graduates: 7 of the graduates were from civil life and mostly from political life. Of the 41 field officers of regular regiments before Santiago only 4 were graduates. Only 2 of the 10 captains of artillery were graduates. The captains and the lieutenants of the regiments, however, were nearly all graduates. The appointees in the departments of the Adjutant-General, the Inspector-General, the Judge-Advocate-General, and the Paymaster-General were largely civilians. In the two departments which developed the most scandal, of the 121 new officers appointed in the Quartermaster's Department 79 were from civil life, and 42 from the army: of the latter only a very small number were graduates. In the Subsistence Department, of 115 new appointments 92 were from civil life, and 23 from the army, not all of whom were graduates.

After four years of *war* the reorganized regular army had in 1866

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1 general, 1 lieutenant-general, all 5 major-generals, and 8 out of 10 brigadiers, who were graduates of West Point. After thirty-three years of *peace*, on January 1, 1898, of 3 major-generals and 6 brigadiers 1 only was a graduate.

An examination of the rosters shows that the recent war was led by stone-masons: the battles were won by the captains who were architects. In the war of '61 all heads of departments (except the Medical Department) were graduates: in the war of '98 all heads of departments (except those of Engineering and Ordnance) were non-graduates. What contrasts in their records!

What was the matter with the army of 1898? A stone-mason as Secretary of War, a stone-mason at the head of each department, and stone-masons in command. Why does the Government spend a fortune on the education of each of its military architects, and, when he offers his services in time of war, ignore him and take up inexperienced "fathers' sons" instead? It is politics, not war. There were hundreds of West Point graduates, with wide experience in the army and National Guard, who tendered their services time and again, but were ignored because they were not backed by a political boss. The establishment of the Military Academy was recommended by Washington and was founded in 1802. Our own and foreign military critics, as I have said, pronounce it to be the very best scientific military school in the world. Why does the Government expend so much money on it each year, if its graduates are not utilized, if one may become a great soldier by merely possessing the friendship of a Senator?

Our army is to be suddenly increased to 100,000 men. Who will be the new officers? Politicians' sons, of course, or old, worn-out politicians ready to be retired on three-fourths pay for life. What will be the result in the next war? Disaster, of course, until young men, brainy men, educated specialists, are put to the front. We have an abundance of the best officers in the world; and they should be utilized where their technical knowledge and enthusiasm can be felt. Our Government should know that the bare fact that a man can ride a staid old cart-horse without falling off does not fit him to command a regiment, any more than freedom from seasickness on a ferryboat fits a man to command the "Oregon." *No one should be permitted to hold the position of general or colonel, or to serve on any division or brigade staff in the regular army, unless he be a graduate of the Military Academy, or have shown special fitness during years of army service, and have passed a rigid examination in strategy, tactics, logistics, and military engineering*

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at least—the foundation-stones of military learning. It is worse than a blunder, it is, as I have said, a crime, to put thousands of precious lives under the command of an uneducated soldier, no matter how experienced and efficient as a subaltern; for the trade of stone-mason does not fit a man for the profession of architect. The code of ethics inculcated at West Point does not permit officers to seek self-advancement through private or indirect channels. They are, therefore, practically unknown to their political rulers, who are surrounded by self-seekers. The public is equally ignorant of actual conditions; and, as officers in the service are not permitted to speak for themselves, it is high time that some one should speak for them.

These are scientific times. War is the most scientific of professions; and, if we wish Manilas on the land, we must equip our regiments as skilfully as we do our battleships.

I am aware that individuals usually get the blame for the results of bad methods, and that the real censure should rest upon our bureau system, which is not only bad, but ridiculous. Who can imagine Cæsar winning victories over the Helvetii by advancing the right wing instead of the left, in obedience to a message from a strategy board in Rome, or delaying his expedition into Britain while the Senate quarrelled over the selection of his quartermaster- and commissary-generals, chosen for life, and independent of the general commanding, and who might or might not favor him with transportation and supplies. Why a ridiculous system of independent staff bureaus for the army, while the navy escapes this affliction? Is one less technical or scientific than the other? Who, pray, has changed the laws of war on land, and left them unchanged at sea?

Of course, military experts laugh at us. But what is to blame? Politics, of course. What makes us so foolish and unpatriotic? Why, hunger for spoils during long years of peace. And we see no hope of improvement, until the time shall come when we are called upon suddenly to meet a foe that is neither hungry nor anxious to be whipped and sent home. Then, after the humiliation of defeat, we shall cease to run armies and regiments on the Town-Meeting system. One man will be put in command, with absolute control over *every* subordinate; and the politicians will be relegated to the rear in military as well as in naval affairs. The time will come when our rulers will find that warfare on land is quite as scientific as warfare on the sea, and that our permanent independent bureaus are prohibitive of rapid and decisive military operations.

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Our army as a whole is not degenerate. The *personnel* of the rank and file is superb. The younger and middle-aged officers positively have no superiors. Give the young men a chance, give the architects a chance, and we shall see our new army of 100,000 men tactically as perfect as Frederick's, and manœuvred as scientifically as Napoleon's.

Our navy is perfection because *all* its officers are scientific sailors. Did it make our politicians seasick to ride a horse, our army would be equally favored and equally efficient. It is the politicians who are degenerate. The Naval Academy is the mother of the navy; the Military Academy is the step-mother of the army. The one reveres its mother and follows her precepts: the other, unable to comprehend its step-mother, is jealous of her influence. The difference is seen in the scientific manœuvres before Santiago on the sea and in the haphazard manœuvres around it on the land. Utilize our scientific officers, and we shall have a scientific army.

ALEXANDER S. BACON.

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DIPLOMATIC PAY AND CLOTHES.

VIENNA, *January 5.*—I find in this morning's papers the statement that the Government of the United States has paid to the two members of the Peace Commission entitled to receive money for their services $100,000 each for their six weeks' work in Paris.

I hope that this is true. I will allow myself the satisfaction of considering that it *is* true, and of treating it as a thing finished and settled.

It is a precedent; and it ought to be a welcome one to our country. A precedent always has a chance to be valuable (as well as the other way); and its best chance to be valuable (or the other way) is when it takes such a striking form as to fix a whole nation's attention upon it. If it come justified out of the discussion which will follow, it will find a career ready and waiting for it.

We realize that the edifice of public justice is built of precedents, from the ground upward; but we do not always realize that all the other details of our civilization are likewise built of precedents. The changes, also, which they undergo, are due to the intrusion of new precedents, which hold their ground against opposition, and keep their place. A precedent may die at birth, or it may live,—it is mainly a matter of luck. If it be imitated once, it has a chance; if twice, a better chance; if three times, it is reaching a point where account must be taken of it; if four, five, or six times, it has probably come to stay—for a whole century, possibly. If a town start a new bow, or a new dance, or a new temperance project, or a new kind of hat, and can get the precedent adopted in the next town, the career of that precedent is begun; and it will be unsafe to bet as to where the end of its journey is going to be. It may not get this start at all, and may have no career; but, if a crown prince introduce the precedent, it will attract vast attention, and its chances for a career are so great as to amount almost to a certainty.

For a long time we have been reaping damage from a couple of disastrous precedents. One is the precedent of shabby pay to public servants standing for the power and dignity of the Republic in foreign lands: the other is a precedent condemning them to exhibit themselves officially in clothes which are not only without grace or dignity, but are a pretty

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loud and pious rebuke to the vain and frivolous costumes worn by the other officials. To our day an American ambassador's official costume remains under the reproach of these defects. At a public function in a European court all foreign representatives except ours wear clothes which in some way distinguish them from the unofficial throng, and mark them as standing for their *countries*. But our representative appears in a plain black swallow-tail, which stands for neither country nor people. It has no nationality. It is found in all countries: it is as international as a night-shirt. It has no particular meaning; but our Government tries to give it one: it tries to make it stand for republican simplicity, modesty, and unpretentiousness. Tries, and without doubt fails; for it is not conceivable that this loud ostentation of simplicity deceives any one. The statue that advertises its modesty with a fig-leaf really brings its modesty under suspicion. Worn officially, our nonconforming swallow-tail is a declaration of ungracious independence in the matter of manners, and is uncourteous. It says to all around: "In Rome we do not choose to do as Rome does; we refuse to respect your tastes and your traditions; we make no sacrifices to any one's customs and prejudices; we yield no jot to the courtesies of life; we prefer our manners, and intrude them here."

That is not the true American spirit; and those clothes misrepresent us. When a foreigner comes among us, and trespasses against our customs and our code of manners, we are offended, and justly so: but our Government commands our ambassadors to wear abroad an official dress which is an offence against foreign manners and customs; and the discredit of it falls upon the nation.

We did not dress our public functionaries in undistinguished raiment before Franklin's time; and the change would not have come if he had been an obscurity. But he was such a colossal figure in the world that whatever he did of an unusual nature attracted the world's attention, and became a precedent. In the case of clothes, the next representative after him, and the next, had to imitate it. After that, the thing was custom; and custom is a petrifaction: nothing but dynamite can dislodge it for a century. We imagine that our queer official costumery was deliberately devised to symbolize our republican simplicity,—a quality which we have never possessed, and are too old to acquire now, if we had any use for it or any leaning toward it. But it is not so; there was nothing deliberate about it; it grew naturally and heedlessly out of the precedent set by Franklin.

If it had been an intentional thing, and based upon a principle, it would not have stopped where it did: we should have applied it further.

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Instead of clothing our admirals and generals, for courts martial and other public functions, in superb dress uniforms blazing with color and gold, the Government would put them in swallow-tails and white cravats, and make them look like ambassadors and lackeys. If I am wrong in making Franklin the father of our curious official clothes, it is no matter—he will be able to stand it.

It is my opinion—and I make no charge for the suggestion—that, whenever we appoint an ambassador or a minister, we ought to confer upon him the temporary rank of admiral or general, and allow him to wear the corresponding uniform at public functions in foreign countries. I would recommend this for the reason that it is not consonant with the dignity of the United States of America that her representative should appear upon occasions of state in a dress which makes him glaringly conspicuous; and that is what his present undertaker-outfit does when it appears, with its dismal smudge, in the midst of the butterfly splendors of a Continental court. It is a most trying position for a shy man, a modest man, a man accustomed to being like other people. He is the most striking figure present: there is no hiding from the multitudinous eyes. It would be funny, if it were not such a cruel spectacle, to see the hunted creature in his solemn sables scuffling around in that sea of vivid color, like a mislaid Presbyterian in perdition. We are all aware that our representative's dress should not compel too much attention; for anybody but an Indian chief knows that that is a vulgarity. I am saying these things in the interest of our national pride and dignity. Our representative is the flag. He is the Republic. He is the United States of America. And when these embodiments pass by, we do not want them scoffed at: we desire that people shall be obliged to concede that they are worthily clothed, and politely.

Our Government is oddly inconsistent in this matter of official dress. When its representative is a civilian who has not been a soldier, it restricts him to the black swallow-tail and white tie; but if he is a civilian who has been a soldier, it allows him to wear the uniform of his former rank as an official dress. When Gen. Sickles was Minister to Spain, he always wore, when on official duty, the dress uniform of a major-general. When Gen. Grant visited foreign courts, he went handsomely and properly ablaze in the uniform of a full general, and was introduced by diplomatic survivals of his own Presidential Administration. The latter, by official necessity, went in the meek and lowly swallow-tail,—a deliciously sarcastic contrast: the one dress representing the honest and honorable dignity of the nation; the other, the cheap hypocrisy of the

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Republican Simplicity tradition. In Paris our present representative can perform his official functions reputably clothed; for he was an officer in the Civil War. In London our late Ambassador was similarly situated; for he, also, was an officer in the Civil War. But Mr. Choate must represent the Great Republic—even at official breakfasts at seven in the morning—in that same old funny swallow-tail.

Our Government's notions about proprieties of costume are indeed very, very odd—as suggested by that last fact. The swallow-tail is recognized the world over as not wearable in the daytime: it is a night-dress, and a night-dress only,—a night-shirt is not more so. Yet, when our representative makes an official visit in the morning, he is obliged by his Government to go in that night-dress. It makes the very cab-horses laugh.

The truth is, that for a while during the present century, and up to something short of forty years ago, we had a lucid interval, and dropped the Republican Simplicity sham, and dressed our foreign representatives in a handsome and becoming official costume. This was discarded by and by, and the swallow-tail substituted. I believe it is not now known which statesman brought about this change; but we all know that, stupid as he was as to diplomatic proprieties in dress, he would not have sent his daughter to a state ball in a corn-shucking costume, nor to a corn-shucking in a state ball costume, to be harshly criticised as an ill-mannered offender against the proprieties of custom in both places. And we know another thing; viz., that he himself would not have wounded the tastes and feelings of a family of mourners by attending a funeral in their house in a costume which was an offence against the dignities and decorum prescribed by tradition and sanctified by custom. Yet that man was so heedless as not to reflect that *all* the social customs of civilized peoples are entitled to respectful observance, and that no man with a right spirit of courtesy in him ever has any disposition to transgress these customs.

There is still another argument for a rational diplomatic dress—a business argument. We are a trading nation; and our representative is our business agent. If he is respected, esteemed, and liked where he is stationed, he can exercise an influence which can extend our trade and forward our prosperity. A considerable number of his business activities have their field in his social relations; and clothes which do not offend against local manners and customs and prejudices are a valuable part of his equipment in this matter,—would be, if Franklin had died earlier.

I have not done with gratis suggestions yet. We made a great and

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valuable advance when we instituted the office of ambassador. That lofty rank endows its possessor with several times as much influence, consideration, and effectiveness as the rank of minister bestows. For the sake of the country's dignity and for the sake of her advantage commercially, we should have ambassadors, not ministers, at the great courts of the world.

But not at present salaries! No: if we are to maintain present salaries, let us make no more ambassadors; and let us unmake those we have already made. The great position, without the means of respectably maintaining it—there could be no wisdom in that. A foreign representative, to be valuable to his country, must be on good terms with the officials of the capital and with the rest of the influential folk. He must mingle with this society: he cannot sit at home—it is not business, it butters no commercial parsnips. He must attend the dinners, banquets, suppers, balls, receptions, and must *return* these hospitalities. He should return as good as he gets, too, for the sake of the dignity of his country, and for the sake of Business. Have we ever had a minister or an ambassador who could do this on his salary? No—not once, from Franklin's time to ours. Other countries understand the commercial value of properly lining the pockets of their representatives; but apparently our Government has not learned it. England is the most successful trader of the several trading nations; and she takes good care of the watchmen who keep guard in her commercial towers. It has been a long time, now, since we needed to blush for our representatives abroad. It has become custom to send our fittest. We send men of distinction, cultivation, character,—our ablest, our choicest, our best. Then we cripple their efficiency through the meagreness of their pay. Here is a list of salaries for English and American ministers and ambassadors:

City.	Salaries.	
	American.	English.
Paris	$17,500	$45,000
Berlin	17,500	40,000
Vienna	12,000	40,000
Constantinople	10,000	40,000
St. Petersburg	17,500	39,000
Rome	12,000	35,000
Washington	.....	32,500

Sir Julian Pauncefote, the English Ambassador at Washington, has a very fine house besides—at no damage to his salary.

English ambassadors pay no house-rent; they live in palaces owned

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by England. Our representatives pay house-rent out of their salaries. You can judge by the above figures what kind of houses the United States of America has been used to living in abroad, and what sort of return-entertaining she has done. There is not a salary in our list which would properly house the representative receiving it, and, in addition, pay $3,000 toward his family's bacon and doughnuts,—the strange but economical and customary fare of the American Ambassador's household, except on Sundays, when petrified Boston crackers are added.

The ambassadors and ministers of foreign nations not only have generous salaries, but their Governments provide them with money wherewith to pay a considerable part of their hospitality bills. I believe our Government pays no hospitality bills except those incurred by the navy. Through this concession to the navy, that arm is able to do us credit in foreign parts; and certainly that is well and politic. But why the Government does not think it well and politic that our diplomats should be able to do us like credit abroad, is one of those mysterious inconsistencies which have been puzzling me ever since I stopped trying to understand base-ball, and took up statesmanship as a pastime.

To return to the matter of house-rent. Good houses, properly furnished, in European capitals, are not to be had at small figures. Consequently, our foreign representatives have been accustomed to live in garrets,—sometimes on the roof. Being poor men, it has been the best they could do on the salary which the Government has paid them. How could they adequately return the hospitalities shown them? It was impossible. It would have exhausted the salary in three months. Still, it was their official duty to entertain the influentials after some sort of fashion; and they did the best they could with their limited purse. In return for champagne they furnished lemonade; in return for game they furnished ham; in return for whale they furnished sardines; in return for liquors they furnished condensed milk; in return for the battalion of liveried and powdered flunkeys they furnished the hired girl; in return for the fairy wilderness of sumptuous decorations they draped the stove with the American flag; in return for the orchestra they furnished zither and ballads by the family; in return for the ball—but they didn't return the ball, except in cases where the United States lived on the roof and had room.

Is this an exaggeration? It can hardly be called that. I saw nearly the equivalent of it once, a good many years ago. A minister was trying to create influential friends for a project which might be worth

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ten millions a year to the agriculturists of the Republic; and our Government had furnished him ham and lemonade to persuade the opposition with. The minister did not succeed. He might not have succeeded if his salary had been what it ought to have been,—$50,000 or $60,000 a year;—but his chances would have been very greatly improved. And in any case, he and his dinners and his country would not have been joked about by the hard-hearted, and pitied by the compassionate.

Any experienced "drummer" will testify that, when you want to do business, there is no economy in ham and lemonade. The drummer takes his country customer to the theatre, the opera, the circus; dines him, wines him, entertains him all the day and all the night in luxurious style; and plays upon his human nature in all seductive ways. For he knows, by old experience, that this is the best way to get a profitable order out of him. He has his reward. All Governments except our own play the same policy, with the same end in view; and they, also, have their reward. But ours refuses to do business by business ways, and sticks to ham and lemonade. This is the most expensive diet known to the diplomatic service of the world.

Ours is the only country of first importance that pays its foreign representatives trifling salaries. If we were poor, we could not find great fault with these economies, perhaps,—at least one could find a sort of plausible excuse for them. But we are not poor; and the excuse fails. As shown above, some of our important diplomatic representatives receive $12,000; others, $17,500. These salaries are all ham and lemonade, and unworthy of the flag. When we have a rich ambassador in London or Paris, he lives as the ambassador of a country like ours ought to live, and it costs him $100,000 a year to do it. But why should we allow him to pay that out of his private pocket? There is nothing fair about it; and the Republic is no proper subject for any one's charity. In several cases our salaries of $12,000 should be $50,000; and all of the salaries of $17,500 ought to be $75,000, or $100,000, since we pay no representative's house-rent. Our State Department realizes the mistake which we are making, and would like to rectify it; but it has not the power.

When a young girl reaches eighteen she is recognized as being a woman. She adds six inches to her skirt, she unplaits her dangling braids and balls her hair on top of her head, she stops sleeping with her little sister and has a room to herself, and becomes in many ways a thundering expense. But she is in society now; and papa has to stand it: there is no avoiding it. Very well. The Great Republic lengthened

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her skirts last year, balled up her hair, and entered the world's society. This means that, if she would prosper and stand fair with society, she must put aside some of her dearest and darlingest young ways and superstitions, and do as society does. Of course she can decline if she wants to; but this would be unwise. She ought to realize, now that she has "come out," that this is a right and proper time to change a part of her style. She is in Rome; and it has long been granted that when one is in Rome it is good policy to do as Rome does. To advantage Rome? No,—to advantage herself.

If our Government has really paid representatives of ours on the Paris Commission $100,000 apiece for six weeks' work, I feel sure that it is the best cash investment the nation has made in many years. For it seems quite impossible that, with that precedent on the books, the Government will be able to find excuses for continuing its diplomatic salaries at the present mean figure. MARK TWAIN.

P. S. VIENNA, *January 10.*—I see, by this morning's telegraphic news, that I am not to be the new ambassador here, after all. This—well, I hardly know what to say. I—well, of course I do not care anything about it; but it is at least a surprise. I have for many months been using my influence at Washington to get this diplomatic see expanded into an ambassadorship, with the idea, of course, th——But never mind. Let it go. It is of no consequence. I say it calmly; for I am calm. But at the same time——However, the subject has no interest for me, and never had. I never really intended to take the place, anyway—I made up my mind to it months and months ago, nearly a year. But now, while I am calm, I would like to say this—that, so long as I shall continue to possess an American's proper pride in the honor and dignity of his country, I will not take any ambassadorship in the gift of the flag at a salary short of $75,000 a year. If I shall be charged with wanting to live beyond my country's means, I cannot help it. A country which cannot afford ambassadors' wages should be ashamed to have ambassadors.

Think of a Seventeen-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ambassador! Particularly for *America*. Why, it is the most ludicrous spectacle, the most inconsistent and incongruous spectacle, contrivable by even the most diseased imagination. It is a billionaire in a paper collar, a king in a breechclout, an archangel in a tin halo. And, for pure sham and hypocrisy, the salary is just the match of the ambassador's official clothes,—that boastful advertisement of a Republican Simplicity which manifests itself

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at home in Fifty-thousand-dollar salaries to insurance presidents and railway lawyers, and in domestic palaces whose fittings and furnishings often transcend in costly display and splendor and richness the fittings and furnishings of the palaces of the sceptred masters of Europe; and which has invented and exported to the Old World the palace-car, the sleeping-car, the tram-car, the electric trolley, the best bicycles, the best motor-cars, the steam-heater, the best and smartest systems of electric calls and telephonic aids to laziness and comfort, the elevator, the private bath-room (hot and cold water on tap), the palace-hotel, with its multifarious conveniences, comforts, shows, and luxuries, the—oh, the list is interminable! In a word, Republican Simplicity found Europe with one shirt to her back, so to speak, as far as *real* luxuries, conveniences, and the comforts of life go, and has clothed her to the chin with the latter. We are the lavishest and showiest and most luxury-loving people on the earth; and at our masthead we fly our one true and honest symbol, the gaudiest flag the world has ever seen. Oh, Republican Simplicity, there are many, many humbugs in the world, but none to which you need take off *your* hat!

M. T.

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COLONIES AND OTHER DEPENDENCIES.

THE application of the lessons of history to the solution of present problems is always a difficult task, and generally a very unsatisfactory one. Circumstances at different times are never alike. If it ever be true that history repeats itself, it is also true that it never repeats itself in the same way. No two waves of the ocean are alike; and yet we can predict with some confidence what the waves will do. Individual men have their peculiarities, and they are all moved by individual and differing motives; but masses of men under similar situations are apt to act very much alike. Substantially the same defiance of the laws of human nature brought the Spanish dependencies to successful revolt in the Netherlands, in South America, in Mexico, in Cuba, and in the Philippines. The highest value of history is to separate what is individual and accidental from what is essential and permanent, and to apply the results in the conduct of current affairs. In view of the national interests that confront us, it cannot be untimely to discuss the elements of strength and of weakness that colonies and other dependencies have contributed to national progress and vitality.

The Greek colonies, founded as they were for the most part by adventurers, formed no very important part of the Greek polity. Though they early dotted the northern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, they had few interests in common, and were, each for itself, substantially independent. A formal relationship, it is true, was kept up with the mother-city; but the relation was that of a daughter to a mother after the daughter had become of age. The allegiance was a natural one; but it was hardly obligatory, except in a moral sense. The Greek colony, therefore, scarcely amounted to a dependency. If a difficulty occurred between two colonies, interference and support on the part of the mother depended upon policy and convenience rather than upon obligation. Hence it was that in Greek life the colony played a very insignificant part. For the surplus population of Athens and Corinth the colonies were a convenient attraction; but in the process of migration identity with the mother-city was practically lost. Even in the terrible stress of the Peloponnesian War, the colonies were defended by the mother-

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city, not as territory that must be preserved, but as a convenient fighting-ground on which the enemy might be weakened.

There was no certainty that a colony would not, on some slight provocation, turn against the mother-country. When Corcyra, a colony of Corinth, resented the protection which the parent-city had offered to Epidamnus, the Corcyreans sent ambassadors to Athens for help; and when the Athenians replied that the applicants were a colony from Corinth, the answer was: "Every colony, as long as it is treated kindly, respects the mother-country, but when it is injured, is alienated from it; for colonies are not sent out as subjects, but that they may have equal rights with those that remain at home." This reply reveals very perfectly what seems to have been the spirit of Greek colonial life everywhere. The Greek colonies were never regarded as an integral part of the Greek nationalities, and were never an element of national strength.

The case was far different with Rome. In no part of that marvellous political organization which evolved the Roman Empire out of a single city was greater sagacity shown than in the system of colonization. In general, it might be said that the colony followed the army. As soon as a territory was conquered a colony was organized, to keep and control the country taken. This system began in the very earliest history. The colony was duly organized by a *lex*, a *plebiscitum*, or a *senatus consultum*, that is to say, by a charter, and was sent out with all the authority and the protection of Rome itself. The members of the colony were given a certain portion—often a third part—of the lands colonized; and the portion thus assigned was carefully designated and marked by metes and bounds. In order to give solemnity to the act, the colony was installed by a formal religious ceremony; and we can well believe that this ceremonious induction of the new officers impressed upon the native population some notion of the majesty and power of the new Government.

There were several political features of this method of colonization that are especially worthy of notice; for they were the characteristics which for centuries bound the colonies with peculiar firmness to the central Government. In the first place, colonization was always a voluntary movement on the part of the colonists. Then, too, the Roman citizen never lost his citizenship by joining a colony. Whenever he might appear in Rome, he could exercise all the civil rights, and enjoy all the privileges, to which he had ever been entitled. Furthermore, the financial inducements offered in the gift of lands were such

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as to hold out a reasonable hope of improved condition. Finally, the colonists, who in Rome generally belonged to the plebeian or humbler class, practically took the rank of patricians in the new community. These several characteristics offered inducements enough to provide colonists for all the new territories as fast as they were conquered. This was true not only in Italy, but also in Spain, in Gaul, in Britain, and even in some parts of the East. It is worthy of note, also, that in these provisions there were so many elements of strength that everywhere the newly acquired dependencies became rapidly incorporated into the great body politic as an essential part of the growing nationality. The provisions of the fundamental law, that is to say, of the charter, determined the nature of each individual government for itself. This, of course, was framed in a manner that was not inconsistent with the great body of the Roman law. The general excellence of the system is enough to account for that marvellous development of provincial thrift which, in the course of a few centuries, built up the evidences of Roman greatness that remain even to the present day.

The ultimate fall of the Roman Empire was not caused by any weakness of the colonial system, but rather by the defects of the Imperial Government at its very heart. As the dependencies poured their wealth into the lap of Rome, the appetite for luxury was increased by what it fed on; and ingenuity was taxed to increase the supplies. This led to constant attempts, not only to acquire new territory, on the one hand, but also, on the other, to impose ever-increasing exactions upon the dependencies already established. By this policy the outlying provinces were made to feel more and more that in the exchange of taxation for protection the balance was altogether against the dependencies. Thus the ties were loosened and the antipathies increased. These peculiarities were enormously aggravated by the avaricious exactions of the Roman governors. The proconsuls generally went out poor: they almost invariably returned rich. As time went on the provinces became the fields in which reckless and broken-down nobles recruited their fortunes. The process by which this infamous work was done, as described by Cicero in his oration against Verres, was probably repeated in a hundred other regions. Under the Empire it is certain that matters grew worse and worse. Under such conditions it was not strange that the garrisons found it increasingly difficult to preserve order and to enforce the exactions of the imperial authority. The provinces everywhere illustrated the saying of the Corcyreans above quoted.

In the days of the Republic, and during the first century of the Em-

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pire, the system of colonization was no doubt a great element of strength. As Niebuhr said, it consolidated the government, checked the decay of population, and diffused the unity and the language of the nation. But it is certain that, as soon as these results had been accomplished, there was developed an unmistakable tendency in the opposite direction. Guizot, perhaps more clearly than any other historian, has pointed out the fact of this tendency, and its influence on the course of events. With the various revolts of the dependencies Rome had little difficulty in coping; but, when fierce attacks came from without, the result was very different. If the people of the provinces were doomed to be slaves, they were quite willing to change masters. Indeed, the chances seemed to lie in favor of the Government which had the fewest wants, and, therefore, was likely to impose the fewest exactions. Why the mighty Empire crumbled so easily before the onsets of the barbarians has often been clouded by a multitude of learned reasons; but the explanation, when reduced to its lowest terms, is exceedingly simple. It was nothing more nor less than the fact that the exactions of the central Government had become so oppressive that the dependencies were ready, and even glad, to transfer their allegiance to any other Power that might present itself.

In the history of modern colonies and dependencies it is very easy to find causes and results analogous to those which first built up the Roman Empire and then destroyed it. The example of Spain is the one which first suggests itself. The Spanish system was always intrinsically weak in that it never adopted colonization as a policy. It was a system of conquest, and of conquest alone. As soon as the invading army was successful, military rule was established, and exactions were pushed with the extremest severity. No pretence was entertained that the conquered had any rights which the conqueror was bound to respect. From Columbus down to Weyler, the spirit has been essentially the same. Ingenuity was uniformly exercised to the uttermost to devise means by which the largest possible returns to the governing officers and to the mother-country could be procured. It was the method of the later Roman Empire, aggravated by the fact that there were generally no colonists to claim the protection of the home Government. It is not strange, therefore, that the Spanish dependencies have thrown off their allegiance whenever any opportunity has appeared.

There is another phase of the Spanish system of dependencies which should not be overlooked. It is the effect of the enormous streams of wealth which for more than a century went from the provinces to the home Government. The amount of this wealth has not been very generally

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understood; but Soetbeer has recently shown that it was enough to make the Government practically independent of all other sources of income during the whole of the great century which followed the accession of Charles V. The tendencies to absolutism, which Charles and Philip II inherited from the Moorish wars, were therefore reinforced by a fatal financial independence. The effects of these tendencies showed themselves in the rapid decline during the seventeenth century and in the utter collapse which resulted in the War of the Spanish Succession. Here, then, we see in full force and in aggravated form the very evils which resulted in the downfall of the Roman Empire. There was a more successful rapacity on the part of the home Government, and, consequently, a more intensified determination to revolt on the part of the dependencies.

It would be unjust to the colonial systems of France, Portugal, and Holland to say that they were in fact, or even in character, similar to the system of Spain. And yet in no one of these systems has there been any permanent prosperity. If the Dutch dependencies in the East Indies are an apparent exception, even these are not linked to the home Government in such a way as to be in any sense an element of strength. They are scarcely a part of the Dutch nation; and, if they are a source of income, it is only because the vigor of the paternal rule has been tempered by a good system of permanent service, and a shrewd understanding of the needs and characteristics of the subjects. The French colonies in America were so dominated by the spirit of religious propaganda that there would have been little room for political improvement, even if, during what may be called the Colonial period, excellence of government had formed any part of the French system. Even under the French Republic there is little evidence of a clear understanding of the elements of colonial thrift and success.

But with the British Government the case has been very different. As Prof. Seeley pointed out with so much ability in his "Expansion of England" and in his "Growth of the British Empire," the acquisition of new territory has generally been accidental instead of the result of a deliberate policy. Rather it should be said, perhaps, that the defence of dependencies already established, and the defence of the rights of trade, have been the leading motives in the acquisition of new territory. For example, the conquest of India was not the act of a deliberate purpose, but the result of a conflict between English and French trading-companies. But it has always been a principle of British policy that a foothold once obtained must be defended; and the first successes on the

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eastern coast of India led to complications which demanded further advances and conquests. It was much the same in Africa. The acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope by treaty from Holland led to conflicts with the surrounding neighbors, as well as to the advance of the frontier, much as the frontier has been advanced in the United States. But, however lacking in systematic premeditation the various steps of British advancement may have been, there is to be found no absence of system in the method of government, when territory has once been acquired. The systems in Canada, in India, and in Australasia differ, one from another, in many and in essential particulars; but, when they are analyzed, it will be found that success has been attained in all cases as the result of certain fundamental characteristics.

In the first place, the British have uniformly, at least ever since the American Revolution, organized the government of their dependencies with specific regard to the rights of the people governed. In theory, and, for the most part, in fact, they have given political privileges and liberties as rapidly as, in their opinion, a due regard for good government and stability would warrant. It would certainly be correct to say that they have seldom failed to convince the leading minds of their dependencies that the people are better off than they would be if they were free from the British rule. On no other theory can the fact be explained that the three hundred million people of India, with all their complicated and minutely organized systems of native presidencies and governments, are content to remain under the rule of a few score of British officers and a few thousand British soldiers. It is doubtful if the government of India can ever be as free as is the government of Canada or the government of Australia. But the tendency is in that direction; for the natives are made to believe that their political and individual rights will be increased as rapidly as such rights may be justified by an increase of order and intelligence. Prof. Seeley expresses grave doubts whether the British Empire has been strengthened by the possession of India. He even intimates that, in his opinion, the occupation of India to-day is a source of weakness rather than an element of strength. But he lays great stress upon the responsibility that accompanies the possession; and it is that very sense of obligation to the people of the dependencies that has done so much to keep the dependent governments from degenerating into mere sources of income.

The second fundamental element of thrift and strength in the British dependencies has been the character and intelligence of the men that have been charged with provincial affairs. The British early came to

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see that, to secure good governments so far away from home, a systematic service must be established. Into this service, in one way or another, men of the highest intelligence and integrity must be induced to enter. It was seen that, to secure this result, compensation must be large, and the tenure of service must be relieved from the contingencies of political vicissitudes. No man of parts would think of going to India for a long term of service without great inducements. The Government wisely settled the matter in a large way. Those who have read that most delightful of English biographies, Trevelyan's "Life of Macaulay," must remember the description Macaulay gives of the reasons which led him to banish himself for five years to India. He was without a fortune; and, in order to be a useful Member of Parliament, he had to be independent. He was offered a position on the Council of the Indian Government at a salary of £10,000 a year. Being a bachelor, he believed he could live, even in India, on one-half the salary, and return at the end of five years with an independent fortune of £25,000. The importance of the incident is in the light which it throws on the British method of securing the men they desire. Mr. Kidd has recently called attention to the maxim prevalent in the British Government that "power must be paid." By a rational interpretation of this maxim, the Government has been able to secure for the Indian Service two invaluable results,—men of signal ability, and men who were raised above the temptation to increase their fortunes by speculation and fraud.

But this system of very large pecuniary inducement could well be applied only to the very highest offices. To attract capable men to the offices lower than the very highest, other means had to be used. A Civil Service analogous to the present service in our army and navy was early established. A good education, permanency of tenure, pensions at the end of long service, good social standing,—these are the inducements which, even without high salaries, are able to fill the armies and navies of Europe and America with officers of the highest capacity and integrity. Long before the modern Civil Service system was adopted in England the British had tried a similar service with extraordinary success in India. Permanency of tenure was established, promotions were made on the basis of requisite examinations, and pensions were as liberally provided for as in the military and naval services. In order that the requisite education might be secured Haileybury College was established for the special purpose of training young men for the Indian Civil Service; and this college was continued until it was found that the universities were giving all the training needed for the Civil Service examinations. It

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is well known that the success of this experience had much to do with bringing about a similar Civil Service system in the home Government.

Here, then, were the three factors of British success; viz., (1) respect for the rights of the natives in the provinces ruled; (2) salaries which commanded the highest grade of character and talent for the chief offices; and (3) a Civil Service which attracted young men of ability and ambition to enter the subordinate positions. It has been with political machinery thus constructed that Great Britain has bound her colonies and dependencies to the home Government, and brought about a solidity and a loyalty which, with their ever-growing vitality, constitute perhaps the greatest political achievement in the history of the world.

The failures and the successes of other Governments cannot be without their importance in the study of the great questions now confronting the American people. Dependencies are upon our hands; and the question how we are to govern them will unquestionably be the most absorbing topic of our political life for months, if not for years, to come.

Military rule, however fortunate we may be in having officers that command universal respect, cannot be seriously considered as a permanent method. Sooner or later we must adopt a method of civil government to which the military commanders shall be subordinate; and upon our success in determining the characteristics of such government will, in truth, depend the success of our insular policy.

It does not seem probable that the constitutional question, as to our right to acquire and hold and govern new territory, will present any permanent embarrassment. That problem was solved by the Louisiana Purchase and by the subsequent decisions and dicta of the Supreme Court concerning it. Public opinion, moreover, has heartily acquiesced in the right and propriety of these acts. Florida, California, Oregon, and Alaska have also been acquired by treaty in a similar way. The method of annexing Texas and Hawaii was different; but these acquisitions, also, were founded on the proposition that the right to acquire new territory was firmly established, if not unquestionable.

Nor can the constitutional right be successfully questioned by the matter of motive as to the use to which the new territory is to be put. Surely there can be no permanent consideration given to the plea that we may acquire territory for one use and not for another. It may be difficult to find any intimation in the Constitution that we may acquire new territory for any purpose whatever. But territory has been acquired, for one purpose in the case of Florida and Texas, and for another in the

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case of Alaska. The Constitution makes provision for the government of territories; and, whatever the thought of the Fathers in regard to the matter, this provision has been historically applied to territories acquired since 1789, as well as to those in possession of the Government when the Constitution was framed. The unquestionable implication is that any territory in the possession of the Government may be governed as a Territory until Congress shall see fit to change the form of its government into that of a State. Nevada, if we may believe the remarkable statement recently made in his Memoirs by Mr. Charles A. Dana, was admitted to the Union in the course of the Civil War, not because the Territory was considered fit to be a State, but because the President and Congress thought the country needed Nevada in the Union at that particular moment. No such exigency has attached to New Mexico; and New Mexico has remained a Territory fifty years. Alaska will remain a Territory indefinitely.

Then, too, the general system of constitutional interpretation that has come to prevail points in the same direction. Right or wrong, what is called "strict" construction has not adapted itself to the needs of the growing country. The example was set by Marshall, the greatest of our judges, of giving the nation the benefit of the doubt. And, when we think of it, we find it hard to resist the conclusion that this was the only possible method of securing national perpetuity. The difficulties in the way of amending the Constitution are so great as to make amendment almost impossible. It is significant that no amendment has ever been adopted for the purpose of extending power, but all have been made for the purpose of restricting it.

But, if a constitution framed more than a century ago cannot be amended, it must certainly be interpreted with great flexibility. It is mere commonplace to say that steam and electricity have made the world very different from what it was in the eighteenth century; but we sometimes fail to realize that those differences have gone into the matter of government as well as into the matter of industrial and commercial life. Even diplomacy has been revolutionized; and not only the policies, but, to a large extent, even the methods and the details, of Governments all over the world are now determined at the national capital. The Philippine Islands are not so far away from Washington as was the Northwest Territory a hundred years ago. It was not so easy to reinforce and direct St. Clair as it has been to reinforce and direct Dewey. President McKinley, with his Board of Strategy, can far more easily and intelligently direct movements in the waters of China

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than Madison could direct Gen. Jackson at New Orleans, or even at Pensacola.

Now a constitution, however marvellous its intrinsic excellences a hundred years ago, and however wonderfully adapted to the wants of a growing nation, could not, in the nature of things, make definite and specific provisions for such new conditions. Moreover, the demands made by the new conditions cannot be set aside: on the contrary, they are often imperative and irresistible. No intelligent people will ever be permanently bound by an obstructing law, or even an obstructing constitution, that cannot be changed. If, therefore, the Constitution, in case it unmistakably and persistently resists the demands of public opinion, cannot be modified, it will either bend or break. In the development of the country thus far it has, with all needed flexibility, yielded to new necessities. The inference as to what is likely to occur in the future is unmistakably plain; and the question, as to the propriety and desirability of the permanent occupation of insular territory, so far from being one of constitutional law, is simply one to be determined by considerations of national policy.

Our national history has been one of expansion. It is probable that Washington never thought of the possibility of our acquiring territory west of the Mississippi River. Certain it is that no provision was made in the Constitution for dealing with any additional domain. But, notwithstanding this important fact, we began the policy of Expansion almost at the beginning of the century. A mere naming of the different acquisitions with the corresponding dates is enough to show that this policy has not been the accidental characteristic of any one period or of any one party. The Louisiana Purchase in 1803; the acquisition of Florida in 1819; the annexation of Texas in 1845; the acquisition of Oregon in 1846; the acquisition of California and New Mexico in 1848; the Gadsden Purchase in 1853; the purchase of Alaska in 1867,—these have been enough not only to indicate a definite line of policy, but also to more than double the territory for which the Constitution was framed.

It would be interesting to point out in detail the various arguments that have from time to time been presented in opposition to this irresistible policy; but it is enough to say that they were singularly analogous to those we are hearing at the present moment. "How can new territory be admitted without the consent of all the States of the Union?" Jefferson asked the question; and, when nobody answered it, even the President himself did not allow the constitutional scruple to stand in his way. "How can the French and the Spanish and the In-

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dians, all with their own peculiar methods and laws, be brought under the American Constitution?" No answer was formally given; but, after the territory was annexed, it was found that the provisions of the great Ordinance of 1787 for the Government of the Northwest Territory served as an excellent model, and, as a matter of fact, worked well in practice. And so it was in regard to a hundred other objections. They were answered, not in a way that was logically satisfactory, but by the stern sequence of successful events.

If, as Guizot once said, "there is nothing that tortures history more than logic," it is also true that logic and consistency may become the bugbear of small statesmanship. The moment a phrase or a maxim is taken out of its original setting and purpose, and applied to the perpetual control of current affairs, it drives all action into a system of helpless doctrinarianism. Few Americans will dissent from the general proposition that governments "derive their just powers form the consent of the governed"; but we have imposed government over the Negroes and the Indians without taking the trouble to ask their consent. We might go further, and say that the women of the country are governed by laws to which their consent has never been obtained. Indeed, the maxim can never be made to apply in practice, unless it is understood to mean simply that Governments are most successful when their policy is determined by a majority of those who happen to be in power. It is only by this application of the maxim that we can justify the rule of Republicans over Democrats, or that of Democrats over Republicans; for neither party has ever consented to be ruled by the other. In fact, it is only the majority that ever gives its consent.

It was less than fifteen years after the adoption of that great arsenal of valuable political apothegms known as the Declaration of Independence that Congress also adopted the Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory. The importance of that fundamental law has been universally admitted. Indeed, it may be said that, with the single exception of the Constitution itself, it is probably entitled to higher consideration and respect than any other kindred instrument that has been formulated in the history of the country. And yet the provision which it made for the government of the Northwest Territory was singularly undemocratic. At first, all power was put into the hands of a governor, a secretary, and three judges appointed by Congress, subject only to certain unimportant limitations imposed in the Ordinance itself. They were to "adopt and publish in the district such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may be necessary and best suited to the circumstances

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of the district." The laws adopted by these five men, unless revoked by Congress, were to be in force until there should be "five thousand free male inhabitants of full age in the district," when a General Assembly was to be elected, in regard to which Section 9 of the Ordinance reads:

"Provided, that no person be eligible or qualified to act as a representative, unless he shall have been a citizen of the United States three years, and be a resident of the district, or unless he shall have resided in the district three years; and in either case shall likewise hold in his own right in fee simple two hundred acres of land within the same. Provided also that a freehold in fifty acres of land in the district, having been a citizen of one of the States, and being a resident in the district, or the like freehold and two years' residence in the district, shall be necessary to qualify a man as an elector of a representative."

The provisions of this Ordinance, which served as well for the government of the Louisiana and the Florida Territories as for the Northwest, show conclusively just how far the Fathers were controlled by the doctrine of "the consent of the governed." These provisions also show that our modern dependencies may be much more easily governed by reverting to the restrictive system of the Fathers than by adopting the more liberal systems that have recently come to prevail. If the earlier suggestions should be followed, it would seem to be no very difficult task for modern statesmanship to devise a promising system of government for our new dependencies.

It is evident, however, that, in order to insure even a prospect of success, certain conditions must be sternly complied with. There is little reason to suppose that the new tropical dependencies will attract any considerable number of immigrants; and, therefore, the most promising method of government will be that which has been found so successful in the experience of the English under similar conditions. The methods of other nations are chiefly valuable for showing what we ought to avoid; and so it may be said that the English Government has not only been remarkably successful in the control of its dependencies, but has also been the only modern Government that in this field has had any success whatever.

What to avoid we can learn from many quarters. If we are to advance in a haphazard way, we shall commit the blunders which have wrecked so many attempts, and shall only add another to the failures which are so thickly strewn along the course of history. But, fortunately, no one of the elements of British success is fundamentally abhorrent to our own system and methods. It is true we have advanced very slowly in the improvement of our Civil Service. But the English Government advanced quite as slowly as we have done; and they came

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finally to adopt the method, which has so completely transformed and purified the home Government, only after the same method had demonstrated its value and efficiency in the provinces. Surely such a method is not impossible of imitation; and there is no more reason why we should hesitate to imitate it than there is why we should hesitate to imitate the English jury system, or the Australian ballot system. No good method of government is patented or copyrighted; and any system which has been found unmistakably to reduce the evils which are always found under every other system ought to be freely made use of.

Nor ought we to hesitate to take a lesson from the British in regard to the pecuniary inducements offered to talent and character for service in the dependencies. The United Kingdom, we are told, does not strive for an income from the dependencies; but it insists that the dependencies shall support their own Governments. The salaries of provincial officers are not a burden upon the home treasury. Nor, inasmuch as efficiency and honesty are secured, are they a burden upon the provincial treasuries.

It may as well be admitted at the very outset that there can be no reasonable hope of large success, unless the character of the service for eminent respectability and usefulness be raised far above the temptations of peculation. The statement of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, that in recent times no British civil officer, either at home or in the provinces, has been accused by friend or foe of using his position for his own benefit, is a most extraordinary tribute to the British system, and is all the more remarkable because it is well known that provincial Governments have always presented peculiar temptations. If we are to take our lessons from success, rather than from failure, we must unhesitatingly adopt three fundamental principles in the organization of our service. We must pay salaries high enough to attract ability and integrity into the service; we must have a tenure of office that is not subject to the vicissitudes of political changes at home; and we must have a system of admission to the service and of promotion after the service has been entered strictly dependent upon a judiciously prepared system of examinations. If this method should be adopted, it is impossible to see why we should not be able to build up an efficient and incorruptible Civil Service. To admit the impossibility of such would be to admit that we are better fitted for the affairs of war than for those of peace.

We have not been accustomed to shrink from large undertakings. Our history shows that we deal with large things more successfully than with small ones. We have shown ourselves able to cope with the larg-

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est of evils, when they have once touched the popular imagination. The fundamental conservatism of the country is, doubtless, slow to act; but it acts with irresistible force when once it is aroused. It would not admit that it has yet been baffled by any political or social problem. If the people have been negligent of reforms or improvements, it has been because they have been too busy with attending to their own ever-increasing prosperity. But this negligence implies no inability and no lack of determination. It is unquestionably the will of the people that we should have and should hold what we have taken. This policy appeals to the consciousness of destiny. By repeated annexations we advanced to the Pacific. In the centuries to come the great ocean at the west may be as important commercially as the smaller ocean at the east. It is in the course of nature that the most prominent Power in its waters should be the United States. To advance still further is in accordance with the uninterrupted tendency of the country. To decline to take and to keep what the fortunes of the most righteous of wars has given us would be to arrest the great current of our historic advance, to throw away one of the greatest of opportunities, and to confess national incompetence.

The deeper meanings of this movement should also have a place in the consideration of the question. We seem to be on the eve of great international changes. Indeed, such changes appear already to have begun. The revolution in China can hardly do less than open the country to the trade of the world. Railways will be constructed, waterways will be improved, and the unmeasured wealth of agricultural and mineral resources will for the first time be thrown open to commercial enterprise. Civilization is closing in upon barbarism as never before. The survival of the fittest seems to be the law of nations as well as a law of nature. As Mr. Kidd has so forcibly pointed out, the temperate zone is now occupied. The prodigious contributions which science has recently made to the processes of manufacture and transportation are forcing such a movement into the tropics as history has never before known.

Shall the people of the United States take no part in this world movement? And, if they take part in the movement, shall they leave unprotected their interests at a distance of thousands of miles? It is not difficult to foretell the answer to these questions. And the movement is not one of imperialism; it is simply the application of republican methods to the government of people that have never known any other methods than those of anarchy, rapacity, and cruelty.

CHARLES KENDALL ADAMS.

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WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE PHILIPPINES?

It is too soon to draw party lines on the question of what to do with the Philippine Islands. Until the President has developed his policy, about which he has not uttered a word, and until Congress has passed on the matters involved, it will be impossible to determine what issues are before us.

Before these lines are in print it is probable that the Treaty will have been ratified. There will then remain the question written at the head of this article: "What shall we do with the Philippines?" I propose to endeavor to assist the readers of THE FORUM to arrive at a correct conclusion on this subject, by some short reference to our past colonial policy and to that which it is proposed to adopt with regard to the Hawaiian Islands.

The first colony we ever had, after we ceased to be colonies ourselves, was the Northwest Territory. The Act organizing this Territory was passed in 1787. It preceded the adoption of the Constitution; but it was acted on afterward. Until the Territory should have five thousand inhabitants it was to be governed by a governor, secretary, and three judges, appointed by Congress. These officers were to select any laws they pleased from the laws of the original States, and put them in force over the Territory. All these officers had to be freeholders in the Territory. This process of lawmaking was almost as crude and positive as the systems which prevail in Russia and China to-day. There were no legislators elected, and no voters to vote for any.

This same provision for the government of the Northwest Territory was applied to the territory south of the Ohio River in 1790, to that of Mississippi in 1798, to Indiana in 1800, to Michigan in 1805, and practically to Illinois in 1809. In the Territory of Louisiana the first Act vested all civil, military, and judicial powers in such persons as the President might direct. The next year the legislative power was vested in a council consisting of thirteen persons to be appointed by the President. Similar legislation was extended to what is now the State of Missouri; and from 1805 to 1812 the Territory was governed by laws made by a governor and three judges,—or a majority of them,—who had the power to make all laws.

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To illustrate our colonial system, take the case of Alaska. For sixteen years, 1868–1884, Alaska had almost no government whatever except the will of the President. He was authorized to make rules concerning the fisheries, firearms, and liquors; and the customs and navigation laws were extended to the Territory.

It is a trite matter to call attention to the District of Columbia, which is as complete a specimen of colonial government as exists in this world. It is governed by Congress; and no one of its quarter of a million of people can vote. We could not, if we wished, give the Philippines a stronger government.

We, who are a trifle progressive, are called "Imperialists," because we are not going to allow the poor Filipinos to vote. Probably we are not going to allow them to vote until we are satisfied they can vote intelligently; but, just as certainly, when the time comes that the Islanders are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage they will get it. In all human probability they will secure it sooner than some of the Negro population in some of the Southern States. Gentlemen of the South, gentlemen of Dixie—some of us Imperialists do not blame you at all for taking all possible legal measures to protect your cherished rights. Will you not forgive us, if we pursue the same policy with regard to a new and untried race?

And now let us see how the generation of to-day proposes practically to meet the questions growing out of the annexation of Hawaii. It will be instructive because it may forecast to some extent the action of Congress touching the Philippines.

By the "Joint resolution to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States," approved July 7, 1898, five commissioners were provided for, to "recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem necessary or proper." The commission consisted of Shelby M. Cullom, chairman, John T. Morgan, Robert R. Hitt, Sanford B. Dole, and Walter F. Frear. The first two of these were Senators; the third was a Member of the House of Representatives; and the last two were residents of Hawaii,—one having been President, and the other being an able and distinguished jurist.

They visited Hawaii, Maui, Oahu, and Molokai, and their report, together with a bill submitted by them, is before Congress, from which the following facts appear: The population is composed of different races and nationalities. Of Hawaiians and mixed blood there are 39,000; Japanese, 25,000; Chinese, 21,500; Portuguese, 15,000; Americans, 4,000; British, 2,250; Germans and other Europeans, 2,000; Poly-

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nesians and miscellaneous, 1,250; total, 110,000. The native people are kindly and affectionate. Many of the Japanese are contract laborers. About 700 Chinese have been naturalized. Nearly all the Chinese laborers desire to return to China. The Japanese are not so particular about returning to Japan. Although the Americans are in a small minority, they practically dominate the affairs of the country politically, financially, and commercially. The Islands are about 2,100 miles southwest of San Francisco, and are between 18° and 23° north latitude and 154° and 161° west longitude.

The climate is modified by the trade winds and by the Japanese gulf stream. During the warmest month of the year, September, the temperature is about 78°—except for two hours in the middle of the day. The area of the island of Hawaii is 4,210 square miles, and the population 33,285; Maui has 760 square miles and 17,726 population; Oahu, 600 square miles and 40,205 population. There are sixteen other small islands.

On the north side of Molokai there is a leper settlement, where about 1,100 lepers are cared for by the Government of Hawaii.

The Commissioners report that the United States, in owning Pearl Harbor, hold the key to the commerce of China, Japan, and Australia. It is proposed to erect the Islands into "The Territory of Hawaii." Citizenship of the United States is provided for in Section 4 as follows:

"All white persons, including Portuguese, and persons of African descent, and all persons descended from the Hawaiian race on either the paternal or maternal side, who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii immediately prior to the transfer of the sovereignty thereof to the United States, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States."

A legislature consisting of two houses, as in our system, is provided for. The Supreme Court is the judge of the legality of elections. Members of the legislature are not eligible for appointment, or election, to any office; and no officer or employee of the Territory is eligible for election to the legislature. In voting for members of the legislature each voter may cast for one representative as many votes as there are representatives to be elected, or he may apportion them.

The Senate is to consist of fifteen members. A Senator must be thirty years old, a male citizen of the United States, and must own $2,000 worth of property, or have received during the preceding year $1,000 income. He must have resided in the Territory three years. A Member of the House of Representatives must be a male citizen of the

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United States, twenty-five years old, a resident of the Territory for three years, worth $500 in property, or have had an income of $250 during the preceding year.

A voter for a Representative must be a male citizen, a resident in the Territory for one year, twenty-one years old, have registered, have paid all taxes due, and be able to speak, read, and write the English or Hawaiian language.

To vote for Senator a person must possess all the above qualifications, and, in addition, must own and possess real property worth $1,000, on which valuation legal taxes have been paid, or have received an income of not less than $600 during the preceding year.

Space will not permit me to pursue in detail all the features of the scheme of government. Boards of registration are provided for. A governor, secretary, a United States district judge, a United States district attorney, and a United States marshal are to be appointed. The Governor has the veto, which may be overridden by a two-thirds vote. There is to be a delegate to Congress. The Hawaiian laws not inconsistent with the Constitution, or with the laws of the United States, are to remain in force until repealed or altered by Congress.

Here, then, is a scheme of government, in the main similar to our own Territorial system, provided for a people of whom the overwhelming majority are Hawaiians, Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese, and of whom but 4,000 are Americans.

It is claimed by the Commissioners that the people of Hawaii are capable of self-government, and have proved this by the establishment of a republic.

It cannot, however, be admitted that, simply because a republic has not existed in a country up to a given time, the people thereof are incapable of establishing one and of governing themselves. The case of Hawaii itself disproves such an allegation; and the luminous pages of history, from Rome to France, deny it. In self-government there must, as in other things, be a beginning.

It is the fashion, imitating the performance of the Gridiron Club, at Washington, to treat the Filipinos as savages, and as living without any government in a state of nature. The facts are that the Islands are divided into four provinces, and four military districts, and are governed by politico-military commanders. There is a captain-general and a lieutenant-governor. There are mayors of cities, petty governors, alcaldes, and, in fact, all the usual machinery of government. The people are intelligent and kindly, and are imbued with republican principles. To

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say that we want to enslave these people is a slander. To say that we shall not improve their condition is to contradict history.

It is just as idle to say that the possession and control of the Philippines will not benefit our trade and commerce. Our trade with China is growing. It increased from 11,000,000 taels in 1890 to more than 30,000,000 in 1897. This statement does not include imports and exports which go and come through Hong Kong and London. Unless every writer on the affairs of the Far East is mistaken, Eastern Asia to-day presents the most important field for commerce that the world contains. Railroad-building in China, Manchuria, and Siberia may well occupy the time and attention of the manufacturer of steel and iron, in which industry we hold the first place in the world. After lumber, and next to refrigerated and canned meat, the iron and steel industry in the United States is the most valuable and important.

There rises in the path of progress in China but one dangerous spectre; and that is the partition of the Celestial Empire. Our retention of the Philippines will tend to prevent the destruction of the Empire, and to preserve for us an invaluable market.

Since the foregoing was written the writer has been appointed a member of the Commission to the Philippines. When the article appears in THE FORUM he will be far away on the Pacific Ocean, journeying to his post. It is apparent that he can no longer with propriety discuss in print the vexed questions which lie before us as a nation. His business, until his mission is terminated, will be to carry out the instructions of the President. The magazine writer, untrammelled by public responsibility, may wander at will in the enchanted fields of literary disquisition; but the official charged with grave duties should write and speak as little as he can. This article, therefore, must close more abruptly than was intended. It would have been entirely withdrawn, but for the fear that the editor and publisher might thereby have been embarrassed.

CHARLES DENBY.

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INFLUENCE OF THE WAR ON OUR PUBLIC LIFE.

MODERN history is a record of alternating periods of intense individualism and strong national feeling. Rapid economic growth accompanies the one: vigorous and buoyant political life characterizes the other. In our own political development the periods of assertive national policy give evidence of strong national feeling. The promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine marked the flood-tide of the spirit of Americanism: it rests upon an abiding faith in the institutions of the New World. At the present time we find it difficult to picture the enthusiasm aroused by our early foreign policy; but to the generation of the early twenties the leadership of the United States in the affairs of the American continent seemed a matter of course. This deeply rooted conviction as to our national destiny gave a moral elevation and dignity to political life which it has not again attained. While the Slavery struggle contained the elements of a high moral purpose, the political feeling it aroused was sectional rather than national.

Since the Civil War we have been passing through a period of intense individualism. Political struggles have failed to arouse either strong national feelings or high ethical ideals. Individual, class, and sectional interests have been made prominent by the commercial and industrial questions to which the attention of the people has been directed. The manufacturer has desired a high tariff to increase his profits; the working-man, in order to raise his wages. The creditor has advocated a gold standard; the debtor, a silver standard. Thus the tendency to judge public questions from a purely individualistic, a dollar-and-cents standpoint has been gradually incorporated into our political thinking. The effect upon the public life of the country is clearly apparent. To one section of the population government is a necessary evil, designed to avoid the greater harm that would result from the clash of individual activities; while to another it is something akin to a great business corporation dispensing favors and patronage. The scramble for privileges at the expense of the community is not confined to any one class. The huckster obtains special rights on the public highways in exchange for his vote: the wealthy corporation receives valuable franchises in re-

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turn for an annual contribution to the party treasury. In short, the character of our political life has drawn attention exclusively to those of its phases that promise personal gain.

Our attitude toward government and, in fact, all our political ideas have been strongly influenced by this spirit of individualism. Protection to life, liberty, and property, which, to the American mind, is the starting-point as well as the end of government, is but the formulation in law of one of the leading tenets of our political creed. The mechanism of government, with its manifold checks and balances, is designed to give the individual a free field of activity; while the restrictions of governmental action contained in our State and Federal constitutions serve to keep the public authority within the bounds of its more negative *rôle* as guarantor of individual rights. So long as these rights are protected, the American public remains indifferent to inefficiency, wastefulness, and even corruption in the administration of public affairs.

In our industrial life we stand before the nations of Europe as the personification of individual initiative and enterprise. The exceptional opportunities afforded by a country of imperfectly exploited resources arouse a spirit of independence, which tends to weaken political ties and to lessen the interest in the activity of government. In Europe the manufacturer and merchant are constantly seeking the recognition and coöperation of the public authority: in the United States these classes wish to be assured of governmental passivity. While special privileges are eagerly sought, private enterprise does not wait upon governmental encouragement; nor does it seek to enlist governmental coöperation. Students of American history have dwelt at great length, and justly so, upon the services which this spirit of self-reliance and self-assurance has rendered. It has fostered those qualities that make for economic growth and prosperity. The marvellous development of inventive genius, the utilization of every productive resource, the discovery of new forms of capitalistic combination and association, are all directly traceable to its influence.

Until within recent years, any suggestion that this intense individualism—which, in its political garb, we are accustomed to call "individual liberty"—was overshadowing qualities equally essential to national greatness would have received little attention. But as the lack of interest in public affairs becomes more apparent, and the solution of many of our internal problems shows the necessity of a deeper sense of political obligation, the conviction is gaining ground that we are developing abnormally in one direction, and that the individualistic tendencies of our political life must be offset by higher national ideals.

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We are thus brought to the threshold of a struggle from which no nation has escaped—the conflict between liberty and authority. Each stage of political evolution calls for a new combination of these two principles: over-development in either direction means stagnation and decline. Periods of national development, in which one is strongly emphasized, give rise to conditions demanding the application of the other. Equilibrium, however, is not automatically restored. Habits of thought and principles of political policy maintain themselves long after the conditions from which they derive their justification have disappeared. The resulting contradiction has been fatal to every one of the ancient civilizations. It explains the conquest of Greece, the decline of Rome, and the downfall of the Renaissance republics.

Among modern nations England furnishes the only instance of an effective combination of liberty and authority, presenting in this respect some significant contrasts with our own conditions. Owing to her insular position, industrial advance involved territorial acquisition, particularly at a time when colonial possessions meant the exclusive enjoyment of commercial privileges. Although some of the largest of the early colonial enterprises were inaugurated by trading companies, colonization soon became a distinctive governmental function. The development of great naval strength, made necessary by this policy of territorial expansion, increased further the power of the public authority, and kept before the minds of the English people the importance of the state in the life of the nation. This growing appreciation of the part played by government served to counteract the individualistic tendencies fostered by commercial freedom and by the Reformation.

In the United States during the last three decades the individualistic spirit has met with no such counteracting force. It is not surprising, therefore, that the present generation should show but little appreciation of national power and influence. Its political thinking and ideals are, as I have said, individualistic rather than national. To develop such national ideals has been the central thought in every effort for political reform.

In these attempts to raise the level of our political life some have appealed to the more selfish instincts; but the argument, that devotion to public affairs pays in the long run, has had but little effect. Others have invoked purely ethical considerations, emphasizing the duties of the citizen, but have met with no greater success. A misapprehension as to the nature of the incentives to public devotion and sacrifice has been at the root of the difficulty. The ideals of the nation, rather than the reason and calculation of the individual, constitute the source of civic

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strength and activity. Where such ideals are grouped about the individual and his welfare, rather than about the nation, there will be little response to argument and exhortation, no matter how strong the appeal. To awaken in a people a high sense of obligation to its past and future, requires the inspiring touch of events that fire the imagination and make vivid the picture of its power among the nations. In other words, the policy of the country, past or present, must furnish the elements from which national ideals are formed. The possibilities of national power and influence once clearly seen, intense civic activity is certain to follow. Everyone is inspired with the desire to contribute something toward making a reality of these possibilities: the thought of self is merged in that larger national purpose compared with which individual ends seem petty and subordinate. Thus, where the appeal to utilitarian calculation is unavailing, the stirring force of some great national achievement is all-powerful.

Ancient Rome, Renaissance Florence, modern Germany, and united Italy furnish striking instances of this fact. The history of England during the present century is also one continuous demonstration of the influence of great national power—particularly as manifested in international relations—upon public life. The consciousness that upon the policy of the Government the fate of nations depends, the conviction that every important move in the world's affairs awaits England's co-operation, have developed high standards of civic morality. The constant object-lessons of national strength arouse the active interest of the population in the affairs of the nation; while the ideals of national influence thus awakened strengthen national ties, and guard against the more extreme forms of class-antagonism.

The contrast between the periods of strong national feeling and pronounced individualism in American political development, with the lessons of European—particularly English—experience, give some clew to the requisites for our further political advance. Viewed in the light of this contrast, a new and deeper meaning attaches to the vigorous national policy which the logic of events is compelling us to adopt. We now are entering upon a period of national feeling similar in some respects to that of the Monroe era. The reluctance to accept the new situation, evinced in many quarters, is but the natural result of our pronounced individualism, which has obscured the obligations attaching to commercial expansion and national growth. The readjustment of the country's international relations, which must follow the recent struggle with Spain, will supply the connecting link between our economic and political de-

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velopment. Its influence, however, will extend far beyond these limits. It will modify our political ideas, develop a broader view of the country's relation to the larger affairs of the world, and react upon domestic politics, with the result of raising the level of our public life.

The first effect in point of time, if not in importance, will be to give to the population a clearer appreciation of the foreign policy which the country's political and economic position demands. The popular view of our present relation to the East and to the West has been largely determined by the individualistic spirit of the age, the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine itself being colored by its influence. "Prohibition of European interference with the political arrangements of the New World" is the keynote of the policy of Adams and Monroe. Instead of making this positive rule the guiding principle in our relations with foreign Powers, we have given first place to a negative corollary which is in closer harmony with the political ideas of the last three decades. The principle of minding one's own business, which expresses the average American's view of his relation to the community, is carried into the domain of politics. Government must concern itself with domestic affairs, and with these alone. The advice of the founders of the Republic serves to strengthen this conviction. With example, inclination, and precept all uniting to influence our political thinking, it is not surprising to find our foreign policy construed to mean that wherever Europe lays her hands, provided she does not encroach upon the American continent, we will carefully avoid all contact.

In this interpretation of our relation to European affairs, we are apt to forget that political conditions have completely changed since the beginning of the century. Many of the purely political reasons for isolation have disappeared. The steady advance of popular government has lessened the contrast between the political systems of the Old World and the New. The nations of Europe are no longer the down-trodden and despot-ridden peoples of the early decades of the century. Nor can we point to ourselves as the only country enjoying civil and political liberty. In short, the inherited prejudice against contact with the monarchical institutions of Europe has lost all justification. At no time have the Old World and the New had so much in common. Many of their problems are strikingly similar; and it is but natural that each should look to the other for valuable lessons of experience.

The change in economic conditions has been equally far-reaching. Instead of eleven millions of population we have now more than seventy, with all the problems which that growth implies. The railroad, the

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steamship, and the telegraph, while establishing closer communication between the different sections of the country, have destroyed our commercial and political isolation. During the seventy-five years that have elapsed since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine the political map of the globe has undergone radical transformation. European dominion and influence now cover large portions of the Far East. Each year we are necessarily brought into closer contact with the institutions of the Old World. The eastward movement of Western civilization has placed the United States in an entirely new relation with foreign Powers.

As against a strong national conviction, mere argumentation, or even demonstration, is, however, of little avail. The irresistible force of events is necessary to produce any lasting impression. Our interest in the West Indies and in the Philippines, whatever may be the ultimate disposition of these islands, is certain to hasten the adaptation of our political ideas to the demands of economic and social growth. The advance from a position of economic dependence to one of equality with Europe carries with it obligations from which we cannot escape. Closer contact with the Far East will make clear where the great commercial opportunities lie. The peculiar conditions of trade in that portion of the globe demand that our Government pave the way for commercial supremacy. Our merchants and manufacturers will no longer remain indifferent to the scramble of the European Powers for special trade privileges. Thus, little by little, the negative attitude of the American people toward Government will give way to a more positive interpretation of its *rôle*. Non-interference with European affairs will no longer be interpreted as isolation from European contact. In short, the doctrine of political isolation, based on the Monroe Doctrine, is likely to be set at rest by the force of recent events.

Another and hardly less important result of the present struggle will show itself in the relation of the Constitution to American political life. The enormous influence it has exerted upon the thought and activity of the people is fully explained by its content. Prohibitions upon government and specific guarantees to individual rights make up the body of the instrument; while positive grants of governmental power occupy a subordinate position. The Constitution is thus the clearest legal expression of the individualistic spirit; and it is regarded by the average American as the epitome of political wisdom,—a body of rules designed to guide a progressive nation for all time. To suggest any change, except in times of stress and strife, is little short of sacrilege. Its hold upon the minds of the people is so strong that questions of pub-

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lic policy are tested by constitutional standards before their merits are examined. The recent Income-Tax decision furnishes a striking illustration of this. The opinion of the Supreme Court disposed of the measure far more effectually than a verdict at the polls.

This reverence for the Constitution has given us a long period of unexampled political stability, in striking contrast with the condition of France, where the ever-varying currents of popular opinion are constantly threatening anarchy and disruption. The advantage that we have derived from the unswerving loyalty to the instrument has, however, obscured the dangers of the situation. Harmony between law and economic conditions is essential to vigorous political growth. A written constitution, no matter how perfect originally, must derive its strength and justification from the conditions to which it is applied. Unless changes in conditions are reflected in the instrument, or in its interpretation, political stagnation and disruption are sure to follow.

While it is comparatively easy to demonstrate the validity of these general principles, to ensure their constant application requires the convincing force of events, of actual problems such as those which the present struggle will involve. The control of Spain's former colonial possessions, whether temporary or permanent, will make it necessary to devise forms of government hitherto unknown to the Constitution. This alone will place the instrument in a new light before the people. It will show us that great questions of public policy cannot be summarily disposed of by the argument that the Constitution does not contemplate any such development. Whatever the decision upon the question of territorial expansion, it must be based upon a careful consideration of all the factors involved, of which the Constitution is but one. A century of growth has developed problems which the founders of the Republic could not have foreseen; and to these the Constitution must be adapted.

Unless the signs of the times are fundamentally misleading, the influence of the period of strong national feeling into which we are entering will be most clearly felt in its effects upon our civic life. Indications of the change are already apparent in the newspaper press, in the tenor of public meetings, and in all the organs of public opinion. They give evidence of an intensity of patriotic feeling which is certain to give a new importance to our perplexing internal problems. The sacrifice of life and treasure in the vindication of national policy will long leave its impress upon the public mind. A nation that has once placed itself in the service of a great cause will not permit corruption

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and inefficiency to sap the strength of its institutions. Standing before the world as the champion of an oppressed people, our Government must command respect, rather than excite fear. Those who have been warning us to settle our internal questions before entering upon the more complex problems incident to territorial expansion, have mistaken the nature of the forces that make for political greatness. They have confused the logic of individual and national progress, affording another illustration of the tendency to measure all public questions by individual standards.

The precept of the beam and the mote, while admirably fitted for the guidance of individual activity, cannot be applied to the conduct of national affairs. No great public question, internal or international, can be satisfactorily solved unless individual assertiveness is checked by well-developed civic instincts. The source of this energizing civic force differs with each period of a nation's history. Mediæval Europe found it in a strong religious spirit; Renaissance Italy, in the idealization of the city republic; modern Germany, in the enthusiasm for national unity. We have long required some influence to take us from the extreme individualism and spirit of self-aggrandizement that have characterized our growth since the Civil War. Our entry into the larger affairs of the world is destined to perform this service.

The new civic spirit aroused by the recent war, and strengthened by the great national problems which have sprung from it, will deeply affect the political leadership of the country. On all sides we hear lamentations over the decline of American statesmanship. Republics, we have been told, will not tolerate men of real ability. Others have attributed the absence of great national leaders to the intense commercialism which dominates our political and social life. The real cause lies deeper. Where public life gives little opportunity to men of great ability and intellectual power, mediocrity will have a free field. The talent of the country will seek activity in other directions. At the present time, the judiciary,—State and Federal,—owing to the enormous influence which it wields, is the only branch of the Government that attracts a high order of ability. The failure of the present generation to produce great statesmen is due to the absence of those common political issues that make real national leadership possible, rather than to a want of available material. With the important questions now arising, our public life will offer unlimited possibilities of distinction and fame. It will enlist the energies of men who have hitherto found greater opportunities in business or professional life.

Owing to a lack of proper perspective, it is difficult to establish the

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organic relation of recent events to preceding epochs of national growth. It is clear to every observer, however, that the country has received one of those object-lessons of national unity and power through which new civic ideals are developed. The enthusiasm aroused by our vigorous foreign policy is but the outward expression of a newly awakened faith in our national mission,—a faith that will effectually guard against the evils of exaggerated individualism. With such ideals dominating our public life, individual assertiveness will continue to be an important factor in the country's economic supremacy, and will become a source of national strength as well. The equilibrium between commercial activity and public devotion thus established, we may look forward to a period of civic activity to which the "Era of Good Feeling" furnishes the only parallel.

That the modification of our political ideals is fraught with grave dangers, no one will deny; nor is it unlikely that the new political problems will subject our institutions to a severe strain. But it seems equally certain that the strong faith in republican government and in the blessings of civil and political liberty will carry us over the critical stages. However this may be, the dangers are incidental to growth, and can be avoided only by the nation's definitely setting its face against all progress.

To many, it may seem that the result of the present struggle is hardly commensurate with the sacrifice. When viewed in its relation to the forces that have shaped our national growth, however, the conflict assumes a new meaning. It represents one of the steps in a slow, but unceasing, process in which England and the United States have played and will continue to play the most important part—the substitution of social order for anarchy, instability, and misrule. Our territorial acquisitions during the present century, the declarations of 1823 and 1865, the establishment of English influence in India, China, and Egypt, are but parts of one great movement,—a movement that will inevitably lead us to new responsibilities in the affairs of Latin America. Viewed in this light, the conflict with Spain was as "irrepressible" as the Slavery struggle.

L. S. ROWE.

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THE BOROUGH SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

THE difficulty which stands in the way of a citizen's intelligent understanding of the municipal government under which he lives, and of his intelligent participation therein, increases not in arithmetical, but in geometrical, importance as the municipality increases in size. For not only are the problems themselves more complicated, and the knowledge required to solve them increased, but the citizen is so far removed from the machinery of his government by the element of sheer space that the inevitable tendency of increase in municipal magnitude is gradually to diminish intimate connection between the citizen and the municipal administration. A concrete illustration of this could be furnished by almost every department of the city government.

Except the few of us who have taken a special interest in education, how many know where the public school in our district is situated? How many know to what precinct we belong, or where we should go if we had need of the police? How many know to what person to apply in case of a complaint regarding sanitary conditions? How many of us have ever personally visited the school in our district, or attended any of the meetings of the Education Department, or discussed matters of street cleaning or sanitation with any of the city officials? How many know the location of any of the municipal offices in this city to which we should address ourselves for information or for the redress of grievances?

Since the administration of the regretted Col. Waring, we have all, doubtless, become aware that there is a Street Cleaning Department in New York; but probably few know where this Street Cleaning Department is situated, or how, under the new charter, it is governed. And we are all so out of touch with the officers of our municipal government, through the mere fact that the city departments have in our minds neither local habitation nor a name, that all desire to improve city government is paralyzed at its inception by ignorance of the mechanism through which it works.

The isolation to which the inhabitants of such large cities as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, or Boston are condemned is enhanced by the absence of all neighborhood feeling: indeed, it may be said that a city

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has ceased to be provincial and has become cosmopolitan when its residents can boast that they do not know the names of their next-door neighbors. This cult of isolation is destructive of good democratic government, which depends for its success upon collective action for political ends. New York is divided into election districts, each of which is expected to send representatives to our municipal and State legislatures. This political plan proceeds upon the tacit assumption that the residents of each election district are sufficiently known to one another, and sufficiently familiar with the political needs of their districts, to agree upon a municipal policy and upon the best candidates to carry out this policy in the two legislatures respectively. But this very assumption is false. The residents of election districts are not familiar with one another; their opinions, if they have any, regarding the needs of the district widely diverge; and they practically never have an opportunity of agreeing upon a municipal policy or upon a political candidate. It is upon the falseness of this assumption that the machine and the boss flourish. It is in great part because we have no ready opportunity of meeting our fellow-citizens, and because we have no natural communion with our city officials, that the few men who make it their business to control the nomination and election machinery of the city succeed in nominating for us candidates upon whom we have never agreed, and in putting us through the motion of electing these candidates, however distasteful they may be.

Another inconvenience attends the isolation of the citizens of our large towns. There are some organs of government that are not likely to function successfully unless the routine work of the trained official is supplemented by the sympathy and enthusiasm of the volunteer. This is particularly the case in dealing with the problem of pauperism. The estrangement—I might almost say hostility—between the volunteer and the official in this department of municipal activity leads to pernicious consequences. It tends to the administration of the department by officials who have little fitness or sympathy for the work. In their indifferent hands the almshouse tends to become a roof under which the drunken "rounder" can be sure of the rest which enables him to get over one debauch and to prepare for another. The volunteers, on the other hand, are found grouped in hundreds of societies, entirely helpless to remedy the evils that arise from perfunctory municipal administration, and so eager to relieve distress that the vast machinery of the Charity Organization Society is necessary to prevent the pauper from living upon the charity of these various societies in turn.

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To the evils which result from the political and social isolation of the citizens of our large towns might easily be traced many other equally disastrous consequences. It is the object of this article to show not only that this isolation can be eliminated, but that, by a simple political device, it has been eliminated in the city of Paris, France.

Ever since Étienne Marcel attempted to use Paris to undermine the throne it has been deemed imprudent to allow Paris to elect a single mayor of its own, who could in his person represent so turbulent and impulsive a population. Therefore, except during some brief periods of revolution, the administration of Paris has been split up into districts. There are now twenty such districts, or *arrondissements*, in Paris, each of which has its own town-hall, or *mairie*, and its own mayor. To every Parisian the town-hall is the embodiment of municipal activity. From the moment of his birth to that of his death it is with the *mairie* that he has to do. The day he is born his birth must be registered there; from the *mairie* issues the doctor who is to see that the infant's name is enrolled among the future soldiers of France; it is at the *mairie* that he draws lots for military service; it is there, when he reaches majority, that he registers and votes; and it is at the *mairie* that he is married, that his death is recorded, and his burial certificate issued. It is a committee at the *mairie* that watches and reports upon the school which he attends. It is there that, later, his property is assessed and his taxes are paid. If he saves money, it is at the *mairie* that he finds a savings-bank, where he can deposit it at the best rate of interest. If he has to borrow money, it is again at the *mairie* that he can obtain, from the branch of the Mont de Piété there, the largest amount possible on the article he has to pledge, at the lowest rate consistent with safe administration. If he is interested in the health of his district, he has an opportunity of sitting on the local board which is organized by every mayor of the *arrondissement;* and if he takes an interest in charity, it is at the *mairie* again that he and the women of his family can join the committee organized for that purpose.

Behind the functions of the *mairie* above set forth there is a profound philosophical as well as a practical principle. It is the principle which distinguishes between two very different orders of municipal activity; that is to say, the difference between the municipal activity which is properly denominated business and the municipal activity which includes much more than mere business. Upon this distinction it is impossible to insist too much. The more so, perhaps, because some of our reformers have set up the doctrine, that municipal government is

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business, as a sort of *shibboleth* by which to distinguish those who want government to be good for the governed from those who want to make it good for themselves.[1] It is undoubtedly true that municipal government is, to a great extent, housekeeping on a large scale, and that, to this extent, the city should be run on the principles of business rather than on those of the spoilsman. But municipal government involves far more than mere housekeeping, unless the word is extended to include the loving care of a mother for her children. And this loving care cannot be covered by the word "business." So long as the city undertakes to educate youth, to relieve poverty, and to prevent crime, she is engaged in a task which far exceeds in difficulty the purely business tasks of municipal administration. Among these last are clearly the management of public works; such as paving, street cleaning, street lighting, water-works, and the fire and dock departments. If these departments are to be well managed, they must be put in the hands of skilled officials and be made subject to a strong central control. By the side of the purely business activities of a municipality, and strongly contrasted with them, are those in which there is a humanitarian element; such, for example, as public health, correction, charity, and education.

The unskilled but public-spirited citizen cannot render much service to the city in the paving or the lighting of streets, or in the management of the fire and dock departments; but he can render a service of priceless value to the skilled officials of the town in such matters as education, correction, charity, and health. It would be quite impossible within the compass of a magazine article to trace the recognition of this distinction throughout all the departments of the city of Paris; and, indeed, it cannot be admitted that it has in every case been fully and sufficiently carried out. In one of these departments, however, the work of decentralization and the principle of enlisting the services of the volunteer by the side of the skilled official have been well and fully applied; and it is to this department therefore that I shall now confine myself.

In Paris the work of public charity is confided to two kinds of boards—a central board and twenty local boards; that is to say, one local board in each *arrondissement*. The central board has at its head a director appointed by the Prefect of the Seine and the Minister of the Interior. He is assisted by a board of twenty members. This board consists of the Prefect of the Seine, who is its chairman, the Prefect of Police, two members of the Municipal Council, two mayors or deputy

[1] This was made the issue of the campaign of 1890 in New York by the People's Municipal League.

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mayors, two representatives of the local charity boards, one member of the Council of State, one member of the Court of Cassation, a hospital physician, a hospital surgeon, a professor of the faculty of medicine, a member of the Chamber of Commerce, and a member of one of the councils of *prud'hommes*. These members, in so far as they represent organized bodies, are appointed by the President, on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, out of a list prepared by the bodies to which they respectively belong. The five remaining members are appointed at large. It should be observed that this central body is composed of skilled men.

The local boards are constituted as follows: The chairman of the board is the mayor of the *arrondissement*. The board sits at the *mairie*. It is composed of twelve administrators, one-half of whom are appointed by the Prefect, or the central administration, and one-half by the Municipal Council, or the local administration. Every *arrondissement* is divided into twelve zones; and each administrator is allotted to one of these zones. Each one of these administrators—and this is the point to which particular attention is called—is at liberty to organize a subcommittee of his own, consisting of an indefinite number of men and women residing in the zone, able and willing to help him in the administration of his duties.

Without entering into the details of charity administration in Paris, many of which would be found open to criticism, it is particularly pointed out that one of the functions of this elaborate scheme is to keep such check upon every individual who obtains assistance as to make it impossible for the same pauper to receive aid from more than one charitable body. In other words, the administration of charity in Paris is so organized as not to waste a dollar and as to render the existence of such a body as a Charity Organization Society superfluous.

It ought not to be necessary to add much in the way of comment to this account of local administration through the *mairie* system. Suffice it to say that the *mairie* has become the place to which every Parisian naturally goes for information regarding municipal affairs and for help in the development of social activity. The features in it which most deserve notice are, in the first place, that it recognizes the distinction between municipal work which can be well done by skilled officials only and that which, on the contrary, cannot be well done without the help of the volunteer. The former is put into the hands of a Civil Service carefully kept free from political considerations and strongly centralized. The latter, while controlled at the centre by a skilled Civil Service, is also

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distributed throughout Paris by means of local committees directed by skilled officials, but composed for the most part of volunteers.

Subsidiarily, but none the less usefully, the committees in every *arrondissement* meet at the same place—the *mairie*. And, naturally therefore, out of this continual gathering of public-spirited citizens at the *mairie* there grow many other useful public works. Thus, every *mairie* has a large circulating library; and every *mairie* administers a fund, called *La Caisse des Écoles*, which is applied to the improvement of educational facilities and to the educational assistance of such children as need it. In a word, the *mairie* is the place to which all citizens can go who desire to take an active part in social as well as municipal activities; and it thereby keeps alive the neighborhood feeling, the absence of which is pregnant with such evil consequences in our own large towns. It is interesting to note here that Dr. J. M. Rice suggested in THE FORUM some years ago[1] that, for educational work, a large city be treated as a "collection of small ones" and that, for this purpose, New York be divided into twenty districts.

Among the problems which confronted the framers of the Greater New York Charter was that of maintaining, in each of the territories consolidated, the local interest in municipal government so essential to its success. This was of importance as regarded all the territories consolidated; but it was especially important in the case of Brooklyn, which, although its charter was of earlier date than that of New York, and although its population reached almost a million, was about to lose its individuality, and become merged in that of a neighboring, and to some extent competing, city.

In the consolidation, therefore, of Brooklyn, Long Island City, the Bronx, and Manhattan and Staten islands, the framers sought to preserve such local interest as already existed in those territories, by the maintenance in each of them of a borough organization. In the framing of these borough organizations the Commission took "counsel, in the first instance, of the experience of New York when the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth wards were annexed to the city some years ago." The Commission, in its report, states that

"at the outset, this territory was placed under the control of the Department of Parks, which proved unable to deal with the situation to the satisfaction of the neighborhood. In the meanwhile some fifty villages, which had no common drain-

[1] In "The Public School System of New York City"—THE FORUM for January, 1893, p. 628.

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age system, no common street system, and none of the attributes of a city, remained, to a considerable extent, unimproved and impossible of improvement, because the territory containing them was not even mapped as a part of the city. Under these circumstances, after seventeen years the residents of the annexed district secured from the legislature the authority to elect a Commissioner of Street Improvements for the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth wards, who has, in effect, three duties: First, he is charged with the duty of mapping any territory for which no commissioner's map has been adopted . . . Second, he has a certain initiative, if he wishes to use it, in the matter of local improvements. Third, he performs some of the functions of the Department of Public Works in the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth wards."

The Commissioners did not consider it wise to confer upon the borough organizations any of the functions of the Department of Public Works; but they believed that the experience of the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth wards justified them in entrusting the first two duties mentioned above to local boards constituted in each of the consolidated territories. Each consolidated territory now constitutes a borough, with a president of its own. There are twenty-two local boards in Greater New York, with five executives, or presidents, the president of each borough presiding over every local board in his borough.

The five presidents of the five boroughs have the right to sit on the Board of Public Improvements; and each president has a right to vote on all questions affecting his own borough.

It should be observed that under this plan the powers granted to the borough organization are practically confined to local improvements in connection with the Board of Public Improvements.

It is now more than a year since the Charter went into effect; and no provision in it has given rise to more criticism than the one above set forth. In view of the likelihood that some legislation will be proposed at Albany on this subject, it becomes immediately important to examine what value, if any, there is in the principle that underlies the division of a large municipality into boroughs; how far this principle has been carried out in the Charter; and what modifications, if any, should be made in the latter, in order to carry out the principle as extensively as possible. The interest in this subject is not confined to Greater New York. On the contrary, the principle that underlies borough organization is believed to be of priceless value to all our large towns; the more so, perhaps, because in our country it has been heretofore largely, if not universally, neglected.

If, then, we apply to our own case the lessons we have learned from a study of the Parisian system, it seems probable that the boroughs constituted by our present charter are too large for the purpose of main-

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taining neighborhood feeling, and that they have not been given the powers most useful to such local boards, or those that local boards could most beneficially exercise. It seems as if the attention of the framers of the Charter had been called too particularly to the experience of the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth wards, the needs of which, because they are suburban, are peculiar and transitory. In suburban districts, sparsely populated, and consisting in large part of vacant lots held by speculators for a rise in value, it is obvious that the question most agitated by real estate owners interested in the development of the district would be the question of public works. A consideration, however, of the municipal needs of the more thickly populated districts in the centre of a town would tend to the theory that public works were matters for central control rather than for local initiative. This must not be taken as a condemnation of the initiative given to borough boards in our charter. In view of the peculiar conditions presented in our cities, where buildings have been allowed to spring up regardless of artistic design and public convenience, it may be wise to give to every borough some initiative in regard to public works.

But the attempt has been made in this article to show that there is a more precious work for the boroughs to perform than those given to them in our charter. This work consists essentially in the decentralization of those municipal functions which, because they are not of a purely business character, can be efficaciously performed only with the unofficial and voluntary assistance of citizens particularly interested therein. These functions have already been distinguished: they are included for the most part in the departments of charity, correction, education, and public health. To these, however, the New York citizens who, at Col. Waring's bidding, helped him in the administration of his department will want to add that of street cleaning; and it is probable that a fair trial of the Borough plan would develop the utility of the coöperation of public-spirited citizens in still other departments.

The boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn are far too large for the purpose proposed. If we are to take Paris as our model, the Borough of Manhattan would have to be divided into six or eight boroughs in order to enable each borough to be a centre of municipal activity, from which such invaluable results as those above set forth could ensue. Greater New York is now divided into a large number of districts for different purposes. For example, there are election districts, school districts, police precincts, judicial districts, fire districts, and street-cleaning districts,—none of them bearing any harmonious relation to another, and

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each mapped out independently of the other solely with a view to the convenience of the particular purpose of the department to which it belongs. Some of these are permanent; others shift from year to year; so that, though we live in the same house all our lives, we are never sure where we are to go to register or to vote.

A properly devised Borough system, with a municipal building in every borough, ought to concentrate, as the *mairie* does in Paris, all the local functions of a great city. This building should represent for us the embodiment of municipal activity: we ought to have a sense of property in it and, through it, in our city. It is there that we should go for every municipal function: to register and vote, to sit on committees of education, charity, prisons, and public health; to coöperate with all city officials who ask our coöperation; to summon the police; to secure justice; to file building plans; to record births, deaths, and marriages; to initiate public improvements; to care for our nearest parks; to abate nuisances; to administer savings-banks, free libraries, and municipal pawnshops,—in a word, to make our neighborhood well-paved, well-lighted, well-cleaned, orderly, and sweet to every sense, whether of body or of mind.

It would seem, therefore, that a study of municipal needs would lead to the conclusion that, so far from abandoning our Borough system, what we ought to do is very much to develop it. Let every citizen have, within easy access of his home, a borough building to which he can address himself for all the social and municipal purposes of life. Let those who take an interest in improving social and municipal conditions find in such a building a place where they can meet and know one another. Let such a building be a ground upon which the city official can meet the citizen volunteer in those departments where coöperation between them is advantageous. Then, perhaps, would each of our citizens acquire some sense of the stake he has in our city, and of the practical possibility of rendering effectual assistance to it; then, perhaps, would our Board of Aldermen better represent the now unexpressed desires of the people; and then, too, might we hope to have in our Legislature at Albany men more clearly instructed as to our rights, and better equipped to vindicate them.

Our cities are like ships that have not "found themselves": they are made up, as it were, of the wreckage of the nations. Under the stress of weather and necessity disjected parts have been hurriedly lashed together to serve a temporary purpose; and the makeshift of yesterday has, by mere lapse of time, become the institution of to-day. The wonder is

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that so imperfectly devised a scheme should work at all; not that it should work so ill.

But, bad as our political machinery is, it is a model beside the chaos which reigns over the relations of our passengers and crew. For, while we maintain all the insignia of office, and regularly go through the movements of selecting our officers every year, we are most of us helplessly aware that the ship is really under the control of a few passengers and the "loblolly-boys." We are in fact a mob, each of us hypnotized by his avocation, without sympathy or communion one with another, and, because isolated by the very pressure of the crowd about us, incapable of our own distress.

If we are ever to make a city in fact as well as in form, this isolation must come to an end. The machinery of our government must tend to bring us into human relations with one another. We must have functions of municipal activity in which all who will may take part; and in the exercise of these functions we may learn to know, and in the end perhaps respect, one another. Then, one strong, sonorous municipal voice may replace the multitudinous wailings and creakings which characterize our present political *pis-aller*.

EDMOND KELLY.

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LIFE ON OTHER WORLDS.

SOME of our neighbors in the solar system, particularly Mars, are said to exhibit well-delimited areas which increase in size, and undergo variations in color, corresponding with the seasonal changes of the planet on which they occur. Repeated observations of this character have been a most fruitful source of discussion among astronomers; and many, in fact, deny the accuracy of the investigations detailing the existence of, or changes in, the bands, belts, or "canals" on members of the solar system. It is not for the layman to sit in judgment upon this lack of harmony in the celestial choir, except perhaps to take note of the arguments of biological import used in the controversy.

An examination of the results of observations of the canals of Mars, made continuously throughout an entire year by the staff of one of the best equipped stations in the world, goes far to weaken such denials. The mere rehearsal of the many theories which have been advanced in interpretation of the belts or canals of Mars would carry the present article far beyond its intended limits; and if the semi-scientific literature upon the subject were included, an extensive excursion into the regions of humor and phantasy would result.

The increasing attention paid to this biological phase of astronomical work has brought about the reference of many incidental questions to the physiologist; and it is to be said that the evidence at hand, consisting chiefly of the facts mentioned above, affords but slight foundation for demonstration or sound speculation as to life on other worlds. No more should be expected than that the biologist should outline the more important properties of living matter, and project these into the conditions existent on other planets; though it is by no means to be assumed that the structure or organization of protoplasm is identical throughout the universe. A statement of the generalized properties of terrestrial living matter will afford a convenient basis of discussion of such evidence as may, from time to time, be brought to our attention by the astronomer.

The protoplasm of terrestrial plants and animals is a more or less fluid substance, which varies in consistency from that of the white of

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an egg to the hardness and brittleness of a seed. The fluidity is due to the presence of water; and the amount of liquid present depends upon the degree of development or activity of the organism of which it forms a part. Thus, the quiescent protoplasm of seeds contains 5 to 15 per cent of water; while actively growing tissues of plants or animals may hold as much as 90 or even 99 per cent. Living matter is not a solution in a physical sense, but consists of the more fluid portion of fairly homogeneous structure in which are imbedded numbers of bodies of widely differing physical and chemical properties. These bodies are centres of physical, chemical, and physiological activity. The complex interplay of forces set free here and in the imbedding stroma constitutes the phenomena termed *life*. Fluidity must be an indispensable property of any type of living matter which we are able to imagine; but it need not be due to the presence of water. This might be replaced by any other substance liquid at ordinary temperatures prevalent on the planet upon which it occurs. In such instances, the degree of fluidity would be dependent upon a set of conditions entirely different from those of the earth.

Terrestrial protoplasm shows, by chemical analysis, the invariable presence of twelve elements of low atomic weight, which were presumably formed early in the history of the universe. These elements are carbon, nitrogen, sulphur, hydrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, chlorine, potassium, sodium, magnesium, calcium, and iron; and they must, doubtless, play an important part in the construction of living matter everywhere. It is not to be assumed that all of these should necessarily be included, nor that others of lower or higher atomic weight might not take part. In general, it might be said that the factors determining the elements entering into the existence of any protoplasm would be determined by the age, atomic weight, and abundance of those present. The possibility that the elements may exist elsewhere with different properties from those with which we are acquainted must also be considered. That other elements may take an important part in the construction of living matter is suggested by the fact that silicon, fluorine, bromine, iodine, aluminum, and manganese are also found as occasional constituents.

In order to exhibit an activity which might in any sense be comparable to that of the living matter with which we are familiar, it would be necessary to have the included elements built up into several complex compounds of high molecular complexity which would not be totally inactive to one another, and the chemical activity of which might be easily influenced by external factors, such as temperature.

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Furthermore, one or more of the compounds should unite readily with a disintegrating agent of wide distribution, which union would set free the stored-up energy. The disintegrating agent might be present in the atmosphere or in the substratum. Oxygen of the air performs this office on the earth; and the process constitutes respiration. Respiration is a breaking-down process, or destructive metabolism; and its products are heat, mechanical forms of energy convertible into work, and elements or simple compounds. The last may be excreted or retained by the organism.

The construction of the complex compounds of which protoplasm is composed must be accomplished by means of energy derived from some source external to the organism. The source of that used by terrestrial organisms is the food consumed, together with a certain amount of heat, light, and electrical or magnetic energy. When the food consumed consists chiefly of complex decomposable substances, the amount of radiant energy used is very small, as in the case of most animals and many plants. When the food is of comparatively simple substances, the amount of radiant energy used is often very large, as in the case of green plants which need much sunlight for their development. Plants accumulate a great amount of complex material by means of this energy; and essentially they are constructively metabolic organisms. Animals use the complex material constructed by plants for food, are destructively metabolic, and may be said to be parasitic upon the vegetable kingdom. The activities of these two branches of the living world theoretically equalize each other; but, according to all data at hand, the products of the plant world far overbalance those of animals in all particulars.

Thus, it is customary to speak of the maintenance of the composition of the atmosphere by the opposing action of plants and animals; plants giving off oxygen and absorbing carbon dioxide, and animals carrying on the reverse processes. As a matter of fact, the physical or, more particularly, geological combination and liberation of these substances render the total product of the living world of comparatively little importance. It is conceivable that all of the organisms of any system might make large use of radiant energy as plants do and, at the same time, attain a development corresponding to that of animals. The differentiation of living things into plants and animals is, therefore, an incident in terrestrial natural history, not a universal necessity.

The nature of the activity of protoplasm demands that it should take in a more or less constant supply of matter from the substratum

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of surrounding medium, and build this matter up into the compounds of which its body is composed, excreting material of no further use to it. Terrestrial protoplasm accomplishes this by the ingestion of solid particles of the desired substances, or chiefly by the osmotic absorption and excretion of fluid solutions. Incidentally the chemical union with the limiting membrane of the substances absorbed by it, and their liberation in the original form in the interior, as well as the passage of compounds in divided form or as separate ions, electrolytic effects, and electric currents, may play a more or less important part in the absorption of food-substances.

One or more of the last-named methods may become the principal one or ones in the accession of food- or building-material in extra-terrestrial organisms. The absorption and assimilation of more material than is consumed in respiration implies an increase in the bulk or weight of an organism. The increase, or growth, as it is termed, may continue until the volume bears a certain proportion to the surface, determined by gravity, the substratum, the surrounding medium, the atmosphere, and the specific constitution of the organism or given mass of living matter. Hence, no inference can be made of the size of organisms elsewhere in the universe, since each of these factors plays a variable part.

An essential characteristic of living matter is its capacity for response to environmental variations by changes in the form, size, structure, composition, and degree of activity of the organism into which it has developed. It is of the greatest importance that it should be able to undergo such physical alterations as will enable it to endure conditions unfavorable to growth and activity. Thus, terrestrial protoplasm has the power of ridding itself of a large proportion of its water upon the approach of a cold season or of an extremely warm environment. The alternation of favorable and unfavorable seasons, such as summer and winter, or wet and dry periods, on the earth's surface has resulted in stamping upon protoplasm the habit of moving in cycles. Summer and winter do not necessarily correspond to seasons of growth and of rest, respectively, throughout the universe. It is quite conceivable that the season of high temperature might be the resting-period of the organisms on any planet, and that the winter would furnish the most favorable conditions for the activity of the living matter. Again, the formation or acquisition of food-material and growth might take place in separate seasons.

The recurrence of unfavorable seasons for activity tends to induce the formation of specialized reproductive bodies, in which form the

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animal or plant may endure greater extremes of temperature, etc. This fact is much more prominent in the vegetable than in the animal kingdom. Other factors, of course, enter into the necessity for the production of spores, egg-cells, seeds, and eggs; but it is not unreasonable to suppose that the sexual phase and specialized reproductive bodies might be entirely lacking in the systems of organisms on any world. The formation of new individuals might result from budding, essentially simple growth, in the same manner as new plants arise from runners or offsets, or as a gardener grows his stock from cuttings consisting of leaves or bits of stem. Similar occurrences are frequent among the lower animals; and a writer of fiction, in a recent discussion of the inhabitants of Mars, brings about their multiplication in this manner.

The form and structure of an organism must depend directly upon the factors constituting its environment; and terrestrial life should not be taken to resemble that of other worlds. It has been pointed out that the organisms of any planet would not necessarily be divided into plants and animals; and even if such were the case, the resultant forms could have only the most remote resemblance to terrestrial forms. The similarity of two systems of living things derived from unlike beginnings, and coming through untold ages of development under the most widely different conditions on separate planets, would be absolutely impossible.

Concerning the existence of life elsewhere in the universe, it is to be remembered that the general physical condition of an extra-terrestrial body must be taken with great caution as the index of the presence or absence of living things. The protoplasm of resting seeds may withstand the cold of liquid air nearly 200° Centigrade below the freezing-point, or more than 300° below zero Fahrenheit. These seeds and spores of bacteria live and grow after being subjected to a temperature of 125° Centigrade, or nearly 260° above zero Fahrenheit. It is thus to be seen that terrestrial protoplasm is capable of an adjustment to a range of temperature of 325° Centigrade, or nearly 600° Fahrenheit. In view of these facts, it would be extremely rash to say that complex masses of matter constituting a protoplasm might not exist at temperatures much above and below those of the earth. The range of endurance would depend upon the liquids entering into the composition of the living matter in question. The extremes of temperature given above were produced artificially, of course. With the exception of the heats of volcanoes, thermal springs, and lightning-flashes, they are not produced on the earth's surface; and plants have had no opportunity of acquiring special adaptations toward the endurance of such extremes. A temperature equal

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to that of the sun, where the elements are more or less separated into layers, and where the molecular velocity is very great, would form an absolute upper limit to life, though the actual limit would be far below this point. Absolute zero, or 273° Centigrade below the freezing-point, would form a lower limit, though periodic recurrences of this temperature would by no means form a barrier to life.

The presence of an atmosphere, even intermittently, is not necessary to life, although the presence of the liquid to which the fluidity of the living substance would be due would imply the presence of a more or less attenuated atmosphere. The respiratory or disintegrating agent might be present in the substratum or nutritive medium. Among terrestrial organisms, the anaerobic bacteria are instances of plants which not only do not need an atmosphere, but actually perish in its presence, or in one of its constituents, and live deeply immersed in the bodies of other plants or of animals with which their presence is always associated. The absence of a permanent gaseous envelope, or fluid medium, would render impossible the development of any but fixed forms, attached firmly in place like typical plants. Such conditions would be eminently unsuitable for locomotor organisms resembling animals, although such types might exist by means of special adaptations for storing the respiratory agent.

Great stress has been laid upon the colors of the bands or canals of Mars, in the discussions as to the probability that these areas may be zones of living organisms. It is to be seen from the above that a comparison with the colors of terrestrial vegetation is practically meaningless. The green coloring-matter of plants is due to a substance which serves the purpose of a screen in absorbing rays of light and in converting them into heat and other forms of energy. It does seem probable that light would be the most available source of energy for living bodies on all planets more distant than the earth from the sun; yet the absorbing screen, in any instance, might take up almost any portion of the visible or invisible rays, and reflect any color. Then, if the invisible rays alone were absorbed, color would be of even less significance in the interpretation of planetary markings. Periodic variations of the color of such markings are, however, of great importance as indications of life, when taken in connection with other groups of facts. Special mention is made of the matter of temperatures, atmospheres, and color, since these are the criteria used by astronomers in discussing the possibility or probability of extra-terrestrial life.

The primary purpose of this paper is not to declare or deny the

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existence of organisms on other bodies besides the earth, but rather to call attention to the limitations of such life, if it does exist. A consideration of all data at hand leads to the conclusion that extra-terrestrial life is quite within the range of possibility, and, indeed, seems highly probable. Up to this date, however, actual demonstration of phenomena which would change the probability into a well-recognized fact has been but scanty. We may look with the greatest hope to the investigations now in progress upon the surface-markings of Mars for the all-important evidence. Positive proof that life is not to be found on that planet would only leave the main question open to determination by observations upon other bodies within the range of our means of research.

The determination of the presence or absence of life on other members of the universe presents a most fascinating problem to the planetary observer, and affords to the biologist a most alluring field for speculation. The subject will doubtless claim an increasing amount of attention from the votaries of both branches of science, and will attract a large share of popular interest.

D. T. MacDougal.

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NEEDED REFORMS IN OUR MONETARY SYSTEM.

A REFORM of our monetary system demands (1) the complete recognition of the gold standard; (2) the retirement of all Government issues of the paper currency; and (3) the substitution of bank-assets for Government bonds as security for bank-notes.

Notwithstanding all the light that has been shed upon the Money question within the last five years, opinions are still so diverse that it is not an easy task to present to the clear comprehension of even the more acute mind the inadequacy of our system of currency, and the insecurity of our monetary standard. A complete discussion of the question requires that we should demonstrate not only that, for a long period of time, the gold coins have been the standard coins of this Government, but also that to change to any other would be disastrous to our commercial progress.

The first step in the establishment of a monetary system is the designation of a unit of value-measure. The unit, to possess the greatest stability, must be composed of the metal used in the settlement of international balances.

Congress fixed upon the dollar as the unit, and provided that the same should be composed of 24.75 grains of gold and 375.25 of silver. While Congress possessed the constitutional power to provide for the coinage of both gold and silver units, it did not have the power to fix the relative values of these two metals, so that one or the other might not, at times, be worth more in the markets than estimated by law. While as coins they could be accorded equal debt-paying power, as measures of value they were liable to vary according to the law of supply and demand. The impossibility of maintaining two standard units of different metals soon became manifest. The attempt resulted in the expulsion of gold coins from circulation.

Mr. Ingham, Secretary of the Treasury under President Jackson, in a most able and exhaustive report to Congress, May 4, 1830, said:

"It seems from these facts, to which many others of later date might be added, that, however exactly the proper equilibrium of values of gold and silver may be adjusted at the mint, the balance is liable to be disturbed by causes which can neither

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be anticipated nor controlled by political power. If the regulations be founded on the most exact calculations of relative values for the time being, the vibrations of the values of gold and silver must alternately cause the expulsion of each; and where one metal is more essential to public convenience than the other, the adjustment which exposes that under any circumstances to general exportation or melting may become a greater evil than a regulation which constantly excludes from circulation the less desirable coins."

To remedy the evils which prevailed under the Act of 1792, Congress in 1834 changed the ratio of coinage from 15 to 1 to 16 to 1. By this change the gold coins were degraded until they contained less value than the silver ones; and, as a result, gold became plentiful, while silver began to disappear. The continued and increasing scarcity of small change became a matter of serious embarrassment to the people; and Congress was again called upon to deal with the subject. The Act of 1853 was passed. By the provisions of this measure, the quantity of silver in the fractional coins was reduced, free coinage of the same suspended, and their tender limited to five dollars and under. In order that the subsidiary silver coins should be kept at a parity with gold, a provision was incorporated in this Act for their redemption in gold.

In 1857 Congress went a step further, and demonetized all foreign silver coins; and from that time, till the passage of the Bland-Allison Act in 1878, not a dollar of unlimited legal tender silver was to be found in circulation. Thus we see that gold was made the standard metal in 1834, and that, in all subsequent legislation, the gold coins were recognized as the standard coins of our monetary system.

The objection that gold is too dear a metal for a standard becomes, upon a moment's reflection, absurd. Those who make such an objection have not looked very far into the subject, to say the least. As a standard, one metal is just as dear as another. Silver and copper do not contain as great value in the same space and weight; but as standard coins they would stand for their relative values in gold. Those who insist that gold is a dear money, and that silver, with free coinage, would be a cheap money, are unable to discern any distinction between the words "valuable" and "dear." The most valuable is generally the cheapest, because it is the best suited for the purpose; while the least valuable is often the dearest, because it cannot so economically do the work. Herein lies the superiority of gold over silver. It enables those engaged in commerce to conduct the same at the least expense and greatest profit. Gold will, therefore, remain the standard of exchange, regardless of the monetary systems of nations.

There is also a wide distinction between a "cheap" and a "degraded"

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money. A degraded money has ever proved the most expensive; while a cheap money has always been the companion of progress and prosperity. Cheap money is evidenced by a low rate of interest; while a degraded money is distinguished by a diminution in its purchasing power. So long as gold remains the standard metal, no stable monetary unit can be made of any other; and every effort to do so will impede the progress, and blight the prosperity, of the nation that attempts it.

A silver standard would not possess stability. It is impossible to divorce our trade and commerce from the gold standard. It would make no difference of what metal the standard unit might be composed: its value as a measure would always be determined by the value it contains, measured by gold. It is for this reason that a gold unit will always possess stability, while one composed of any other metal will fluctuate. Gold being the metal by the value of which all other metals are measured, the value-measure of units coined of other metals would rise and fall as the value of the metals of which they were composed should go up or down in comparison with gold.

It may appear incredible to some, yet it is a fact, that we were practically upon the gold standard during the entire War of the Confederacy. The prices of our exports, as well as of our imports, were fixed by the gold standard; and exchange was drawn on that basis.

The mode of carrying on our foreign trade during the time of the suspension of specie payments was of the most expensive and complicated character. When a merchant in New York received an order from Liverpool,—the price offered being in gold,—the first thing he was compelled to do was to ascertain the price of gold in greenbacks; next, the price of the product in currency; and then the currency price was reduced to its gold value. If, after reducing the transaction to a gold basis, he ascertained that he could fill the order at a profit, he would first, to avoid any loss from the instability of our currency, anchor his deal to the gold standard. This he did by selling at the exchange a sufficient sum of gold to cover the transaction. He would then go out and purchase, say cotton, with currency, place the cotton on board ship, receive his bill of lading, take it to the bank, and draw a draft for the amount on his customer in Liverpool. The bank would pay the draft in gold; and he would then take the gold to the exchange, and deliver the amount of his sale. All this labor and expense was necessary to avoid the risk of a loss by reason of a rise in the value of currency while the transaction was being consummated. For example, suppose that the Liverpool merchant had ordered $5,000 worth of cotton, and that at the

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time currency was at a discount of 50 per cent. It would have taken $10,000 in currency to make the purchase. Had he pursued the usual course of trade, he would have first purchased the cotton, placed it on board ship, taken his bill of lading to the bank, drawn his draft, received his gold, and then have taken it to the exchange and sold it. But, between the time of the purchase of the cotton in currency and the sale of the gold received in payment of his draft, the price of currency might have risen until at a discount of only 45 per cent. If so, his $5,000 in gold would have brought him only $9,500 in currency, instead of $10,000 paid out by him in the beginning.

Now, while the New York merchant was able to protect himself against the risks of a loss, the dealer who purchased from the planter in the South, or from the farmer in the West, was not able to do so. There was no gold exchange near the seat of his operations. He had either to carry the risk or to shift it upon the planter or the farmer. The latter he could do only by paying less for the product. As an illustration, suppose that a dealer in the West should purchase 1,000 bushels of wheat for $2,000 in silver, and ship to New York. If the price of wheat and silver remained the same during the transaction, he would receive back his $2,000 in silver, and no loss would be incurred. But if, when his shipment reached New York, silver had risen in price until the silver in a dollar was worth 55, instead of 50, cents in gold, the New York merchant would look at the price of wheat in Liverpool in gold and pay its equivalent in silver. Taking the price of silver on that day, he would find that $1,000 in gold was worth about $1,818 in silver, and would pay that sum for the consignment. The Western dealer, when he received his returns, would find himself out of pocket about $182. What would he say to the farmer from whom he had made his purchase, when he undertook to make another, and was asked the same price per bushel? He would immediately answer: "No. I cannot afford to pay you that price. I lost $182 on the last transaction. You must understand that the price of wheat is fixed in Liverpool in gold, and that the price there regulates the price all over the world. Now, if our money were kept at par with gold, it would always be of the same relative value, and I could trade with you without incurring any risk of a loss by reason of a rise in its gold price before I had disposed of my purchase. But the greatest risk I find in trade is on account of the instability of our money. When I purchased that last lot of wheat from you, the silver in a dollar was worth 50 cents in gold. But when I sold it was worth 55 cents; and I received $1,818 only in return for the $2,000 I paid to

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you. I am out $182 on the transaction; and I cannot afford to buy any more at that price. You will have to take less, or we cannot trade."

Now it is plain that the entire risk of dealing with an unstable money must and will be shifted upon the producer. The product of the farmer and of the wage-worker must carry the whole burden.

The evils of an unstable measure of value are so pernicious that the question of the maintenance of all our money at the gold standard should be not only beyond question, but, like the virtue of Cæsar's wife, above suspicion. Under existing laws, the preservation of our silver and paper currency at this standard is dependent upon the discretion of a single Cabinet officer and on the uncertainties of the result of a popular election every four years. It is within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury, at any time, by a mere change of policy, to supplant the gold standard and to place the country on a silver basis. Not only is this possible, but our financial system is so vulnerable that it is within the power of a few individuals of large means to extort at their pleasure an issue of Government bonds, or to drive him to that extremity.

During the last twenty years we have coined and forced into circulation nearly 500,000,000 of silver dollars, each of the intrinsic value of less than 45 cents, with the sovereign declaration that they were of equal debt-paying power with 100 cents in gold. Up to the present time, the policy of all Administrations has been to uphold the monetary value of these silver coins, by conceding a choice of money to the creditors of the Government, and by a pledge that, if it became necessary, the Secretary of the Treasury would redeem the silver coins in gold. While, whenever the issue has been raised, the people have sustained this policy, on more than one occasion a serious doubt has arisen as to the ability of the Government, at all times and under all circumstances, to maintain the coinage value of such a large volume of silver.

The operation of the "endless chain," which began during the Administration of President Harrison, by reason of a financial stress in Europe, and continued almost throughout the second Administration of President Cleveland,—resulting in the sale of $262,000,000 of bonds and the accumulation of a large surplus in the Treasury, notwithstanding a deficiency in the revenues,—was a practical demonstration of what could be accomplished by an organized effort to thwart the policy of the Administration to maintain the gold standard.

It has been the policy of successive Administrations to hold in the Treasury a gold reserve of $100,000,000 for the redemption of greenbacks. Under existing laws, it is made the duty of the Treasurer to

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redeem in lawful money national-bank notes. The Government is, therefore, indirectly bound for the redemption of national-bank notes in gold; so that the gold reserve might be easily raided, notwithstanding that all the Treasury notes were held by the Government. Now it is plain that the Treasury might have an abundance of available cash to meet all demands, and still, by the operation of this so-called endless chain, be forced to issue bonds till all the outstanding greenbacks and national-bank notes were redeemed and locked in the vaults of the Treasury. This result could be accomplished in a comparatively short time, and without the employment of a very large sum of money.

It is doubtful if any other Government in the world could prosper for any length of time under a financial system so unscientific and so indefensible. When we reflect that the volume of credit in circulation aggregates billions of dollars, and that all this rests upon such an insecure foundation, it is remarkable that we have thus far been able to escape a financial catastrophe. The first step, therefore, in the reformation of our monetary system must be to provide for the maintenance of the gold standard.

It is claimed, however, that there is not enough gold in the world to afford a sufficiency of redemption money. But the volume of redemption money required depends more upon the soundness of the system than upon its proportion to the volume of currency in circulation. A system which guarantees the ultimate redemption of all credits at their standard value will not require a large volume of redemption money. It must be remembered that ultimate redemption is in property, and that only as standard money is likely to measure greater value in property, by reason of the failure of the Government to maintain the parity of other money with the same, is it more preferable. So long as the holder of other coins and credits is assured that the same will command property of equal value with standard money, he will be perfectly indifferent as to redemption. With a fixed standard and a safe system of currency, the volume of redemption money required would be very small. The unsoundness of our present system lies in the fact that the Government has the legal right to redeem in either gold or silver coins, while, at the existing ratio, the latter are intrinsically worth less than half the former. Under such a system, the slightest symptom of a financial stress starts a run on the redemption fund. The desire is not so much to possess gold as it is to convert credits into a form that will insure their redemption in property without loss.

The second step should be to provide for the exchange of all other

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kinds of money, silver and paper, with gold. In no other way can all of our circulation be kept at a parity. The single gold standard being firmly recognized, and provision made for the exchange of all other kinds of money for gold, all doubts as to the parity of every dollar with every other dollar will vanish.

While the question of the standard has been the most injurious in its effects, it is admitted by the most experienced monetary scientists that our system of currency is very defective and that a reformation must take place before we can hope to avoid permanently many of the evils from which the people have so seriously suffered.

The operation of the endless chain, by which the Treasury may be emptied of gold, and bonds issued *ad infinitum*, is so palpably vicious that additional argument is not necessary to demonstrate its baleful influence. Under its operation, the value of the standard unit is in constant peril. The remedy for this evil is obvious. The greenbacks must be retired, or reissued only in exchange for gold. Under the present system the Treasurer is compelled to redeem bank-notes in greenbacks. If Government redemption should be continued, the restricted use of the greenback would afford no additional protection to the Treasury, as gold would have to be substituted for the use of lawful money in the redemption of bank-notes. There is another objection to making the greenbacks a favored currency. The banks would be able to use them as a reserve, and at the same time hold in the Treasury an equal amount of gold. No extra facilities should be afforded for the hoarding of gold. On the contrary, every dollar that may be absorbed should be forced into circulation. It is the only way of removing from the minds of the people the impression that gold is the money of the rich, and is, therefore, inimical to the interests of the poor. The people are unduly jealous of the influence of the banks; and a provision that would give to the latter the control of a large part of our supply of gold would not be likely to impress them as a measure designed for their relief. Any discrimination by the Government between the different kinds of money in circulation would raise a doubt as to its ability and intention to maintain the parity of all at the gold standard.

The objection to the retirement of the greenback currency is based on an erroneous idea. It is remarkable that, after years of experience, so many intelligent economists are still wedded to the idea that a currency issued by the Government is the most economical for the people. The Secretary of the Treasury, in discussing this phase of the question in his recent report, said:

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"It is the misfortune of evil conditions to produce derangement and hinder progress, which, if continued, so accustom the subject of them to their existence as to create in him an apathetic indifference to needful and healthful reforms. Indeed, it is a familiar fact that individuals, families, and nations ignorantly suffer under the illusion that the very source of their afflictions is of itself an agency for good. Something like this has marked our financial history for thirty years."

The opinion has long prevailed amongst the great mass of the people that a Government issue was a cheap currency, that greenbacks cost them nothing; when the very reverse is the fact. No more expensive form of currency for the people could be devised. No person has ever been able to obtain honestly a single dollar without first giving in exchange for it the equivalent of 100 cents in gold. The Government cannot and does not loan its credit. Hence, every obligation issued by it, before it can reach the hands of the people and become a part of the circulation, must be purchased and paid for. In other words, the people, to secure this form of currency, must first surrender articles of equal value. So far as the people are concerned, every dollar of it might just as well have been in gold. True, the Government saves the interest on this amount of its indebtedness; but the pecuniary benefits thus afforded to each individual are so remote and infinitesimal as not to be appreciable.

The objections to greenbacks as a currency apply with equal, if not greater, force to national-bank notes. National-bank notes, except in localities where Government bonds are held as investments, are more expensive than greenbacks. It is impossible to organize a bank, especially in the agricultural section of the West and the South, without actually reducing the volume of money in circulation. A, B, and C may possess $50,000. They may decide to start a bank. They purchase in some financial centre bonds at a premium of, say, 10 per cent. They get $45,000 of bonds. These they deposit with the Government; receiving 90 per cent of their par value in bank-notes, 5 per cent of which they must deposit in the Treasury as a redemption fund. By the operation, they have taken out of the community $50,000, and brought back only $38,475,—a loss of $11,525 in the circulation. While the stockholders of the bank may increase the earnings of their capital, it is plain that the people, by reason of the contraction in the volume of money in circulation, must suffer greater inconvenience, and pay higher rates of interest.

When the present banking system was established, the credit of the Government was greatly impaired; and one of the objects was to appreciate the value of Government securities. The system, however, did

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not flourish until the State-bank currency was extinguished by the imposition of an annual tax of 10 per cent. The effect of the destruction of State-bank currency upon the West and the South, though not foreseen at the time, proved almost disastrous. All State-bank currency was suddenly driven out of circulation; and the vacuum was filled by the execution of mortgages and the sale of State, county, and municipal bonds bearing interest at from 8 to 12 per cent. The frenzy for borrowing on public account became so intense that it was necessary, in order to prevent universal bankruptcy, to place a constitutional limit upon the indebtedness of counties and towns. Then began the return to specie payments, and a consequent shrinkage of prices commensurate with the appreciation of our credit to the gold standard. Here were the West and the South, heavily mortgaged and bonded at high rates of interest, upon a depreciated base just as the country started upon a return to a sound financial and commercial standard. The heavy drains made upon their productions, to meet the exactions of this constantly increasing demand, soon brought bankruptcy and ruin to communities which had theretofore seemed highly prosperous.

The cry for relief came from every quarter; and every financial vagary, from an issue of fiat money to the deposit of agricultural products in Government warehouses as security for loans, in turn found enthusiastic support. Impracticable as were these proposed schemes, upon an examination of the arguments made in their support, it will be found that their design was to inaugurate a policy that would relieve the people from the evils of our present system of currency. The Subtreasury scheme of the Farmers' Alliance, by which it was proposed that the Government should loan its credit to the farmers, upon a deposit of agricultural products, was nothing more nor less than an effort to devise a plan by which the farmer's products should become the basis of loanable credits. While all these were impracticable, they demonstrate that the people had a pretty correct idea of the cause of their distress. Under the present system, the West and the South, with a constantly depreciating market, have had to pay annually large sums for the use of loanable credits, which, under a proper system of bank-issues, they could have supplied to themselves without expense.

Whenever a public building was to be constructed, county or municipal bonds, running from twenty to thirty years, and bearing interest at from 7 to 9 per cent, were issued and sold to foreign capitalists. In almost every instance the interest paid exceeded the principal of the debt. This drain upon the productions of the West and the South re-

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sulted in the rapid augmentation of the banking resources of the East; and soon new schemes were devised by which the accretions to their capital could be employed in making additional drains upon our surplus productions. Foreign life- and fire-insurance companies invaded every nook and corner; and soon the lives and property of our citizens were under heavy tribute. We are now burdened with accident, surety, and casualty companies, syndicates and pools, trusts and combinations, until it would seem that there is no limit to the schemes that may be devised for holding the new and fertile sections of the country under tribute to those possessing a surplus. If we could approximate the net sum that has been paid by the people of the West and the South for the use of a credit capital since the establishment of the present system of currency, we should, in all reasonable probability, find that it has cost them more than twice the sum of their present banking resources. From this we can gain some idea of what it has cost them to be deprived of the privilege of issuing credits based upon their own resources.

The results of the operation of the State Bank of Indiana will convey some idea of the savings that the people would have made, had they enjoyed the economy of a currency based upon local assets. This bank was chartered in 1834, the State subscribing for one-half the stock. Its charter expired in 1854, when the State, by reason of the constitutional prohibition, terminated its connection with the bank. Upon the settlement of its affairs the managers paid to the State, as its share of the profits, more than $3,000,000. By its operation the people supplied themselves with loanable credits; and the money received in exchange for their surplus products remained in the State, and increased, from year to year, the volume of wealth.

What the agricultural people, more especially those of the South, need is a supply of loanable credits with which they can more cheaply produce and market their products. When they have done this, they will have no difficulty in securing, in exchange, the best money in circulation; nor will they be likely, upon its receipt, to complain because of its great purchasing power. In many sections of the South the bankers secure funds from the banks in the East, paying as high as 6 per cent interest. These they loan to planters and merchants, who make advances to the small farmers during the cropping season. The banker must have something for his trouble and expense, and so must the planter and the merchant; so that, by the time the money reaches the small farmer, the rate of interest ranges from 12 to 15 per cent.

Now, how can these people be relieved of this excessive burden?

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There is but one way; and that is, by so reforming our system of currency that loanable credits may be issued upon the paid-up and unimpaired capital of the banks. The banking capital of the country is the active capital; and when it is cheapened, productive industry will receive the benefits. A currency based upon the assets of the bank will not only be more equitably distributed, but will expand and contract in volume, according to the demands of trade and commerce.

As an illustration of how capital may be cheapened by the utilization of assets in the hands of the people, let us suppose that there is a community of merchants, manufacturers, farmers, physicians, and those following other vocations and professions, without any circulating medium. In order to relieve their embarrassment, one hundred of the more substantial property-owners meet and sign up, in different sums, $100,000 in notes, payable at some future date. These notes, in the absence of any other form of circulation, would, no doubt, pass freely in the community. But how would they most likely get into circulation? After everything was ready, some one of the parties would probably suggest an equal division; another would express a desire for more than his share; while still another might not, at the time, have any need for his. To satisfy all, they would most likely agree to place the entire sum in control of one member, to be loaned out at interest in such sums as would convenience all. At the end of the year, after paying expenses, the profits or interest would probably be divided, each receiving his proportionate share of the earnings. Now, it is readily seen that each has been a borrower of his own credit. The entire wealth produced in that locality would have cost nothing for the use of loanable credits, and would have remained in the community. It would be exchanged for money of real value; and, in time, the entire volume of private obligations would be supplanted by a volume of money of intrinsic value—the result of the savings to the people by being able to supply themselves with loanable credits.

But would it be wise or economical to supplant this entire volume of credit by metallic money? Most certainly not! All the money they could profitably use would be a sum sufficient to enable them to organize their copartnership as a bank corporation, so as to be able to convert their private obligations into bank-notes. By establishing a bank and by issuing a currency, they would be able to supply the community with a circulation at lower rates, and thereby relieve the people of the expense of carrying a large investment in non-productive wealth.

While the importation of $140,000,000 of gold during the last year

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was an evidence of the prosperous condition of our people, we must not overlook the fact that this, of itself, is a non-producing wealth; that it came to us in exchange for products, because it was the cheapest commodity which those engaged in trade with us had to give. The people of Great Britain understand full well that, when they have more gold than is required to support their monetary system, it is economy to get rid of the surplus, rather than surrender their interest-bearing obligations and dividend-paying stocks. Hence, they view with indifference an exportation of gold, until the drain indicates the approach of a financial stress. When this occurs, the Bank of England simply raises the rate of interest; and the outflow of money ceases.

We now have nearly $1,000,000,000 of gold; and the question may well be asked, What use have we for such a large volume? If $500,000,000 will be sufficient—and it unquestionably will—for the support of a sound and adequate supply of currency, then all over and above that sum will be a dead investment. Of what benefit can it be to the people to have $245,000,000 of gold perpetually locked up in the Treasury? Money, to yield a profit, must be invested. To get an income from it, you must part with it; but, the moment it passes from your hands into the hands of another, it remains non-productive. The accumulation, therefore, of a larger supply of gold than is necessary to sustain an adequate volume of currency will result in a positive loss to the country.

Mr. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury, in discussing the question of a metallic circulation, in a report to Congress on February 12, 1820, said:

> "In a country where the currency is purely metallic no considerable addition can be made to it without giving, at the time of its acquisition, articles in exchange of equal value. No addition can be made to the currency without affecting, to the extent of such addition, the enjoyments of the community. The amount so added will, to the same extent, diminish the quantity of articles which would otherwise be imported into the country for domestic consumption, or for reëxportation."

Our efforts should not be to secure the largest possible volume of money of intrinsic value, with the least possible circulation of currency, but so to construct our system as to enable us to use the largest volume of currency with the least supply of metallic money.

With the unparalleled balances of trade in our favor for the last two years, and the probable continuance of the same to a greater or less extent, the profitable investment of our surplus wealth may become a very difficult matter. In view of the probabilities that we shall acquire an oversupply of gold,—if we have not already done so—the clamor for the

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free coinage of silver becomes more and more absurd. With the free coinage of silver, the value-measure of silver in coins would only be the equivalent of the same amount of silver uncoined; and in view of the fact that we are more likely to suffer from a plethora, than a dearth, of metallic money, the profit, if any, to be derived from our silver-mines will be in the exportation and sale of silver as a commodity. If it be said that it would be unprofitable to work our mines for exportation, then it would be unprofitable to work them for coinage, because the coined silver would have no greater exchangeable value than the same quantity uncoined.

When we consider the broad expanse of our territory, the fertility of our soil, the great variety of our productions, and the rapid growth of our commerce, we ought to be able, in some degree, to comprehend the advantages that would accrue to us from the establishment of an economical monetary system. We have long since passed the point when we could conduct our trade and commerce by the use of money alone, even if our supply were unlimited. Were it not for our banks, and the system of exchange they afford, it would be impossible to effect the exchange of products without an almost continued congestion of the markets. The time, labor, and expense required to count and handle money, and to transport it from one point to another in sufficient sums to meet the requirements of trade, would be so great as completely to prostrate business. When in a bank in New York about a year ago, I was shown a bill of exchange for $2,000,000. This had been drawn with as little labor, time, and expense as it would have taken to draw a Post-office order for a small sum on an office in a neighboring town.

During the year 1898 the executors of the Fair estate were ordered by the Probate Court in San Francisco to transfer $1,500,000 in stocks and securities from New York to the former city. They visited all the express companies; and the lowest bid they were able to secure for the transfer exceeded $4,000. Had this great sum been in money, it could have been safely transmitted by bill of exchange at a comparatively nominal expense. By this system of exchange, the actual use of money in commercial transactions has been entirely dispensed with. A few years ago it took days, weeks, and even months to transport money from one section of the country to another: now it can be done at lightning speed.

Evolution in monetary science has kept pace with the inventive genius of the age; so that the working capacity of a dollar, by the use of modern methods, has been increased a thousandfold. All of these

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economical advantages have contributed directly to the profits of the farmer and the wage-earner; and yet from these classes comes the strongest opposition to any substantial reform in our system of currency, because, it is said, the banks will have a monopoly of supplying the people with a currency. Apparently unconscious of the fact that banking is made free, and that the banks are operated by the people, just as every other business is conducted, the cry is, "Down with the banks!" As well cry "Down with the millers!" because they have the monopoly of supplying the people with flour; or "Down with the druggists!" because they control the supply of medicines; or "Down with the grocers!" because they control the supply of provisions.

Of all the people who favor the maintenance of a metallic circulation of gold and silver, supplemented only by an issue of Government notes, or bank-notes based on Government bonds, the agricultural classes and the wage-workers are the ones who must suffer most from a continuation of the policy.

The banking capital is the productive capital of the country. It is the capital that the merchant, the manufacturer, the trader, the farmer, and all others engaged in active business employ; and when it is cheap and plentiful, the wheels of industry revolve easily, labor finds employment at remunerative wages, and the farmer secures the best market for his products. To stimulate investments in property, to advance prices, and to restore activity in every branch of business, this capital should be favored over that which is perpetually locked within safety-vaults. In his very able work, "The People's Money," Mr. Trenholm gives a striking illustration of the benefits to be derived by the people from bank-issues of currency. He says:

> "The history of the Bank of Stockholm affords a striking proof of the effects of bank-issues of currency in reducing the rates of interest. This institution was established early in the seventeenth century by a merchant, and subsequently, viz., in 1688, was made a state bank. At that date, as one of the conditions of the change, it was limited to 8 per cent as a maximum rate for loans on good security; and it was required to allow 6 per cent on deposits except those of the Government, which drew no interest. As a consequence of its operation and its growing credit, the rate of interest rapidly declined throughout the Kingdom; and before the close of the century the bank rate for loans was successively reduced to 7, 6, 4, and 3 per cent per annum, while the rate allowed to depositors was reduced, *pari passu*, until it reached 2 per cent."

Bank-issues, to be responsive to the demands of business, must be attached to the capital which finds employment in active pursuits. No partial measure of reform will afford the relief necessary to silence for-

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ever the demand for the degradation of our money. To provide merely for an increase of bank-notes, by raising the limit from 90 per cent to the par value of bonds, would give no appreciable relief. It would be more likely to aggravate than to alleviate existing conditions. Better by far that we have no legislation than the enactment of a measure which will prove a disappointment.

The Bill (H. R. No. 10289) reported by the Committee on Banking and Currency at the last session of Congress may not have been a perfect, but certainly was a well-considered, measure, designed to correct in a conservative manner the principal evils of the present system. Whatever imperfections it may have contained, time and experience would have demonstrated; and if shown to have been constructed upon correct principles, its improvement would have been an easy matter.

Our experience has taught us that nothing short of a currency national in its character will suffice for a circulation throughout the whole country. National control and national supervision are, therefore, indispensable to the establishment of any system which shall command the confidence and support of the people. All thoughts of a restoration of a State-bank currency, even in a supplementary form, should be dismissed from consideration. The national feature of our banking system meets with universal approval; and its continuation was wisely provided for.

The purposes for which this article is designed do not make it necessary to analyze the various provisions of the proposed measure. All that is required is to call attention to its main provisions and objects. It provided for a standard of gold only and for the exchange, by the Government, of gold coins for all other kinds of money. The gold standard would, under its provisions, become the sole standard in law, as it is in fact; and, by the payment by the Government of one kind of money for another, the maintenance of the parity of all would be assured. It also provided for a gradual change—by banks that should choose to operate under its provisions—of the security for bank-notes from Government bonds to the paid-up and unimpaired capital of the banks.

It is universally conceded by the advocates of currency reform that, whatever changes may be desirable, the provision for the security of bank-notes must be such that their prompt redemption, at all times and under all circumstances, shall never be in doubt. Will the security provided by this measure be sufficient? From a statement furnished by Mr. Eckels, when Comptroller of the Currency, it appears that the average

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circulation of national banks from 1864 to 1894 was $282,000,000, and that the outstanding circulation of banks that failed during that period was $17,819,541, or about $\frac{1}{5}$ of 1 per cent per annum.

A guarantee fund of 5 per cent of the circulation, for which the Bill provided, would be sufficient to redeem all the notes of banks that might fail for a period of twenty-five years. When, therefore, we consider the provisions for the protection and preservation of this fund, by making the claim for redemptions from it a first lien on the assets of the failed banks,—with the provision that the Comptroller might levy an annual tax of 1 per cent on the circulation of all banks for its restoration,—there can be no question as to the sufficiency of the security and soundness of the currency. As, under the present system, national banks are compelled to keep on deposit with the Government 5 per cent of their circulation for the redemption of their notes, and are taxed 1 per cent annually on their circulation, the maintenance of the guarantee fund would be a relief, instead of a burden, to them.

It is, however, contended that the provision giving the guarantee fund a first lien on the assets of the failed bank is unjust to depositors, and that, for this reason, the measure should be amended.

Without going into the merits of the claim as an original proposition, suffice it to say that this preference in favor of the note-holder is not only the principal feature of the present law, but is made so rigid as to prevent the banks from supplying the people with a cheap and flexible currency. The present law requires that the stockholders shall, with a sufficient amount of the capital, purchase bonds, to be deposited with the Government as a security for the redemption of the bank-notes. What difference would it make to depositors, whether the paid-up capital, which is to constitute the primary fund for the redemption of the bank-notes, is held in the bank or invested in Government bonds? The note-holder might, with some reason, be heard in opposition to the change: but the depositor will be in the same position he now occupies; and for him to demand that he be placed on an equality with the note-holder is to demand a protection he does not now, and never did, enjoy. This concession, however, would not impair the soundness of the security.

The provision for the establishment of branch banks has been held up as a great bugaboo wherewith to frighten country bankers. It has been said that this provision was designed to, and would, enable a few large banks to establish branches all over the country, and thereby extinguish the small banks. If such a gigantic scheme were undertaken, would not the large bankers be apt to seek out in each locality those

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most competent to manage the branches, and entrust them with their control? Would not the local bankers most probably become, in this way, identified with the large banks? Would it be harmful to the local banker or the community that the small institutions should thus become associated with the large ones, and enjoy the benefits of an unlimited credit?

The advantages of a Branch Bank system lie in enabling the officers of the parent-banks, who control large amounts of money, to keep in touch with the demands for money in all sections of the country, and to transfer funds from points where they may be idle to points where they may be needed. The danger is not that branch banks would be opened all over the country, but that a sufficient number would not be established. It might, however, be advisable to restrict the establishment of branch banks to the State in which the parent-banks were situated.

In addition to the provisions discussed, there are many other very salutary ones, designed to effect the change in the basis of currency in such a gradual manner as not to affect unduly the volume of circulation, nor to give a shock to the business interests of the country.

While money is plentiful in commercial centres, and stocks and securities are inflated beyond measure, there has been no appreciable rise in the value of real estate, nor any disposition manifested to invest in any new enterprise that will give employment to the thousands of idle hands now seeking work. Something more than a mere increase in the volume of money is necessary to a full and complete restoration of prosperity.

W. D. BYNUM.

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A LOST EDEN—CUBA.

Two hundred years ago Jamaica celebrated her deliverance from the yoke of colonial despotism. The history of her regeneration will repeat itself in Porto Rico; but for robber-ridden Cuba the day of rescue has dawned too late. The harpy swarm of irrepressible outlaws, who executed the decree of Nemesis upon the oppressors of the fair island, have already turned upon its would-be liberators, and for years to come will defeat the efforts of every reformer.

The bushwhacker *penchant* is fatally apt to become a chronic disorder. In the Sierra de la Alpuxares, fifty miles southeast of Granada, a tribe of Moorish refugees defied the power of three successive Spanish autocrats. The Riff pirates pursued their adventurous trade for a thousand years. Some two million Kurds still stick to the predatory habits of their forefathers, who harassed the stadtholders of the caliphs at the beginning of the ninth century.

But in Cuba the proverbial difficulty of subduing highland rebels is aggravated by a combination of circumstances not paralleled even in Sumatra, where the Berg-heer, or Emir, of Acheen coolly invited the Dutch commissioners to inspect the approaches of his mountain strongholds before settling the terms of their ultimatum. Fifteen thousand square miles, or a full half, of the Cuban mountain region is overgrown with forests, as indestructible as superstition, and so matted with creepers that exploring-parties have to employ a vanguard of expert climbers in order to extend the range of their investigations beyond the wayside thickets. "I expect I could hire out to one of your telegraph companies if you drag me to the States," said a facetious adjutant of Gen. Linares'.

"Oh—did you study the Morse alphabet in your leisure hours?" inquired the officer of the American escort.

"No, we had neither letters nor leisure," laughed the hidalgo; "but I got so used to scrambling up palm-trees that I think I could climb your telegraph-poles without prong-shoes."

The pacification of the Caucasus cost the Russian Government a million men and more than a billion rubles, though the barrenness of

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the highland often reduced its defenders to a diet of beech-nuts and water; while the West Indian sierras teem with edible products the year round. Of nut-bearing trees alone there are about fifty different species; of wild grapes, at least a dozen, besides berries, swamp-plantains, mangoes, guavas, carob-beans, and wild pineapples. There are fishes in every brook, and countless swarms of waterfowl on the lagoons of the coast-plain.

Cuba is a veritable museum of gallinaceous curiosities. One species of quail is not much larger than the sparrow; while the hocco, or West Indian turkey, is almost too heavy to fly, and defends its eggs against able-bodied serpents. Quadrupeds were originally rather scarce: but the coast-jungles now swarm with half-wild pigs; and in the uplands imported rabbits have multiplied like our American tramps, and can be seen scampering about the rocks of every wayside ravine. Wild bees betray their hives by turning out *en masse* against the scouts of robber-wasps.

And all that forest-plunder can be stored in ready-made magazines. The limestone rocks of the upper sierras are honeycombed with caverns all the way from Cienfuegos to the south coast, and there are subterranean labyrinths, where outlaws could hide indefinitely, like bandits in the Ghetto of Naples. Some twenty miles west of Port Malagueta a network of limestone catacombs has been traced inland for a distance of eight leagues, and is supposed to extend beyond the watershed of the central sierras; since some of the cave rivers appear to flow toward the south coast. The effluent cavern, or tunnel, of one of these rivers has not less than forty branch caves,—mere fissures at their junction, but every one of them apt to widen out into dome-like vaults, where whole army corps could store their quartermaster supplies, and baffle pursuit by the simple device of obliterating the narrow portal in the cliffs of the main cavern. The daylight terminus of these tunnels is often shrouded by a tangle of creepers; and it would require an army of picket-posts to prevent the excursions of foragers, who appear and disappear like the shadows of the Brocken Spectre.

They watch all the approaches of the uplands; and American baggage-trains would share the fate of scores of Spanish convoys that have come to grief in the defiles of the foothills. Scouts, sent ahead, may report no indication of danger; but at some narrow pass of the road the progress of the vanguard is suddenly stopped by an avalanche of logs and brushwood, followed by a volley of rifle-shots. The mounted pioneers recoil upon the ammunition-train; fallen horses madly struggle

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to extricate themselves from the *débris;* carts are overturned; and the wagon-masters complete the confusion by conflicting orders.

"Firmez, por Dios!" ("Steady, for Heaven's sake!") shouts the commanding officer: but his own nerves are apt to be unsteadied by the uproar of chaos all around, the crash of falling trees, the anathemas of the native teamsters, and the groans of the wounded; while volley after volley rings out from the inaccessible rocks above. Volunteers rush ahead to attack the barricade with crowbars and axes, but are shot dead as fast as they come in view. The jam of carts, too, is getting inextricable; and the total destruction of the escort soon becomes the evident alternative of a headlong retreat.

There is a suspicion that one of the scouts has pocketed a bribe; but he has to be dismissed with a Scotch verdict, the witnesses having contrived to baffle the cross-examiner. They detest foreigners of all races, and will prevaricate like horse-dealers rather than compromise a fellow-countryman.

"These fellows are so crazily clannish that their alliance cannot be trusted for twenty-four hours," said Gen. Beresford, of Wellington's staff, after a year's transactions with the leaders of the Spanish Junta; and that experience will repeat itself to the liberators of the West Indies. The chiefs of the insurgents will be sure to resent dictation; and in every town under American martial law malcontents will multiply like microbes in a Santiago cistern. The whole island will soon be in a ferment of nativist conspiracies. The Creoles will fraternize with the bushwhacker orators: in the ardor of conservatism they will become pious, like the Bombay slum-alley bullies, who denounce the British health officers in the names of a hundred Hindu saints. Nay, even now the charges of oppression awaken responsive groans all along the coasts of the Caribbean Sea; and the very Spaniards ridicule the protests of the Cuban pamphleteers, as in the clever parody published by a correspondent of "El Pays."

"Woe be the day when these narrow-minded barbarians landed on our shores," wails the martyr of independence. "The day before yesterday one of their ruffians actually kicked a son of freedom whom he caught in the act of removing the personal estate of a Spanish miscreant." In a voice hoarse with emotion, he continues:

"Gangs of swashbucklers patrol the highways, and prevent us from reaping the just fruits of victory. A number of Peninsular caitiffs, who had deserved annihilation, and whom we merely tried to relieve of their ill-gotten wealth, were aided by these pestilential foreigners and enabled to hang three of our heroic brethren. Two of them, it is true, were cut down in time to prevent the worst; but their organs of

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respiration are so impaired that they may have to adopt some menial trade—possibly under the supervision of these foreign usurpers. Oh, Reconstruction! what crimes are being committed in thy name!

The stronghold of an enemy of mankind, a Spanish real estate pasha, was set afire, and friends of liberty would have hailed the fiery beacon as a promise of better times; but the henchmen of our Hyperborean oppressors rushed in and extinguished the flames. They were armed with sticks; and, after seizing our emissary —but details are too painful to mention. Four of his aggressors then laid hold of him; and Freedom shrieked when he fell out of a second-story window."

The professional agitators of the Spanish-American republics will indorse those sentiments; and Cuba will become a rendezvous of adventurers from all parts of the revolutionary continent. I predict that Mexico alone will contribute some fifty shiploads of "Liberals," who have been unable to wreck the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. Spain herself will probably send a considerable quota of volunteers, exulting in the chance to enjoy bushwhacker privileges at the expense of the detested "Yanqui." The guerilla-instinct, which fourteen Spanish-American republics inherited from their stepmother-country, was developed in the course of the seven hundred years' struggle against the power of the Moorish infidels, and asserts itself in its fiercest forms in campaigns against foreign invaders. In 1810 the rivalries of Castilians and Catalans were forgotten; Spaniards and Portuguese became fellow-Peninsulars; and Spanish adventurers who were repulsed in an attempt to cross the border-mountains, embarked in Corunna, and reached the mouth of the Tagus in fishing-smacks.

And the coasts of Cuba seem to have been constructed for the special convenience of filibustering expeditions. They are skirted with mud-banks, divided by ever-shifting channels; and there are hundreds of mangrove-swamps, where topographical knowledge would defy pursuit, and where light-draught schooners could moor in safety within a mile of *terra firma*.

The Cuban bushwhacker chiefs will find work for all comers of that sort. Besides the disciplined, or at least organized, Junta guerillas, there are countless hordes of ragamuffins, or *pelados*, as the Creoles call the unkempt desperadoes that dignify their plundering expeditions by the name of warfare, and extend the imprecations of their *vendetta* to all partisans of law and order.

More incorrigible outlaws never infested the southern Apennines or the borderland of Islam and Christendom. Some of the Junta volunteers have proved the disinterestedness of their motives by the sacrifice of every personal comfort except that of an approving conscience; but

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the *pelados* love havoc for its own sake, and would not hesitate to trump up grievances against any patriot who should attempt to enforce the restoration of peace. They are mostly mongrels, weather-hardened and soul-hardened savages, who have reverted to the type of their primitive ancestors, and reacquired the faculty of making a feast-day compensate the hardships of six fast-days; digesting the sun-dried bull-beef of their bivouacs as readily as the made dishes of a ransacked hotel, and sleeping in quagmires on a pillow of willow-hurdles as soundly as in a feather-bed. Their fox-trail instinct will easily prevail against the methods of civilized warfare; and their raids have already depopulated numerous districts, some of which once boasted prosperous farms, but are now shunned as the haunts of the predatory Kabyles are shunned by the Algerian settlers.

In the Sierra Mesilla, northeast of Bayamo, the industrial population has almost entirely disappeared under the terror of the freebooters, whose camp-fires can be seen smoking in the summit-glens, and whose constant raids at last ceased to leave the farmers a living-share in their agricultural products. The Cerro de Cobre, some eighty miles further south, is approached only by cattle-hunters with a military escort: travellers who have attempted the passes of the old overland road have rarely returned to tell the results of the all but inevitable encounter with the scouts of the outlaws.

The valley formed by the west fork of the Rio Verde, in the Province of Puerto Principe, was long dreaded as a haunt of runaway slaves; and these refugees have now been joined by desperadoes numerous enough to become savagely aggressive. Their neighbors, too, have abandoned hundreds of farms that can no longer be hoped to repay the toil of tillage. In stress of circumstances the outlaws eke out a subsistence by hunting and fishing, but withal continue to extend the range of their marauding expeditions; and last winter one of their restless leaders was caught and hanged by a posse of exasperated *rancheros*, on the charge of having decorated his headquarters den with arabesques of human hands, "nailed up spread-eagle fashion, or like a collection of dried fern-leaves."

The total value of the property destroyed by these moss-troopers has been computed to exceed half a billion dollars; and a list of their murders would resemble the bulletin of a Dahomey war-chief.

Scores of outlaw-camps are also found all along the main range of the Sierra Maestra, that skirts the south coast in the Province of Santiago, and branches off in a northwesterly direction along the central watershed of the island. Since 1878 the number and audacity of the

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roving bandits have steadily increased, portentously so during the last half-decade; while the total population of the island has dwindled from two millions to less than one million and a quarter.

Thousands of merchants, depending upon the custom of the country population, have been beggared; and since the close of the Spanish campaigns—practically discontinued at the beginning of the present year—the condition of affairs in the rural districts may be described in the words of an Armenian traveller: "The freebooters are numerous enough to keep the settlements poor; while here and there the richness of the soil continues to attract new settlers."

That attraction, too, will gradually cease; and the few remaining planters will have to garrison their *haciendas*. Country-produce has to be smuggled cityward under cover of cloudy nights, unless the farmer prefers to pay blackmail on every acre of his growing harvest.

And what the *pelados* have done for agriculture, swarms of ownerless curs threaten to do for the stock-farmers of the western sierras. In the eastern provinces cattle-raising has almost wholly ceased; and sheep-breeders might as well try their luck among the hunger-crazed aborigines of Tierra del Fuego. In the west *estancias* contrived to hold their own; but more than five years ago a tourist in the mountains of Pinar del Rio reported that the future of stock-raising would depend upon the doubtful possibility of exterminating the countless packs of half-wild dogs that rear their whelps in the caverns of the sierras, and have learned to prefer mutton to venison.

The increase of these four-footed freebooters has now come to defy control. They have spread from the foothills up to the highlands, and down to the coast-jungles of the plains; and the yelps of their coöperative hordes may be heard waking the echoes of the wilderness whenever a cow strays beyond the shelter of well-fenced *ranchos*. They, too, will continue to multiply; and all Cuba will soon meet the doom of a body infested with myriads of destructive and medication-defying microbes.

The sun of the tropics stimulates the activity of the organic forces by whose ministrations "every neglected spot tends to become beautiful." Tendrils of bush-ropes twine about the ruins of deserted homesteads. On thousands of hill-tops the sylvan deities have resumed their ancient sway; and in Eastern Cuba the undulations of the coast-plain will soon resemble a widespread sea of verdure. But, for the interests of American civilization, it would perhaps have been better if, like the lost Atlantis, the whole island had disappeared beneath the ocean waves.

F. L. Oswald.

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WHEAT: CROOKES *vs.* ATKINSON, DODGE, *ET AL.*

THE relation of population to the food-supply has long commanded the attention of Sir William Crookes; and in his address, as President of the British Association, he stated conclusions—the result of his investigations—to the effect that if population increased at a rate approximating that of recent decades, and acre-yields did not increase materially, the world's wheat-lands would be fully employed about 1931, and exports of wheat from the United States would probably cease, owing to the increase of domestic requirements, and an earlier exhaustion of the arable lands.

Criticising these conclusions in the December issue of the "Popular Science Monthly," Mr. Edward Atkinson says:

> "The point to which I wish to direct attention and inquiry is this alleged nearly complete taking up of the land of the United States capable of producing wheat in paying quantities . . . It will be observed that the present necessities of the world are computed by Sir William Crookes at 2,324,000,000 bushels, of which this country will supply 600,000,000 to 700,000,000 bushels from an area of land devoted to wheat of 71,000 square miles . . . Given a demand of the wheat-consuming population of the world for this whole supply of 2,324,000,000 bushels, this country could supply it at the present average per acre by devoting two hundred and fifty thousand square miles to this crop, or less than ten per cent of the area, omitting Alaska. We could supply the world's present demand, *but of course such computations are purely speculative.*"[1]

It is remarkable that an estimate of the whole world's requirements should be attributed to Sir William Crookes, as in no part of his address were such requirements so much as mentioned, his statements being confined to the requirements of, and supplies available by, clearly designated populations. An estimate relating only to specified populations is certainly not an estimate for the whole world.

While Mr. Atkinson is undoubtedly correct when he characterizes his computations as "purely speculative," the computations themselves seem to be anything but correct. For instance, if, as he says, the United States will furnish 600,000,000 to 700,000,000 bushels of current requirements, it will not come from 71,000 square miles; for, as the Department of Agriculture shows, the square miles harvested in

[1] All italics in this article are those of the present writer.

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1898 numbered some 68,836 only. How can Mr. Atkinson account for this addition of about 1,385,000 acres to the wheat area? Again, if the United States can furnish 2,324,000,000 bushels *from yields equalling the present average* (officially placed at 12.7 bushels an acre), the area employed would be 285,925 square miles instead of 250,000; the element of error in Mr. Atkinson's computation being 14.4 per cent,—a trifle of 35,925 square miles, or a block of wheat-bearing land almost equalling the land-area of the State of Indiana! Again, in the statement that the high price for wheat in 1897 caused an addition of 9,000 square miles to the wheat area of 1898, we find a great discrepancy; for the Department of Agriculture places such addition at some 7,172 miles only.

As indicative of our power to feed the world, Mr. Atkinson remarks:

"I venture to say that if a contract could be entered into by the bread-eaters of the world with the farmers of the United States, giving an assurance of a price equal to one dollar a bushel in London . . . which would yield to the American farmer from sixty to eighty cents per bushel on the farm, the land now under cultivation in wheat and not required for any other crop or pasture would be opened in the United States which would be devoted to this service year by year as fast as the consumption called for it."

How would "land now under cultivation in wheat" be opened? Were it opened anew, how would that increase the supply?

Mr. Atkinson says:

"There are [in the United States] now fully one hundred thousand square miles of land, 64,000,000 acres, fully suitable to the production of wheat at fifteen bushels to the acre, practically unoccupied in any branch of agriculture, which would be devoted to wheat on an assured price of one dollar a bushel in Mark Lane, yielding 960,000,000 bushels."

This statement suggests inquiry respecting the location of the many millions of acres having a productive power 18 per cent in excess of that of the acres now employed, and yet that are "practically unoccupied in any branch of agriculture." These lands must long since have been severed from the public domain, or else the millions of Americans growing wheat on acres of lower fertility would have acquired them under the very liberal land laws. The statement in substance is, that American farmers have selected for wheat some 44,000,000 acres giving yields averaging but 12.7 bushels an acre, while lying idle beside them are 64,000,000 acres which will yield 15 bushels an acre that were procurable at the same cost, and which the altruistic owners keep in idleness, while paying taxes thereon, in order that their less fortunate neighbors may have a market for their products!

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We are told that these 64,000,000 acres would be devoted to wheat on an assured price of $1 a bushel in London, or the equivalent of 60 to 80 cents in the farming districts. If such prices are to have this effect in the future, why have they not been so operative in the very recent past? The reports of the Department of Agriculture show that only in 1893, 1894, and 1895, out of the last thirty years, has the price of wheat in the farm markets averaged as low as 60 cents; that from 1885 to 1897, inclusive, the average was 81 cents a bushel; and that from 1868 to 1883 it averaged more than $1 a bushel. Obviously something more than 60 to 80 cents in the farm markets was required to bring the 64,000,000 acres into use. Possibly this something was a magical $1 a bushel in London. Yet British official reports show that the wheat imported into the United Kingdom in the five years ending with 1877 had an average value in gold of $1.52 a bushel; that wheat imported from 1878 to 1882 had a value of $1.41; and that that imported from 1883 to 1892 had an average value of $1.07 a bushel. While the value of American wheat imported in 1894 and 1895 averaged but 73 cents, yet the average for the five years ending with 1897 was 82 cents a bushel; the average for the last twenty-five years has been $1.20 a bushel; in no year prior to 1893 was the value less than $1 a bushel; and in 1897 it reached 98 cents.

It is clear that up to 1893 the idleness of the 64,000,000 acres could not have been caused by the lack of a price equal to $1 a bushel in London *for American wheat.* Do they not remain idle because they exist only in "purely speculative computations"?

The Indian Territory has an area of 19,840,000 acres, of which possibly one-half is cultivable, the whole being in the tribal possession of some 50,000 Indians. Ultimately the best of these lands will be allotted to the Indians in severalty, leaving little but sterile tracts for white occupancy; and, with Indian farming, production will not be excessive. Indian tendencies are indicated in recent reports of United States Indian agents. Referring to the Osages, Gen. Pollock says, in substance, that, having annuities equalling $200 for adults and children, they prefer village life to agriculture, the majority living but to sing, dance, and carouse. Of the Crow Creeks Agent Stephens reports that intertribal visiting is demoralizing; encouraging idleness, nomadic habits, the abandonment of crops, and the neglect of stock.

Should the whites possess all the cultivable land, it would equal about 80,000 average-sized farms; and a rural population of some 400,000, with necessary work-animals, would require some 4,000,000

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acres for supplies and pasture, leaving less than 16,000,000 acres of infertile waste for highways, railways, town-sites, and other public utilities, as well as for commercial crops of every kind. Notwithstanding these facts, Mr Atkinson says:

"I now propose to submit an inquiry in due form, in order to sustain my own belief that we can supply the whole present and the increasing demand of Great Britain for the next thirty years with six bushels per head at a dollar a bushel from land situated wholly in the Indian Territory, not yet open to private entry, but which may soon be open when the Indian titles have all been purchased."

It is difficult to understand how a *present* demand, stated at 240,000,000 bushels, can be met from lands not available for production, especially when it requires, at the present national average yield, with required seed, the continuous use of 21,400,000 acres out of a possible cultivable area not exceeding 10,000,000 acres, occupied by such Indians as Messrs. Pollock and Stephens have described.

Having stated his belief in the ability of the Indian Territory to meet all present and future demands of Great Britain for wheat, Mr. Atkinson remarks:

"I undertake to say that the State of Texas can meet this whole demand without impairing in the slightest degree its present products of grain, cotton, wool, and meats. . . ."

Including, as he does, water surfaces, Mr. Atkinson credits Texas with an area some 2,200,000 acres in excess of its land surface, and quotes the Secretary of the State Board of Agriculture to the effect that there are some 200,000 square miles *that may be ploughed*, and 100,000 adapted to wheat and *other grains*. Vastly more than half the 200,000 miles is within that hopelessly arid region west of the 100th meridian, and in that infertile swampy coastal region of more than 50,000 square miles extending from the northeast corner of the sterile sands of the long-leafed pine belt on the Sabine to the Rio Grande, of which not 15 per cent is cultivable.

While much of Texas is adapted to maize, the only considerable area adapted to wheat is found between the 31st parallel on the south, the Red River on the north, the 95th meridian on the east, and the 100th on the west. While little, if any, more than half of this region is cultivable, it grows 60 per cent of all the grain and cotton of Texas, and quite 90 per cent of its wheat. It, in fact, constitutes the agriculturally valuable part of the State, two-thirds of which is of little worth except for pastoral purposes.

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Those desiring information in relation to the lands of Texas can hardly do better than consult the reports of the Tenth and Eleventh Censuses, which show that as long ago as 1879 Texas grew 374,000 acres of wheat, although but 445,000 were under that cereal in 1897; the wheat area increasing but 19 per cent in eighteen years as against a population increase of about 100 per cent, an increase of 58 per cent in the area under maize, and one of 228 per cent in the land devoted to cotton!

Assigning to Oklahoma the task of growing nearly 16,000,000 bushels of wheat for British consumption on 3,200,000 acres (to be newly improved) used in a four-course rotation, Mr. Atkinson states that

"Oklahoma (38,719 square miles) was opened to settlement only seven years since [October, 1891], and has yet a great deal of unoccupied land. It will this year raise 13,000,000 bushels of wheat from 850 square miles devoted to the crop."

Oklahoma has much unoccupied land; but it is mostly either in the possession of Indians, infertile waste, or situated in the arid western portion and adapted only to pastoral purposes.

Official publications show that Oklahoma was opened to settlement in 1889; that when credited with but seven years of life, it had grown ten crops of maize, and harvested nine of wheat; that when the Census of 1890 was taken 50,000 acres were found to have been under crops in 1889; that 8,826 farms, including 564,000 improved acres, were in cultivation; and that error and fact in the seven-year postulate were in the ratio of 3 to 7.

Probably the most remarkable statement in Mr. Atkinson's article is that "Oklahoma *will this year* [1898] *raise* 13,000,000 *bushels of wheat from* 850 *square miles devoted to the crop*," although the Department of Agriculture showed in May that the acreage had been greatly increased, and has since shown it to have been some 950,000 acres producing some 14,200,000 bushels!

In bringing forward a witness Mr. Atkinson says:

"An unexpected reply comes from Idaho, as yet insignificant in wheat production, stating that the potential of that State under the conditions named [?] might reach 400,000,000 bushels."

Such a statement may have been both unexpected and "purely speculative"; but that does not prevent its being used as evidence of the ability of this country to grow all the wheat the world requires. Idaho has an area of 53,945,000 acres, of which only 123,000 were under

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wheat in 1897. As yields average 19.2 bushels an acre, it would require 20,833,000 acres, or 39 per cent of the surface, to produce 400,000,000 bushels. As barely 50 per cent of such a State as Illinois, and but 40 per cent of the area of France, has ever been under harvested staples, even a tenth of 400,000,000 bushels would be an astounding output in Idaho, especially in view of the fact that in the Irrigation Report of the Eleventh Census it is stated, in substance, that Idaho consists of mountains and elevated plains; that on some mountain areas sufficient rain falls to mature crops; that around the bases of the mountains and on the plains rarely anything grows without irrigation; that the water in the larger streams sinks, on leaving the mountains, into canyons from 200 to 500 feet below the general surface; while that of the smaller streams sinks into their pervious beds, which go nearly or quite dry after the middle of June, when most needed.

Mr. Atkinson informs us that he "rested for absolute information" on a witness who writes that

"The growing farm prosperity in Minnesota above noted finds its highest development in the past five years, during which the selling price of wheat in London has averaged approximately one dollar per bushel. . . ."

As within the last five years wheat brought lower prices in London than known in the preceding three hundred years, and those for American wheat averaged but 82 cents, while in the preceding thirty years the average was about $1.30 a bushel, and never below $1 for any year, this is singular testimony to offer in support of a contention that $1 a bushel in London is requisite to bring into use lands having a potential nearly one-fifth greater than that of the lands now employed! Does not this testimony prove altogether too much? This witness is also credited with the following statement:

"With no added profit in the business, the settlement of the vacant lands of these States [Minnesota and the Dakotas] and those of Montana and the British Northwest will move on, and twenty-five years from now will find in the territory tributary to Minneapolis and Duluth not less than 400,000,000 bushels of wheat raised annually. . . . The wave of humanity anxious to raise wheat for a dollar a bushel in London would sweep past the boundaries of the four States mentioned, and carry the cultivation of that cereal *all over* Manitoba, Assiniboia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. . . . Settlements would not have extended as far north as St. Petersburg in Russia; neither would settlers have trenched upon the lands with a climate as severe as that of the Russian metropolis."

It is possible that the character of all the statements of this witness is indicated by that relating to the comparative severity of the climates of St. Petersburg and the Canadian Northwest.

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Elisée Reclus says:

"The inhabitants of Europe, though they may live 900 to 1,200 miles farther from the equator, enjoy as mild a climate as do those of America, and the decrease of temperature on going northward is far less rapid than in any other part of the globe."

While statements by M. Reclus require no support, it is well to show by official data the actual mean temperatures, for each winter month and for the winter as a whole, at St. Petersburg, at Archangel, at three Siberian cities, and at three places in the British districts named, which, for terms of years, have been as follows:

Place.	Mean Temperatures for Terms of Years.			
	December.	January.	February.	Winter.
St. Petersburg	21.7°	15.7°	17.5°	18.1°
Archangel	12.5	6.6	9.2	9.4
Barnaul	0.3	— 5.6	4.3	— 0.3
Tomsk	— 1.1	— 3.5	3.0	— 0.5
Irkutsk	1.2	— 3.3	4.8	0.9
Winnipeg	3.6	— 6.8	— 1.9	— 1.9
Regina	5.5	— 7.1	— 5.4	— 2.3
Prince Albert	2.3	— 8.5	— 2.9	— 3.0

It appears that the climate of the Canadian districts, although from six to nine degrees nearer to the equator than St. Petersburg, is as much more severe than that of the Russian capital as 2° below zero is colder than 18° above zero; is much more severe than the climate of Archangel; and is slightly more severe than the terrible climate of the Siberian cities named!

The wide divergence between "absolute information" and official determinations is surprising, and inspires doubt as to the validity of statements from the same source in relation to the wheat-growing capacity of the Northwest,—more especially as in the last eight years 139,000 acres only have been added to the grain and hay areas of Minnesota, or $\frac{1}{5}$ of 1 per cent per annum, and because, at this rate, it will take more than four hundred years to increase the wheat product of the Northwest to 400,000,000 bushels.

Being told that the cultivation of wheat is to be carried "*all over* Manitoba, Assiniboia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan," it is well to see what the Canadian Minister of the Interior has to say of these districts. In an official handbook which was issued in August, 1897, the Minister states:

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"The eastern portion of Assiniboia, for a distance of one hundred and twenty miles westward from its eastern boundary, is practically a continuation to the westward of the grain-growing areas of Manitoba, although the soil is somewhat lighter . . . Within this portion of the district settlement has rapidly extended . . . From Swift Current west there is found a thick growth of buffalo grass [a sign of aridity], affording excellent pasture, and rendering stock-raising a profitable occupation . . . Wheat, however, is not much grown in this section.

Southern Alberta is essentially a ranching and dairy country . . . The rainfall in the district is small, averaging about 12 inches in the year . . . This amount of precipitation is not sufficient to ensure good crops in the majority of years.

A considerable portion of the district of [Saskatchewan] is contained in the wooded portion of the Territories, and unsuited to the immediate [?] requirements of settlement . . . In the neighborhood of Battleford and in the southwestern corner of the district the rainfall is at times insufficient to mature crops."

Available data do not show that any part of the Canadian districts named, except Southern Manitoba and the eastern half of Assiniboia, is adapted to wheat culture; while they do show that over the greater part of these vast regions neither summer heats nor rainfalls are sufficient. In the Northwest Territories as a whole the rainfall since 1889 is shown, by "The Canadian Year-Book," to have averaged but 14.5 inches per annum; while at least 18 inches are required for successful cereal culture. Under such conditions, it will be a very difficult task to carry the cultivation of wheat "*all over*" any part of this region except Southern Manitoba and Eastern Assiniboia, or a region having about the potentiality of one of our principal wheat-growing States.

Mr. Atkinson says:

"In previous essays . . . I have very guardedly computed but one-half our total area of three million square miles (omitting Alaska) as being arable land suitable for the plough. The returns now in my hands would render it suitable to increase that area to two-thirds."

To show that less than a fifth of the computed arable area is employed, a numerical statement of Mr. Atkinson's exhibits only 216,130,984 acres under grain, hay, and cotton in 1897, but, in so doing, understates the cotton area by more than a millton acres.

Comparing, as in the following table, the areas under grain and hay in 1889, as shown by the Census, with those under the same staples in 1895 and 1898, as shown by the Department of Agriculture, and remembering that in six of the last ten years the price of American wheat in London has ranged from a yearly average of 98 cents to $1.19 a bushel, and that, outside the cotton districts, nearly all added acres have been employed in growing minor products, it will be seen how little probability there is of bringing into wheat production the arable acres of which Mr. Atkinson speaks.

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Product.	Acres Employed.			Change since 1889. Acres.	Per Cent of Change.
	1889.	1895.	1898.		
Maize	72,100,000	82,100,000	77,700,000	5,600,000 +	7.8 +
Wheat	33,600,000	34,000,000	44,100,000	10,500,000 +	31.2 +
Oats	28,300,000	27,900,000	25,800,000	2,500,000 —	8.8 —
Barley	3,200,000	3,300,000	2,600,000	600,000 —	18.8 —
Rye	2,200,000	1,900,000	1,600,000	600,000 —	27.3 —
Buckwheat	800,000	800,000	700,000	100,000 —	12.5 —
Hay	52,900,000	44,200,000	42,800,000	10,100,000 —	19.3 —
Totals	193,100,000	194,200,000	195,300,000	2,200,000 +	1.1 +

Since 1889 population has increased 21 per cent, as against an increase of the area under the primary food staples of 1.1 per cent. That is to say, requirements have increased nearly twenty times as fast as the power to produce food. While many more than 2,200,000 acres have been added to the cultivated area, they have been either absorbed by the cotton-fields or devoted to the growth of minor products required by a population increasing more than 2 per cent per annum.

Had not the herds of hay- and maize-eating animals shrunk greatly since 1892, thus rendering vast areas of hay and maize lands available for wheat production, we should probably have reduced the wheat area instead of adding 10,000,000 acres to it since 1895. As the available supply of meats, relatively to population, is barely two-thirds as great as seven years since, we are likely, aside from providing for increase of the population, to find it necessary to restore the diverted acres to the meadows and maize-fields, in order to provide the existing population with required animal products and services.

Since 1892, farm animals have declined from 169,200,000 to 137,600,000, thus liberating more than 12,000,000 acres of oats and hay lands, and permitting vast additions to the wheat area. But herds, being insufficient for even present needs, must be added to in the measure of the existing defect as well as in that of the animal products and services required by all future additions to the population. This will necessitate and force a restoration to other staples of acres recently diverted to wheat.

Should population continue to increase to the extent of only 80 per cent of the present ratio, and the standard of living be maintained, we shall require, before 1931, the product of 250,000,000 more acres under staples and pasture. Failing such additions, drafts must be made upon areas employed in growing products for export. This

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alternative involves that cessation of wheat exportation the mere suggestion of which by Sir William Crookes has so excited many very estimable people.

The practical cessation of additions for nine years to the aggregate area under staples other than cotton indicates that exhaustion of the arable lands made so manifest by the great number of persons contending for each 160-acre tract opened to settlement on any fraction of an Indian reserve.

About twenty-six years ago Gen. W. B. Hazen indicated an early complete occupancy of the arable lands; and in 1882 Gen. Francis A. Walker said, in substance, that there are in Texas vast tracts destined to afford a field for but a few thousand herdsmen, while other vast tracts have no adaptation whatever to the wants of civilized man. North and west of Texas is an unsettled area of some 1,200,000 square miles, a large part of which is comprised of a mighty mass of mountains, unequalled in their totality on the globe, and of which the greater part will remain void of settlement, by reason of ruggedness, barrenness, or lack of moisture. These mountains and the great plains sloping east and west therefrom constitute the "Arid Lands," where agriculture is absolutely impossible without irrigation. Many well-informed persons think that as much of the plains is already improved as is likely to remain in cultivation, and that a refluent wave of population from such regions is not improbable.

The refluent wave came within five years; and thirty-seven Western Kansas counties lost 48 per cent of their population in eight years.

Eight mountain States and Territories, having an area of 556,000,000 acres, had less than 3,300,000 acres under staples in 1897. This indicates that the mighty mountain mass referred to by Gen. Walker should be excluded from the equation, as should some 250,000,000 acres of the plains. Only in the fourteen States and Territories of the great central valleys is even a third of the area cultivable; and in the fourteen it requires a very vivid imagination to see that more than 70 per cent of the surface is arable. That is to say, 400,000,000 cultivable acres is probably much nearer the mark than 600,000,000, not to speak of 1,200,000,000 which have been speculatively computed.

Mr. J. R. Dodge, formerly Statistician of the Department of Agriculture, criticising in an agricultural journal the address of Sir William Crookes, says, in essence, that the President of the British Association states present world requirements for wheat at 2,324,000,000 bushels, although the Department of Agriculture shows them as averaging more

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than 2,477,000,000 during the last seven years, and that Sir William states world supplies from the harvest of 1897 as but 1,921,000,000 bushels, while the Department shows them as 2,214,000,000.

Mr. Dodge evidently failed to note that the scientist was dealing only with the requirements of, and supplies available by, the populations of Europe, the United States, British America, Australasia, parts of South America, and the whites of European colonies, and that the quoted estimates related only to such populations; while the tabulations of the Department annually included some 350,000,000 bushels of wheat grown in Mexico, Japan, India, Persia, Asiatic Turkey, and North Africa, of which, imports of only some 30,000,000 bushels annually by the populations named entered into the criticised estimates. Another important error is made by Mr. Dodge in the same article, when he credits Mr. Edward Atkinson with statements in relation to Oklahoma that referred wholly to another region.

As he quotes "Beerbohm's" as an authority, Mr. Dodge will doubtless accept its statements, although they show that the estimates he designates as "lame" are astonishingly correct. Sir William Crookes's estimate was that the 1897–98 requirements of the populations named aggregated 2,324,000,000 bushels for food and seed, and that but 1,921,000,000 bushels were available from the 1897–98 harvest of the regions inhabited by such populations *plus* imports of 31,000,000 bushels from Asia and North Africa.

On August 17, 1898, "Beerbohm's" stated that

> "the world's wheat stocks, visible and invisible, are about 240,000,000 bushels less than last year on August 1st."

Again, on December 14, 1898, in criticising a letter of Sir William's in the London "Times," "Beerbohm's" said:

> "We, however, quite agree with Sir William in the opinion that this crop will practically have to cover the needs of 13 months."

In the address the *remainder* from former harvests at the beginning of the 1897–98 harvest year had been estimated at 300,000,000 bushels. It being obviously impossible to use the entire remainder, and Sir William stating in the "Times" that the harvest of 1898–99 had been drawn upon a month earlier than usual (monthly requirements for bread alone of the populations named averaging 166,000,000 bushels), while such an adverse critic as "Beerbohm's" shows the remainder to have been drawn upon for 240,000,000 bushels, and the new harvest for

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166,000,000, to eke out the supplies of 1897–8, Sir William's estimate, with the "Beerbohm's" addenda, assumes the following aspect:

	Bushels.	Bushels.
Requirements of designated populations.....	.....	2,324,000,000
Supplies from harvest of 1897–8.....	1,921,000,000	
From remainders of former harvests.....	240,000,000	
Drafts upon harvest of 1898–9.....	166,000,000	2,327,000,000
Distribution in excess of estimate	.....	3,000,000

As on page 7 of the authorized version of his address Sir William had stated the supplies available by such populations from the harvest of 1897–98 to be defective by 403,000,000 bushels, and hostile critics showing, as has "Beerbohm's," that some 406,000,000 bushels derived from other sources have been consumed, statistics seem, in the hands of Sir William, to approach an exact science, while the work of the criticising statistician was shown by the Census of 1890 to be, in many cases, from 10 to 800 per cent out of line.

Mr. Dodge remarks:

"The enlargement of European production, *from a little over* 1,200,000,000 bushels for the decade *preceding* 1890, to more than 1,400,000,000 since that year, whether from enlargement of area or yield increased by fertilization, demonstrates the fact of elasticity in European production. *To be entirely fair—for I am not engaged in special pleading to score a specious point*—some of this increase was from climatic causes."

Now on page 411 of the Report of the Department of Agriculture for 1886, Mr. Dodge stated officially that at the beginning of the ninth decade yields in Europe were very low; while, on page 305 of the Report for 1891, he says:

"The real [European] average of wheat production in the last five years may be *fairly* stated in round numbers at 1,250,000,000 bushels."

It is also interesting to find Mr. Dodge officially saying, on page 454 of the Report for 1892, in relation to the wheat crops of Europe, that

"the average of the period [1886 to 1890] was 1,220,000,000 bushels, not including Bulgaria or the British Possessions [?] in Europe, for which regular data were not presented. Including the crops of these countries, the statement would have been about 1,262,000,000 bushels."

As the average was said to be but 1,250,000,000 the year before, "British Possessions"—if such possessions existed—must have grown 12,000,000. Including the same regions in both periods, Europe's crops averaged 1,305,000,000 and 1,400,000,000 bushels, respectively, so

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that Mr. Dodge's "a little over 1,200,000,000" is an error of about 100,000,000 bushels!

Peculiar comparisons, however, seem not strange to Mr. Dodge, as, on page 100 of Miscellaneous Report No. 5 of the Department of Agriculture, he states that

"the rapid and substantial growth of the export trade [in Russian wheat] will be noted, it increasing from less than 37,000,000 bushels in 1880 to more than 127,000,000 bushels in 1890."

In a table on the opposite page of that report it is shown that exports in 1890 were less than 100,000,000 bushels, although higher up the column it is stated that 127,445,000 bushels were exported in an earlier year. It appears that, to show exports increasing 243 per cent in ten years, the very smallest exports of twenty-four years were selected to compare with the largest, despite the fact that a table in Mr. Dodge's report of March, 1891, shows the exports of 1879 to have been 102,835,000 bushels, and those of 1880 to have been 82,918,000! *From which it appears that exports increased downward to reach the* 37,000,000 *bushels which, in the March report, are shown to have occurred in* 1881!

Keeping the Russian export comparison in view, we shall be the better able to appreciate Mr. Dodge's statement that

"the eminent scientist is almost as lame in his statistics of consumption as he is in those of production . . . It is hard to convince people, scientists as well as plain people, that honesty is the best policy, and that truth in statistics cannot safely be departed from. The practice of stock exchanges, as well as that of bucket-shops, to secure a temporary advantage, can never aid the cause of science or of rural economy."

The implication that Sir William Crookes has resorted to bucket-shop methods to support his conclusions comes with singular grace from a statistician making the quoted export comparison. Also, the reference to lame statistics comes with peculiar force from one whom the Census of 1890 found overestimating the corn and wheat areas by 11,000,000 acres, and underestimating the hay area in great measure, while in cases of individual States his wheat areas were found to be out of line from 7 to 800 per cent!

Truly, "honesty is the best policy" in the employment of statistics, whether by scientists, by plain people, or by professional statisticians; while the ability to eschew bucket-shop methods, to read correctly, to state facts and to state them clearly, and to criticise with intelligence and entire fairness is especially desirable. C. WOOD DAVIS.

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THE NEGRO AND AFRICAN COLONIZATION.

THE Republic of Liberia contains about 75,000 square miles of territory,—room for the entire Negro population of the United States and its natural increase for many generations. Although about 20,000 American Negroes have found homes in Liberia, as a solution of the Race question African colonization has thus far proved a failure; but, looked upon as a necessary initial experiment, the results of the movement are of much interest. Colonization did, in fact, succeed as long as the work was wisely and efficiently conducted. The idea that it is a chimerical scheme, foredoomed to disaster, has resulted from the abandonment of genuine Colonization by its professed friends; and even the Colonization societies have been following for several decades a policy of emigration or deportation merely, the requisites for the establishment of successful settlements having been withdrawn.

The American Negro newly arrived in Liberia has no knowledge of the country or of its products. He is unable to care wisely for himself in health or in sickness; nor does he know how to plant, cultivate, or make use of the agricultural crops of his new home. To expect that a hundred or more such immigrants will be able to maintain themselves, and open a prosperous settlement, in the midst of a tropical forest is certainly most unreasonable; and yet the failure to do this is the chief ground for discouragement in the work of colonization. Instead of prosperity, colonists have met with starvation, fever, and death. Without shelter, food, or medical attendance, the first year usually witnesses a literal decimation. One is reminded of the accounts of the early attempts at colonizing America. The few who can pay or beg their way back to the United States do so; while those who remain are frequently reduced to the most desperate straits. Three or four years of semi-starvation ensue; and then, for the scattering survivors, conditions gradually improve until the penniless immigrant becomes the prosperous planter.

This ultimate success is possible because the American Negro has in Liberia an opportunity better than that which is being eagerly sought by Europeans in the colonies of the various Powers. In fertility

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of soil and in other natural advantages, including climate, Liberia is admittedly superior to other parts of West Africa. The immigrant is provided with land, and protected from encroachment. Liberia contains to-day more civilization expressed in farms under cultivation, comfortable homes, family life, and enlightened public opinion than any other part of tropical Africa.

I am not comparing Monrovia with Freetown, Accra, or Lagos; for these trading ports have been built up by European Powers. But in the colonies behind them is to be found no such civilization as in Liberia. Life and property are more secure there than in some parts of the United States; and the Negro has unmistakably reacted favorably to the stimulus of individual opportunity. Citizens of Liberia, notwithstanding limited views and numerous local prejudices, are indubitably superior as men to most of their race in this country. This superiority is not superficial: it exists in the fact that the Liberian has met and conquered the difficulties of pioneer life in Africa, owns and manages his farm or business, has a voice in the government, and every opportunity of advancement.

Neither am I comparing Liberia with Europe or America, but am merely calling attention to the fact that the Liberians seem to have made a more notable effort in the direction of civilization and progress than any other body of Negroes. Six years of study fortify me in the opinion that, were I a Negro, I would make my home in Liberia; and recently increased opportunities of observing the conditions of the Negro in our Southern States add emphasis to this view.

The difficulties of Colonization are not, indeed, theoretical; but few will deny that it furnishes the only ideal and permanent solution of the Race question in this country. Under the most favorable circumstances, the work will be one requiring the most intelligent, careful, and honest management. In spite of its early success in the hands of efficient men like Ashmun, almost utter failure seems to have attended all late attempts. The explanation of this lies in the absence, during recent decades, of almost all effort which could be properly classified under the head of Colonization. Nearly all the expended energies have been directed toward sending out the emigrants,—the smallest and least important part of the problem. This has spread the impression that colonization is merely a scheme for shipping off the Negroes, to their detriment and peril, as the numerous reports published by returned emigrants have shown. Naturally, under these circumstances, only the most ignorant and idle could be secured,—those who could still be deceived by promises

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of a place where they could live without work. Nothing was farther from the plans and practices of the early advocates of Colonization.

All the progress of the world in the last half-century is to our advantage. The railroads, steamboats, iron bridges, canned meats, bicycles, and innumerable other improvements will touch the work at every point. Nor is the American Negro any longer a penniless freedman. He pays taxes on property to the value of $300,000,000. He can pay his way to Liberia: but he needs proper attention during at least the first year of his stay in that country; and this he cannot provide for himself. He cannot be deported by force or to his disadvantage; but, if the friends of the Negro and of Colonization would follow a reasonable course of action, Liberia might soon become, not merely the superior of the African colonies of the European Powers, but the civilized centre of West Africa, to which the material, intellectual, and social interests of the American Negro would inevitably draw him as rapidly as the work of colonization and improvement could be practically carried on. An exodus of the race is entirely out of the question. To give the American Negro an honorable and practicable alternative would, however, have an immediately beneficial effect, and would tend to relieve local pressure whenever it became acute.

The charges commonly brought against the Negroes of the West Indies have little application to Liberia, which is, in effect, an American colony in Africa. The West Indian Negroes never had the civilized experience, or contact with free institutions, by which, in spite of the fact of slavery, our American Negroes have been greatly advantaged. Instead of discarding his civilization, the colonist in Liberia clings even too tenaciously to the life of "The States." There is accordingly a strong preference for goods of American manufacture, now but partially supplied by way of Liverpool and Hamburg. In the days of sailing-ships the United States had nearly all the trade of West Africa; but this has been largely lost on account of the readier access to Europe furnished by the various lines of steamers. A sustained Colonization movement would mean the establishment of direct steam communication with Liberia; and every increase in the population would add to the volume of commerce, which would thus effectively coöperate with Colonization.

The success of the earlier work of Colonization was so great that the societies having the matter in charge were misled to the inference that it had reached the point of self-perpetuation, and that they needed only to supply colonists. This proposition would have appeared too unreasonable for consideration, had the conditions been better understood. Less

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than 20,000 settlers had been scattered along 300 miles of coast-line, nowhere in sufficient numbers to constitute an effective nucleus of civilization.

Gradual additions to established settlements might be made under careful supervision; but in opening each new colony the pioneer work must be repeated. The Colonization Society may accumulate valuable experience, and hence be able to operate at increasing advantage: but the forests will still be there; and to colonists it will be a new country. No reasonable precaution may be relaxed; for health and life itself, no less than material success, depend upon continued care and watchfulness during the first year at least. Under favorable conditions, and with a hopeful future in sight, the colonists will strive and thrive; for in Liberia, as elsewhere, these terms are synonymous. Without such conditions Colonization has never succeeded; and we have no reason to think it ever will. To create and maintain the requisite facilities will not be work of vast expense, but requires sympathetic comprehension of the difficulties, and thorough organization for attending to numberless details. The more intelligent of the colonists will soon be able to assist us; but efficient direction must always be at hand.

For new settlements we must have carefully selected emigrants, each with a small amount of cash capital. It must be realized that they are not experienced travellers; and their interests, comfort, and safety must be considered from the time they leave their homes in this country. On arrival in Liberia they should be taken at once to a model farm, and given something to do which will enable them to earn their food and shelter, so as not to draw upon their reserve funds. On this farm they will learn to cultivate and make use of the native food-crops, while becoming acclimated and accustomed to their new home. They will have time to select their land and begin first improvements, thus avoiding danger from exposure. Necessary supplies and building-materials must be on hand for sale to colonists at low prices. There must be a carpenter, a blacksmith, and representatives of other trades, with their tools and facilities. There must be a doctor, a church, and a school.

Detailed plans for conducting this work have been submitted to the several Colonization societies and have met with their approval. An excellent site for such a settlement, farm, and school has been selected at Mt. Coffee, about thirty miles from Monrovia. A clearing has been made, fruit-trees and about twelve thousand coffee-trees have been planted, and various seeds sown. It is thus possible to begin at once, and on a larger scale, a thorough experiment in Colonization in the original

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sense of the word, but with modern advantages for conducting the work. The necessities of a settlement, in the way of carpenter, blacksmith, and other shops, are to be met by the establishment of an industrial school on the model of Hampton Institute. In the interest of such an undertaking trust funds, yielding an annual income of about $5,000, are available,—an amount insufficient for creating and conducting such an institution, for which a minimum estimate of $8,000 has been made. For the work of Colonization in the stricter sense of the term, about $12,000 a year will be required; and it is believed that proper management would make possible indefinite expansion with but little increase in the yearly expense. This estimate contemplates a staff including agents, surveyors, physicians, and their assistants, in addition to the travelling expenses necessary in conducting a settlement which would soon be able to care for five hundred colonists yearly. With such a settlement and industrial school once in operation, experience, facilities, and trained assistants would be available; so that the work could be rapidly expanded and made largely, if not entirely, self-supporting, allowing the opening of other settlements with but slight proportional increase of expenditure.

The trust funds of the various Colonization Societies were contributed by patriots and humanitarians before the Civil War for a public purpose which has lost none of its importance by the lapse of time. Those who desire to do so have still the right to join these historical associations, and give them the practical assistance they so much need. The proposed new departure touches at many points the interests of patriotism, philanthropy, and Christian missions, and has the tangible evidence of history and existing fact to warrant anticipations of wider and more lasting influence than can be expected from many enterprises on which vast sums of money are annually expended. The time has come when the Negro, in spite of the advantage he has received from contact with a more advanced race, will make better progress on his own independent basis in his own new, though ancestral, home. A few thousands have already done this, in the face of needlessly multiplied difficulties and dangers which a carefully and honestly conducted Colonization movement might avoid.

In opposition to these suggestions, it is sometimes alleged that an exodus of the race is impossible, that the people will not go, that transportation could not be furnished, and much more to the same effect. The practical fact (ascertained by careful inquiry before the outbreak of the recent acute disturbances) is that a properly conducted undertaking, in which the more intelligent and cautious might have confidence, would have no difficulty in securing emigrants as fast as they could be cared for.

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The interests of Colonization do not conflict with those of the Negro in this country. The higher intelligence, sounder judgment, more practical training, and the larger amount of money he may have, the better will the colonist succeed.

Colonization is not deportation: its primary object is to increase the prosperity of an American colony, which our Government in 1847 refused to own, but which still looks upon America as its mother-country, whence it expects to draw civilization and population. Liberia will attract emigrants as fast as she can give them a satisfactory welcome and improved conditions of life; but it is neither wise nor honest to try to send them any faster. At the same time there is no limit to the number of settlements which might be simultaneously conducted, once success had been demonstrated, and the machinery perfected by experience. As long as there are people who will pay $50 (or a less sum, whatever it may be) for passage to Liberia, ships will be available. Those whose interest in such a plan can be enlisted only by the claim that it contains elements of completeness need not turn away, but should direct their attention to the Liberian end of the problem; remembering that America and Africa—the Negro and the white man—are to be alike advantaged by the attractions which the Dark Continent may be able to offer.

And Liberia is susceptible of improvement. Nature has provided a fertile and beautiful country, well-watered and well-drained. The whole interior of the Republic, including its finest regions, is still unoccupied. By a compact with the Liberian Government, at the time of its assumption of independence, the American Colonization Society reserved for purposes of settlement half the public land; so that this undertaking need not be complicated by any difficulties in obtaining grants. Moreover, the Government has been generous in providing for settlers and investors. The building of highways and railroads would not be attended with special difficulty; and there is no apparent reason why all the agencies of modern progress may not be installed and utilized.

African Colonization is, then, instead of a demonstrated failure, an experiment which, considering the means and methods by which it has been conducted, gives every promise of success, if, with modern facilities, there can be a return to the practical policy of its early agents in the field. In African Colonization can be utilized, to the best advantage of the whole race, all the civilized acquirements of the American Negro, as well as all the personal and financial assistance which may be forthcoming through patriotic, philanthropic, or missionary motives.

O. F. Cook.

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A THEORY OF DRAMATIC CRITICISM.

WILLIAM GILLETTE, in scolding the critic of a town where "Secret Service" had been attacked, says that newspapers have a habit of "roasting" good performances and of letting poor ones down easy. There are mercenary motives involved; but there is also one principle which may be used as a partial defence. As it is absurd to have the same standard for every kind of performance, the person who goes to a theatre devoted to cheap prices and cheap performances must not turn on the show the heavy guns he would use on Bernhardt or Salvini, nor apply to farce, vaudeville, tragedy, and melodrama the same foot-rule. Every kind of art breeds its own standards; and every degree of excellence calls for its own rules of criticism, which is one of the penalties of excellence. Thus it is reasonable to condemn in "Secret Service" certain qualities which in a poorer play would be merits.

We do not seek the highest taste in vaudeville: but even on the variety stage the human appeal is profound; for success there rests on compliance with needs more or less common to us all. "Tom, my Tom, you're wounded." "It's only a scratch. Tell father, dear Rebecca, that I died fighting for my country, and that my only regret is that I have not another life to give." Or suppose a couple of soubrettes, evidently looked upon as padding, and whose names are inconspicuous on the programme, are brought out at 12.30, when scarcely anybody is in the house. They can sing just a little, play on the banjo and mandolin just a little, and do nothing else: but one is a brunette, with black curls around her neck, and black bows on her velvet trousers; and she sings a harmless song about the gayety of city life. The charm of the mere feminine, which counts for much on the Champs Élysées, is less certain to succeed with Anglo-Saxon vaudeville humanity than a piece of pure and homely sentiment, such as "For baby's sake, please take me home," answered with

> "I love you—yes, I love you—just the same,
> Although you fled, and have disgraced my name;
> Although you ran off with another,
> You're still my baby's mother,
> And I love you—yes, I, love you—just the same."

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The man who, during the delivery of this song, falls over chairs, must be comprehended also; for he is a favorite of the audience. Our critic should see deep into the natural history of elements so humble as "chasers," or continuous-performance attractions bunched together to get rid of one audience to make room for another. It is a belief of mine that the profound critic will study our stage as carefully where it caters to the artisan as where it offers more pretentious performances. He will probably have a light and broad as well as an earnest way of taking the theatre; and he will see it counting in the lives of artisans as surely as in the lives of aristocrats. Great writers have now and then stated it; but the mass of men do not remember that nothing influences us more than our amusements. If Ibsen happens to be played, or Shakespeare, or a problem play, even if it be only by Henry Arthur Jones, people talk about an educative influence; but certainly the effect of farces and mixed concoctions for good or evil is not less. The result of morally bad conduct in plays is emphasized altogether too much; while the effect of bad art is less generally understood. How people quarrelled years ago over the moral influence of "A Doll's House"! Some brought up ethical questions in connection with "John Gabriel Borkman"; and few mention "Ghosts" without the moral aspect uppermost. Bad things may happen in good art without harm; and good things presented in bad art may work injury. When bad things are given with bad art the result is little worse than it would be if those pieces were built with equal vulgarity in defence of the moral law. All this is true; and it is true that artistic standards should be as carefully studied, even in the cheap theatres, as moral standards, and that each kind will change with the neighborhood in the same town. The great critic will see each in its place in the civilization of which it is a part. It needs a genius to bring order out of chaos as surely as to analyze the best; and it is likely that the man who grasps the highest will supplement it with the lowest.

To discuss modern art, we must understand modern life. Formerly the upper classes were mainly considered. To-day we are all mixed in; and our critic should see what ingredients graphically represent the mixture. In his mind the details will give support and not confusion to the whole; and what he says will be full of links between prosperity and the slums. The critic who is to mark out our path should know the audience, from gallery to parquet, from the fashionable theatre to vaudeville. He should see it with an eye intimate with the shapes of beauty which have always given immortality to truth; but this is what

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he has in common with the greatest critics of the past. What is special to him is his knowledge of a new situation. The prophet of a civilization in which every stratum of the public has a voice, his first duty is to comprehend the audiences of his country; and he can learn as much at the base of the social system as at its apex. Recognizing the influence of the theatre on numbers always increasing, and noting the confusion of standards and ideals in our changing civilization, one who has convictions to-day should be moved to enforce them. The public, with all its vagaries, has tendencies to be encouraged. All good plays, foreign or native, help to educate the public: but what is worth most is national; for only by being national can high art reach the people. The critic needs principles drawn from all times, but adapted to the conditions of his country; and, as the theatre is dormant in England and America, what is wanted in criticism is inspiration rather than completeness. We need somebody with vigor to stir us to the love of art.

We need a message; but we do not want a moralizer. Above all, we cannot use a prude. As long as coarseness has no stronger enemy than prudery, the victory will be certain. Said Mme. Modjeska:

> "I believe that the stage, in order to be a factor in civilization and in modern life, cannot be treated on the plan of a kindergarten, but must touch all vital interests: it cannot even keep entirely aloof from the delicate subjects, which, though not pleasant to talk over in polite society, have a great social bearing. But there is a measure in everything. All depends on the treatment; and there is a higher instinct of good taste and of nobler ideal which ought to be decisive."

Imagination and beautiful treatment make "Measure for Measure" one of the treasures of the world; pandering and vulgar treatment make "The Conquerors" an evil; and commonplace but decent treatment leaves "The Tree of Knowledge" without moral influence. One of the noblest things in Modjeska's "Measure for Measure" is the honest, delicate way in which she delivers her lines, even where they are most outspoken, and shows by her acting that treatment is everything. She leaves in passages that would frighten actors and managers who stand for indecency; and she says them, and acts the scenes in which they occur, with elevation. The innocent, who sits in cherubic satisfaction through some of our comedies, may have the occasional wisdom of babes and sucklings, but is stupid for every-day use. Misdirected innocence has much dramatic degeneration to answer for.

A criticism consisting of fleeting impressions without a body of settled thought cannot strike the heavier blows. It is frequently praised

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by untrained sceptics, who frisk upon the impossibility of knowledge. When Pope, they argue, says that Shakespeare's characters are individuals, and Johnson, that they are types; when such a man as Hume emits imbecility about the same poet; when everybody contradicts everybody else, a reasonable man will be content to give what these *dilettanti* call, with no cogent reason, his "impressions," in contradistinction to more connected opinions. An extreme defender of serious analysis, Lessing, believed that criticism had raised him from the ordinary level to something very near genius. Each kind of comment has its difficulties; but each also has its value,—the formal and accurate treatise, the erratic impression, or the pregnant sentence of a Goethe, reconciling diverging truths and making of two thoughts not a third thought, "but a star." Even the scholars unearth fruitful details; and while Voltaire is laboriously expounding history, against a work of art in which historical accuracy is irrelevant, he drops one of those sentences which brighten and clarify for ages after the accompanying dulness is forgotten. It is the useful that lives, the futile being interred with or before the bones of its author.

Nevertheless, it is an evil among our critics of to-day that the sound rule, that good is to be sought in everything and evil left to its own destruction, is often used to excuse dramatic columns that read like press agents' puffery. Severity and enthusiasm cannot be wisely separated. "Praise, praise, praise," exclaims the leader of the contemporary English stage, the man who reads no hostile comment, but sometimes commits laudatory notices to memory. Taking criticism as it is to-day, Mr. Pinero loses little by confining his attention to the "Mining Journal"; but his sensitiveness, even in our present conditions, probably deprives him of gain from an occasional hint. A critic of any weight must consider both sides of the shield. Some things are too gross for blame; but the more highly developed and skilfully finished an art becomes, the more needful it is to reveal any flaws in its foundation. Total lack of art, if not beyond the reach of criticism, is at least comparatively innocuous; while some skill based on ignorance or pretence becomes worse in proportion to its excellence. In estimating Sardou it would be treachery to describe his technical adroitness without contrasting it with his meagre substance. An illuminating judgment of Ibsen would reveal caverns and elevations of equal prominence. The common talk against didacticism is aimed at irrelevant moralizing, but occasionally strikes at necessary lessons. To wage war upon evil, although not the highest duty, is one of the duties of the

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dramatic critic, whom Mr. Shaw has called the policeman of the stage. *Primus sapientiæ gradus est falsa intelligere; secundus vera cognoscere.* Lessing, who quoted the maxim, used the first step freely, as the situation before him demanded destruction; but he was able to mount to the second. To-day an insight into the nature of the rubbish which clogs the drama is an indispensable foundation for a discriminating praise of the germs of beauty struggling in the heap.

Of the materials with which the dramatic critic deals the most important is the play; and of the play the heart is the theme. Treatment in mass and in detail needs attention; but only pedantry subordinates the story to any of its decorations. In these days of encroaching naturalism, we need to use our knowledge that a drama means an action; that a play is divided into acts; and that players are actors. A motionless photograph is not a drama; nor can any ornament atone for mediocrity in the fable. "Each art ought to produce not any chance pleasure, but the pleasure proper to it." Many cultivated critics have no idea of what constitutes a play. They extract literary or sociological qualities, as if its very soul were not theatrical. While Dr. Johnson's likeness of the creature, who tried to recommend Shakespeare with isolated passages, to him who brought a brick as a sample of his house is overdrawn, it stands on truth. Texture does have its meaning; and there are tempting possibilities for working out the relation between the details of style and the whole. But that opportunity is subordinate. The first requisite of criticism is a grasp of the larger truths about dramatic conception. Such standards could not be more needed than they are at a period in which the absence of law is a boast, and many speak as if knowledge of the past were obstructive to originality. The critic may be as broad as the author of the lines which accept all species of art, *hors le gens ennuyeux;* but he must know the species of art, and what falls outside of them. Knowledge means regularity. The innocent theatregoer believes that his pleasure will be dimmed by dissection. The critic begins with emotions, takes them to pieces, and puts them together again. His final impression is immediate and æsthetic, rather than analytic; but, because he has studied in the past, it is regulated and firm.

Criticism of acting, although it has always been fragmentary, is a preliminary to judgment of the play. Unless we can recognize what is furnished by the actor, it is impossible to know the playwright's contribution. The average observer praises fortuitously the player or the author; and even the shrewdest critic finds trouble in separating the

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two elements. Systematic standards for acting do not exist. *Hamlet* expounded a few wise but not exact rules. Lessing began with the intention of writing broadly about acting; but, after a few of the best suggestions ever made, he gloomily admitted the hopelessness of his attempt. Lewes started out to remedy this dearth of acting rules, but accomplished little. Of living critics, Sarcey throws the most light on the player's art; but his flashes have little organization. In the drama laws can be enforced; but on acting little of general application can be said. The best aid to criticism of acting is acquaintance with actors. Their opinions are scattered and contradictory, but technical, exact, and clear. In large theories they are not rich; but their working rules are the soundest basis for the construction of such theories, and the greatest aid to a just estimate of their performances.

A number of actors, berating a critic for a hostile notice, picked out one injustice after another, until finally one said, "Yes; but he was there." Being there is a thing by which they set great store, and means something real, almost profound. A first night is everything to them. They live for weeks ahead with their whole beings fixed on those three hours. What happens then and there is of overpowering moment. A critic who goes away and writes as if he had not entered into the event with any interest seems to them unfair and chilling. He may write an admirable article, full of keen analysis of the play itself; but if "he wasn't there" he might, from the actor's point of view, as well have written from the printed book. They want his comment to be alive with the occasion. A part of being there is to give attention to what, from the broader literary point of view, is of little importance. Why should a lover of Goethe, Molière, and Shakespeare, after a production of one of their plays, be as much interested in the conception that all the little actors had of all the minor characters as he is in the central ideas and the more general aspects? Why shouldn't he dismiss in a few lines even the actor who played *Hamlet*, and tell what he thinks about the part? If he does, no actor will say that he "was there."

Another thing which shows this interest in the first night and in the performance, rather than in the whole field of literature and the drama, is attention to other details—the way this scene went off; how A killed B's effect; what idea the costumes gave of the period, or the scenery of the place. It is what you see and hear that night, not what you know and remember, that the actors want: for their fate is to live for the audience; and the audience goes there with its eyes and ears, lives in the present, and has no theories. The critic who is worth most to the actor

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and the manager feels the pulse of this audience, whatever he may have in the background. He is no more independent of it than the actor is. It helps him, among other advantages, to limit the personal equation. How difficult it is not to enjoy some actors in everything! How impossible to endure others in anything! As we must know what belongs to the playwright and what to the player, so we must trace results to the actor's understanding or misconception, to his voice, his magnetism, his gestures, or his beauty. To the public the importance of the source is slight; but the actor himself feels injustice so bitterly that a humane critic struggles for impersonal standards—standards not arbitrary, for they must allow scope for various interpretations, yet clear and strict, revealing error and discord as well as truth and beauty.

First in permanent importance among critics of the drama have been those who extracted the essence of an already living art; describing, and thereby fixing, laws in successful practice, which are thus often preserved and obeyed long after the impulse from which they sprung is dead. The philosopher whose dramatic criticism was so overshadowing that later attempts have been largely comment on him, was not so much an originating mind as the spokesman of a drama flourishing on principles understood by the public, and transmitted from one generation to its successors. For that reason Aristotle's conclusions can no more be overthrown than the works of art whose essence they distilled. They can be supplemented or ignored; but as they are the succinct announcement of rules which proved so fertile, they will influence our minds as long as we care for the highest drama of antiquity. How might the story of our stage be altered if some equal mind had analyzed the Elizabethans; extracting from the plays and the audiences a full system, where to-day the ordinary scholar picks up fragments. With such a manual in the world, explaining with condensed vigor the practice of Shakespeare, Marlowe, Greene, and Peele, which perhaps was elaborated in Mermaid Tavern talk, posterity, for good or ill, would have lighted more fires from that brief burst of genius.

Among critics of another sort, who, instead of accepting and explaining the drama about them, attack it, Diderot and Lessing are first, —the Frenchman an original and disordered genius; the German, with less brilliancy and initiative, a sounder and more assimilative thinker. Each was a reformer; and each did much to cause a revolution from the standards of Boileau and Voltaire: but Diderot had no model for the *bourgeois* tragedy which he wished to substitute; while Lessing battered the French classicists with the English Elizabethans. Partly for this

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reason, Diderot's fertile mind was often erratic in its guesses; but Lessing, studying one successful drama while he attacked another, seldom strayed. On the whole, however, not firmness and permanence, but energy and vivacity, are likely to mark the revolutionary critic. More truth can always be put into the statement of what is good; but there is a sharpness of its own in the exposition of what is bad. Voltaire's explanations of his own principles are almost forgotten; while we remember the picturesque nonsense with which he attacked Shakespeare. Brilliant errors make men think; and there is more truth in the aberrations of great men than in the sanity of mediocrity. When Dr. Johnson gave his reasons for putting Shakespeare's comedy above his tragedy he talked foolishly, but suggestively. Right or wrong, the occasional criticisms of genius are of lasting interest. Whether they be as solid as Goethe or as partial as Hugo, they make us enjoy ideas; and they make thought a reality.

If I were to risk on a particular illustration this general ideal of the dramatic criticism most keenly invited by the theatre of to-day, Lessing would include most of it. Although we need in that field anybody of any guiding force, what is above all fit is a genius who receives the ideas about him in a large and catholic spirit, and sorts and judges them with wisdom and force. He should be, above all, human—a mirror which reflects, although it corrects, the average mind of man. Thus can the public most readily receive the seeds of truth, and thus can most be done by the critic to leaven the great whole which now controls and almost crushes the theatre. Lessing knew the technical side of his subject so well that the first two acts of "Minna von Barnhelm" are, in the opinion of the greatest German, unsurpassed among that country's dramas in constructive skill; but whatever Lessing knew was sunk in his knowledge of life. He was a moralist, a national psychologist. His scholarship interested him only for its human aspect,—for the light it threw on the actual public in front of him. He cared little for the narrow beauties of style. He plunged always to the deepest general interest, with that profound common sense which reached a nation.

The task of the critic is enlarged by universal half-education, but not rendered hopeless. Hereafter, if he is to have real influence, he must, like the dramatist, appeal at once to gallery and parquet. To do that, his moral wisdom must leaven all he knows, making him a brother to the simplest auditor. Can the present opportunity for such a spirit be overrated? The degeneracy of our stage is almost universally as-

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cribed to the controlling influence of the crowd. To reach them, to do a little to kindle their minds and ideas, is as high a mission as is offered to criticism to-day. Their critic must be humble. He must submit, sympathize, and understand, in order to lead. By despising superficial forms, and looking into the heart of the drama, Lessing saw that Shakespeare, for generations contrasted with the Greeks, was, in the larger view, more like Sophocles than any modern dramatist. With a simple and determined mind, opening itself to every appeal of human nature, Lessing almost alone undermined the narrow intellectual influence of French classicism in Germany, and prepared his countrymen for a home-made reality which reached its height before Schiller died, and breathes in the Fatherland to-day.

What would be the value of a man who could tell England and America so clearly what they want? Only he must not be an aristocrat, or a pedant, but a large human being, with a firm stomach, who knows and loves the people.

NORMAN HAPGOOD.

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